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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <item>
      <title>Racial Discrimination in Transportation Network Companies</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1890813</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In a randomized audit study, the authors sent passengers in Boston, MA on nearly 1000 rides on controlled routes using the Uber and Lyft smartphone apps, recording key performance metrics. Passengers randomly selected between accounts that used African American-sounding and white-sounding names. The authors find that the probability an Uber driver accepts a ride, sees the name, and then cancels doubles when passengers used the account attached to the African American-sounding name. In contrast, Lyft drivers observe the name before accepting a ride and, as expected, the authors find no effect of name on cancellations. They do not, however, find that the increase in cancellations leads to measurably longer wait times for Uber.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2021 16:26:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1890813</guid>
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      <title>From gallons to miles: A disaggregate analysis of automobile travel and externality taxes</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1489336</link>
      <description><![CDATA[ Policymakers have prioritized increasing highway revenues as rising fuel economy and a fixed federal gasoline tax have led to highway funding deficits. The authors use a novel disaggregate sample of motorists to estimate the effect of the price of a vehicle mile traveled on VMT, and they provide the first national assessment of VMT and gasoline taxes that are designed to raise a given amount of revenue. The authors find that a VMT tax dominates a gasoline tax on efficiency, distributional, and political grounds when policymakers enact independent fuel economy policies and when the VMT tax is differentiated with externalities imposed per mile.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Dec 2017 10:19:48 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1489336</guid>
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      <title>Can privatization of U.S. highways improve motorists' welfare?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1148699</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2012 11:15:27 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1148699</guid>
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      <title>One for the Road: Public Transportation, Alcohol Consumption, and Intoxicated Driving</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1127249</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The authors exploit arguably exogenous train schedule changes in Washington DC in order to investigate the relationship between public transportation provision, the risky decision to consume alcohol, and the criminal decision to engage in alcohol–impaired driving. Using a triple differences strategy, the authors provide evidence that overall there was little effect on driving under the influence (DUI) arrests, alcohol related fatal traffic accidents and alcohol related arrests. However, the authors find that these overall effects mask considerable heterogeneity across geographic areas and spatial shifting. Specifically, the authors find that areas close to bars that are within walking distance to Metro stations experience increases in alcohol related arrests and decreases in DUI arrests.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2012 14:21:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1127249</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COMPARING THE EFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR REDUCING TRAFFIC CONGESTION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/744194</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper compares the efficiency of a single lane toll, a uniform congestion tax across freeway lanes, a gasoline tax, and a transit fare subsidy in reducing congestion. There are conditions for an efficient outcome relating to travel across modes, across peak and off-peak periods, and sorting out drivers with high and low time costs across faster and slower freeway lanes. Each policy involves some inefficiency. Indeed, the single lane toll, gasoline tax, and transit subsidy forego at least two-thirds of the efficiency gains under an ideal congestion tax that varies across lanes. However the uniform congestion tax achieves over 90% of these gains.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Nov 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/744194</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE VALUE OF AUTOMOBILE TRAVEL TIME: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGESTION POLICY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/693078</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The authors investigate the issue of using congestion tolls to minimize the social costs from automobile congestion.  Public policy has resisted the use of congestion pricing even though economists have predicted it usefulness for minimizing congestion.  The article focuses on the value that automobile commuters place on their travel time.  They explore this issue by using stated preference models to estimate the value that commuters are willing to pay to reduce travel time under a variety of travel conditions and assumptions about how the toll revenues will be spent.  They find that the value is low and surprisingly insensitive to travel conditions and how toll revenues are used.  It appears that even high-income commuters, having adjusted to congestion through their modal, residential, workplace, and departure time choices, simply do not value travel time savings enough to benefit substantially from tolls.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 15 Sep 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/693078</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE TAXI INDUSTRY.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/554996</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/554996</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ADVERSE SELECTION AND STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION : AN ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/255389</link>
      <description><![CDATA[WITH APPLICATION TO INSURANCE PREMIUMS FOR 21-24 YEAR OLD FEMALES]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 1988 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/255389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE MEASUREMENT OF URBAN TRAVEL DEMAND</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/222637</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 1985 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/222637</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PUBLIC CORPORATION: PRICING OBJECTIVES OF BART</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/172383</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The revealed preference approach is used to identify the objectives implicit in the fare structure of a rail mass transit system.  A model assuming bureaucratic aggrandizement provided a better predictor of actual fares than a majority rule or interest group political model. Bureaucratic objectives work to the advantage of commuters from distant suburbs, who are relatively wealthy and young.  The data are too weak to support firm conviction about these conclusions, but our methods contribute to quantitative political economy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Aug 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/172383</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MEASUREMENT OF URBAN TRAVEL DEMAND</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/39571</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper suggests approaches to advancing the behavioral theory of travel demand and discusses some currently unresolved empirical questions on the determinants of travel behavior.  Urban travel demand is the result of aggregation over the urban population, each member of which is making individual travel decisions based on his personal needs and environment.  Travel is not normally an end objective of the consumer but rather a concomitant of other activities such as work, shopping, and recreation. Thus, it is natural to analyze travel demand within the framework of the consumption activity--i.e., household production models.  Selected results are presented from a pilot study of rapid transit demand forecasting in the San Francisco Bay Area.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jul 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/39571</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AN INTEGRATED FARES POLICY FOR TRANSPORT IN LONDON</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/79395</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A common but disputed justification of public transport subsidy is that lower fares will encourage transfer from private vehicles, alleviating the congestion externality.  A quantitative method is developed to judge the validity of this "second best pricing" argument and it is applied to the best available evidence on peak and off-peak bus, rail and private car models in Greater London.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/79395</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE EFFECTS OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION CHANGES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/72254</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper uses a general equilibrium simulation model of residential land use to study the long-run effects of transportation changes in a closed city.  The effects considered here include the aggregate benefits from the income distributional impact of the changes, in addition to the induced alternations in the physical characteristics of the city and in the location and modal choice of different income groups.  The paper breaks new ground in its treatment of modal choice in a location theory model.  An interesting point brought out in the simulations is the welfare-interdependence of different groups resulting from their spatial interaction. /Author/]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/72254</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRANSPORT PRICING POLICIES AND EFFICIENT URBAN GROWTH</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/36018</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Urban growth is assumed to depend on the balance between advantages of urban employment and the costs of public and private transport.  With constant money prices or average cost pricing of buses (free cometition), growth is towards a small congested city, with a period of urban decay when congestion and all travel costs are increasing although the city is shrinking.  Marginal social cost pricing of both modes removes this dynamic inefficiency and leads to much larger cities with faster transport services.  Short-run effects and profitability are found to be poor indicators of the long-run implications of policies. /Author/]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/36018</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE WELFARE COSTS OF NONOPTIMAL AIRPORT UTILIZATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/37278</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A transportation model has been developed and applied to three airports in the Washington Baltimore area.  Marginal cost pricing is used while simultaneously allocating trips among near and far airports.  A set of simultaneous equations are solved to estimate equilibrium marginal-cost prices and tolls.  The value of travel time played a crucial role in the model.  In comparing the cost of passenger trips before and after the imposition of congestion tolls it was found that the welfare cost of nonoptimal utilization of the three airports is about $14 million dollars, 16 percent of the cost of trips without marginal cost pricing.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/37278</guid>
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