Network congestion games are robust to variable demand
The authors consider a non-atomic network congestion game with incomplete information in which nature decides which commodities travel. The users of a commodity do not know which other commodities travel and only have distributional information about their presence. The authors' main result is that the price of anarchy bounds known for the deterministic demand game also apply to the Bayesian game with random demand, even if the travel probabilities of different commodities are arbitrarily correlated. Moreover, the extension result of price of anarchy bounds for complete information games to incomplete information games in which the set of players is randomly determined can be generalized to the class of smooth games.
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Availability:
- Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
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Supplemental Notes:
- © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Abstract reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
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Authors:
- Correa, José
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0000-0002-3012-7622
- Hoeksma, Ruben
- Schröder, Marc
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0000-0002-0048-2826
- Publication Date: 2019-1
Language
- English
Media Info
- Media Type: Web
- Features: Figures; References;
- Pagination: pp 69-78
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Serial:
- Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
- Volume: 119
- Issue Number: 0
- Publisher: Elsevier
- ISSN: 0191-2615
- Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615
Subject/Index Terms
- TRT Terms: Bayes' theorem; Commodity flow; Demand; Game theory; Mathematical models; Networks; Traffic congestion
- Subject Areas: Freight Transportation; Operations and Traffic Management; Planning and Forecasting;
Filing Info
- Accession Number: 01719541
- Record Type: Publication
- Files: TRIS
- Created Date: Oct 18 2019 4:11PM