Non-Aviation Revenues and Their Implications for Airport Regulation

This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. The authors find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, the model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.

• Record URL:
  • http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554511000378
• Availability:
  • Find a library where document is available. Order URL: http://worldcat.org/issn/13665545
• Supplemental Notes:
  • Abstract reprinted with permission from Elsevier
• Authors:
  • Kratzsch, Uwe
  • Sieg, Gernot
• Publication Date: 2011-9

Language

• English

Media Info

• Media Type: Print
• Features: References;
• Pagination: pp 755-763
• Serial:
  • Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
  • Volume: 47
  • Issue Number: 5
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • ISSN: 1366-5545
  • Serial URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13665545

Subject/Index Terms

• TRT Terms: Airports; Landing fees; Market dominance; Mathematical models; Pricing
• Uncontrolled Terms: Complementarity
• Subject Areas: Administration and Management; Aviation; Finance;

Filing Info

• Accession Number: 01343353
• Record Type: Publication
• Files: TRIS
• Created Date: Jun 30 2011 7:11AM