A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

The authors find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

• Record URL:
  • https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011
• Record URL:
  • https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518300119
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01651765
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
• Authors:
  • Bracco, Emanuele
• Publication Date: 2018-3

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Web
• Features: Figures; References; Tables;
• Pagination: pp 117-120
• Serial:
  • Economics Letters
  • Volume: 164
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0165-1765
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Case studies; Fines (Penalties); Political factors; Taxes; Traffic law enforcement
• Uncontrolled Terms: Parking tickets
• Geographic Terms: Italy
• Subject Areas: Finance; Highways; Operations and Traffic Management; Policy;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01662579
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Mar 12 2018 3:03PM