Airline schedule padding and consumer choice behavior

Disclosure programs are quality assurance instruments when consumers are imperfectly informed about product quality. This study examines the On-Time Disclosure Rule for airline on-time performance which ranks airlines based on how well their flights arrive/depart on time. The program creates incentives for airlines to pad their flight schedules and artificially improve their reported on-time performance. Using a discrete choice demand model for air travel, the authors investigate how schedule padding affects consumer preferences. The authors find that schedule padding is associated with negative consumer welfare effects, reinforcing the notion of an unanticipated gaming behavior by firms that ends up harming consumer welfare.

• Record URL:
  • https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2019.05.001
• Record URL:
  • http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699718304952
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/oclc/31005945
• Supplemental Notes:
  • © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Abstract reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
• Authors:
  • Yimga, Jules
  • Gorjidooz, Javad
• Publication Date: 2019-7

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Web
• Features: References;
• Pagination: pp 71-79
• Serial:
  • Journal of Air Transport Management
  • Volume: 78
  • Issue Number: 0
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0969-6997
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09696997

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Airlines; Consumer behavior; Consumer preferences; On time performance; Scheduling
• Subject Areas: Aviation; Operations and Traffic Management; Planning and Forecasting;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01715686
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Aug 30 2019 1:02PM