Bus drivers in competition: A directed location approach
The authors present a directed variant of Salop’s (1979) model to analyze bus transport dynamics. Players are drivers competing in both cooperative and non-cooperative games. Utility is proportional to the total fare collection. Competition for picking up passengers leads to well documented and dangerous driving practices that cause road accidents, traffic congestion and pollution. The authors obtain theoretical results that support the existence and implementation of such practices, and give a qualitative description of how they come to occur. In addition, the authors' results allow to compare the current competitive system with a more cooperative one.
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Availability:
- Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/07398859
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Supplemental Notes:
- © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Abstract reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
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Authors:
- Herrera, Fernanda
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0000-0002-4269-4982
- López, Sergio I
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0000-0002-6573-2099
- Publication Date: 2022-11
Language
- English
Media Info
- Media Type: Web
- Features: Appendices; Figures; References; Tables;
- Pagination: 101220
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Serial:
- Research in Transportation Economics
- Volume: 95
- Issue Number: 0
- Publisher: Elsevier
- ISSN: 0739-8859
- Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/07398859
Subject/Index Terms
- TRT Terms: Bus drivers; Competition; Fare collection; Game theory; Location
- Subject Areas: Highways; Operations and Traffic Management; Planning and Forecasting; Public Transportation;
Filing Info
- Accession Number: 01857638
- Record Type: Publication
- Files: TRIS
- Created Date: Sep 15 2022 9:20AM