Sealed v/s Open Bids for Certificates of Entitlement under the Vehicle Quota System in Singapore

In Singapore, the procurement of a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) is required before a new vehicle can be registered. The procurement is done during uniform price auctions of quotas of COEs. The auction format, which started out as sealed bids in May 1990, changed to open bids in July 2001. In this study, a regression model framework is used to investigate if the shift in auction format has resulted in lower COE premium volatility and a better reflection of demand and supply forces. The results indicate that the open bids format is delivering less volatility and a better reflection of supply and demand forces than the sealed bid format. The average change in COE premium is approximately 16% lower for open bid than sealed bid auctions. However, the open bid format does allow vehicle dealers to dominate bidding for COEs and also leads to market action taking place very late in the auction window. It is suggested that the efficiency of the open bids auction could be improved through the use of incentives for early bids.

Language

  • English

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Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01350040
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Aug 18 2011 8:49AM