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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/763321</link>
      <description><![CDATA[An extensive theoretical literature on the effects of liability rules in accident law exists, but there has been little testing of these theoretical models.  In this article, the author develops an empirically testable model of the incentives for injurers and victims to avoid accidents under both the older contributory negligence rule and the newer rule of comparative negligence.  The model takes into account the fact that in the automobile accident context, drivers do not know in advance with whom they will be involved in an accident, and whether they will be the injurer or the victim, or both.  The author then tests the model using a data set of rear-end automobile accidents that were litigated in court, including some that involved alcohol use.  In these cases, the care levels of the injurer and victim are measured in three categories for each driver: "very bad driving" means evidence was presented in court alleging that the driver was drinking or exceeded the speed limit by a large margin; "mediocre driving" means evidence was presented alleging a mild driving transgression; and "good driving" means no evidence of fault was presented.  The author concludes that incentives to take care to avoid accidents are stronger under the contributory negligence rule than under the newer rule of comparative negligence.  Also, the incentives set up by the comparative negligence rule for drivers to avoid accidents are weaker than is economically efficient.  Thus, the widespread adoption of the comparative negligence rule has probably reduced incentives for careful driving and should be expected to contribute to rising accident costs.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2005 09:11:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/763321</guid>
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      <title>PRICING IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT: THE MOTOR CARRIER EXPERIENCE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733711</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the effects of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 on the freight rates of Class I and II common general freight carriers.  In addition to estimating rate equations, cost functions are also estimated to derive reliable measures of marginal cost.  The specified rate equation also includes variables expected to affect the elasticity of demand. Simulations indicate that deregulation reduced rates in the 15-20% range by 1983 and in the 25-35% range by 1985, showing that the effect has grown over time.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733711</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>FARE DETERMINATION IN AIRLINE HUB-AND-SPOKE NETWORKS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733712</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper tests the hypothesis that any force that increases traffic volume on the spokes of an airline hub-and-spoke network will reduce fares in the markets it serves.  This effect arises because of economies of density on the spokes.  It is predicted that fares in the individual markets served by a large network should be low since a large network is expected to have low costs per passenger as a result of high traffic densities. Similarly, holding size fixed, a network that connects large cities should have higher traffic densities on its spokes and thus lower fares in individual markets than one serving small cities.  The empirical analysis supports these predictions. Network characteristics are found to be important determinants of fare in 4-segment city-pair markets requiring a connection at the hub. In the 4-segment markets served by the hubs at St. Louis and Minneapolis, the empirical model predicts that recent airline mergers should have reduced fares.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733712</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ENTRY AND COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE IN DEREGULATED AIRLINE MARKETS: AN EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE EXPRESS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733713</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of competitive structure in deregulated airline markets that avoids some of the weaknesses of previous studies.  This approach uses reactions of incumbent airlines' stock prices to announcements of entry by People Express to shed light on competitive structure. These stock reactions reveal significant route-specific profits or sunk costs and also provide evidence on the degree of competitive localization present in the industry.  The conclusions emerging from this analysis are corroborated by an examination of price, sales quantity and schedule changes that followed People Express entry.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733713</guid>
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      <title>DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN ACCELERATED VEHICLE-RETIREMENT PROGRAMS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733714</link>
      <description><![CDATA[One potential way to reduce hydrocarbon emission is through accelerated vehicle-retirement programs.  However, it is difficult to forecast participation rates in these programs because the number and characteristics of participants are likely to vary with the price offered to attract old cars.  This paper presents a theoretical model of the owner's car tenure and scrappage decision.  An econometric model of participation is then developed and estimated using data from a recent old-vehicle scrap program in Delaware.  Participation rates at different possible offer prices are then predicted.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733714</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ENTRY AND EXIT IN HUB-SPOKE NETWORKS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733715</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper explains why regional carriers may not survive in hub-and-spoke networks.  It is suggested that when a regional carrier and a hub operator compete in a spoke market, both will suffer losses in that market.  If the hub operator exists in the spoke market, its profits in connecting markets will fall.  As long as the number of such markets is large enough, it is a dominant strategy for the hub operator not to exit from the spoke market, which forces the regional carrier, assuming fixed costs are not sunk, to exit.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733715</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MARKET CONDUCT IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733716</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In this empirical study, conduct parameters (also known as conjectural variations) are calculated for a set of duopoly airline routes.  The mean conduct parameter for each airline is estimated, and inferences are drawn about whether Bertrand, Cournot or cartel models are supported by the data.  Some sensitivity analysis is also conducted with respect to the underlying parameters.  It is found that the Cournot model, rather than the Bertrand or cartel model, is most consistent with the data.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733716</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>INCENTIVE REGULATORY POLICIES: THE CASE OF PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN FRANCE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733717</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper uses a principal-agent framework to study the regulatory schemes used in the French urban transit industry, with the objective of assessing the empirical relevance of the new regulation theory.  The supply and demand model provides estimates for the firms' inefficiency, the effort of managers and the cost of public funds, taking the current regulatory schemes as a given.  This allows for the derivation of the best and second-best regulatory policies for each network, which are compared with the actual situation in terms of welfare gain or loss.  Results show that fixed-price policies lie between fully informed and uninformed second-best schemes.  Cost-plus contracts are dominated by any type of second-best contraction. These results suggest that better-informed regulators are needed for fixed-price contracts.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733717</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DID DEREGULATION AFFECT AIRCRAFT ENGINE MAINTENANCE? AN EMPIRICAL POLICY ANALYSIS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733718</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines aircraft engine histories to determine if deregulation affected the maintenance of aircraft engines.  The examination shows that there was a significant increase in the number of engine hours between major overhauls in the period following deregulation.  Parametric analysis of time between overhauls, which controls for other variables affecting the length of the shop visit cycle, suggest that deregulation is a significant factor in the change.  Logit analysis shows that engine failures, as measure by in-flight shutdowns, have not increased following deregulation.  These results indicate that airlines have optimized scheduled service times and possibly improved the quality of service while paying less attention to minor problems between scheduled service dates.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733718</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE VALUES OF WAITING TIME, TRAVEL TIME, AND A SEAT ON THE BUS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/733719</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The values that travelers attach to travel time can be inferred from their choices among services that differ in time and money costs.  This study applied maximum-likelihood estimation techniques to ridership survey data to provide estimates of waiting-time values.  Survey data was collected for routes on which a schedule of alternating high- and low-fare buses offered passengers an unusually wide range of prices for saving time. Results from this method provide population distribution estimates of waiting-time values rather than merely one or a few representative values.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/733719</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THEORIES OF CARTEL STABILITY AND THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/555057</link>
      <description><![CDATA[EXPERIENCES OF AN 1880S RAIL CARTEL.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/555057</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NEW EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN VEHICLE EMISSIONS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/557444</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/557444</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OPTIMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND VICTIM PRECAUTION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/557445</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/557445</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COAL RATES AND REVENUE ADEQUACY IN A QUASI-REGULATED RAIL INDUSTRY.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/531452</link>
      <description><![CDATA[AEQUITABLE RATES TO COAL SHIPPERS AND COMPETITIVE RATES OF RETURN IN THE RAIL INDUSTRY.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/531452</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CONTRACTUAL FORM, RETAIL PRICE, AND ASSET CHARACTERISTICS IN GASOLINE RETAILING.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/515360</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Sep 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/515360</guid>
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