How a fast lane may replace a congestion toll

This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travelers. Travelers are otherwise identical and other travelers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast lane is always Pareto improving under Nash equilibrium in arrival times at the bottleneck and inelastic demand. It can replicate the arrival schedule and queueing outcomes of a toll that optimally charges a constant toll during part of the demand peak. Within some bounds, the fast lane scheme is still welfare improving when demand is elastic.

• Record URL:
  • http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261511000300
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/01912615
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
• Authors:
  • Fosgerau, Mogens
• Publication Date: 2011-7

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: Figures; References;
• Pagination: pp 845-851
• Serial:
  • Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
  • Volume: 45
  • Issue Number: 6
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 0191-2615
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01912615

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Bottlenecks; Congestion pricing; Economic analysis; High occupancy toll lanes; Peak hour traffic; Scheduling; Toll collection; Traffic queuing; Travelers
• Uncontrolled Terms: Fast lanes; Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimum
• Subject Areas: Highways; Operations and Traffic Management; I73: Traffic Control;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01345132
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS, ATRI
• Created Date: Jul 20 2011 7:27AM