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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>Mass Casualty Incident Preparedness for Airport Emergencies: Report From an Aeroplane Crash Simulation at Guglielmo Marconi Airport, Bologna (Italy)</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2329602</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article reports on a full-scale simulation conducted at Bologna International Airport, Italy, in October 2022 to help emergency medical services learn to handle airport mass casualty incidents.  The authors note that, while rare, airport emergencies are potentially catastrophic so disaster preparedness is essential.  This two-and-a-half hour crash simulation exercise featured a full-size airplane crash that triggered the airport’s emergency plan, including the use of supplementary teams (ambulances, medical cars, and other emergency vehicles).  The simulation included 27 “patients” who were evaluated by EMS; the analysis of the performance found that triage assessment was correct for 81.48% of the simulated casualties.  Of the remaining patients, 11.11% were over-triaged and 7.41% were under-triaged.  All patients were transported to the hospital and the authors note that having a trauma center within 6 kilometers of the airport facilitated this transportation.  They conclude by reiterating some of the lessons learned from this simulation, including ways to improve communication within the different agencies and plans to move ambulances within the airport runway structure without needing guidance from airport personnel.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2024 10:11:36 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Understanding the Impacts of Maritime Disruption Transportation to Hospital-Based Acute Health Care Supplies and Personnel in Coastal and Geographically Isolated Communities</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1702572</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Natural disasters and other hazards can disrupt the maritime transportation system. These disruptions can impact public health, especially in coastal communities, when the transportation of health care supplies and heath care personnel are compromised. In this study, two communities in British Columbia, accessible only through maritime or air transportation, are examined: Greater Victoria, an urban center, and Powell River Regional District, a more remote community. Interviews were conducted with participants knowledgeable of the health care supply chain and emergency management plans in place. Interviews focused on probable impacts to acute health care delivery during a maritime disruption and what could be done to enhance resilience. Key points from interviews included lack of preparedness, lack of on-site storage, interdependence with other supply chains, and lack of information about the existing supply chain. Suggestions to foster system resilience included adding redundancy, improving resource allocation, improving response policies, and increasing collaboration.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2020 15:57:56 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1702572</guid>
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      <title>Emergency Mental Health: Lessons Learned From Flight 3407</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1093678</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Emergency mental health (EMH), a field that is often not well represented when considering emergency preparedness, is nonetheless a vital component to any disaster response. Emergency mental health issues must be considered not only for victims of disasters and their families, friends, and coworkers but also for both on-scene and off-scene responders and members of the community who may have witnessed the disaster. This article describes the EMH preparation for and response to the crash of Continental Airlines flight 3407 in western New York on February 12, 2009, killing all 49 crew and passengers on board and 1 person on the ground. It describes aspects of the response that went as planned and highlights areas for improvement. The lessons learned from this EMH preparation and response can be used to inform future planning for disaster response.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Feb 2011 10:22:24 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1093678</guid>
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      <title>Hospital Response to a Major Freeway Bridge Collapse</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/876827</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On August 1, 2007, the Interstate 35W bridge in Minneapolis collapsed into the Mississippi River, resulting in 127 injuries and 13 deaths. The authors describe how the hospital system responded. They provide comparative analysis of how the three hospitals at which critical or serious casualties were received responded. Methodology consisted of relevant patient data from each of the three hospitals, including those closest to the collapse on each side of the Mississippi River, including injury severity scores, issues identified in after-action reports, and first-hand experiences of hospital physicians. Injury consistency was found with major acceleration/deceleration force injuries. Appropriate prehospital triage was suggested since each hospital first received the most critical patients. Health care system capacity was not overwhelmed, and staff overresponse was generally reported by the involved hospitals. At all of the hospitals, there were problems related to communication and patient tracking. Due to incomplete information from the scene and structural collapse scope, situational awareness was limited. The authors conclude that there was general satisfaction among the hospitals with incident management plan activation and surge capacity. Issues identified in past events, including staff overreporting, patient tracking, and communications, were also problematic in this event. To cope with future incidents, which could be potentially larger, deficiencies will need to be addressed and successful action built on by hospitals.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2008 12:37:21 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/876827</guid>
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      <title>Emergency Medical Services Response to a Major Freeway Bridge Collapse</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/874843</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article describes the emergency medical services (EMS) response to the Interstate 35W Bridge collapse in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on August 1, 2007, when 13 people were killed and 127 people were injured.  The authors note that the complexities of this event included difficult patient access, multiple sectors of operation, and multiple mutual-aid agencies. Unified command between fire and EMS was established within the first 10 minutes of the event on the 10th Avenue bridge just downstream, which provided an overview of the entire accident scene.  Triage and treatment areas were rapidly set up on the north and south banks and an EMS supervisor was assigned to each bank.  Patient evacuation and transportation was rapid, with the collapse zone cleared of victims 95 minutes after the initial 9-1-1 call.  Six EMS agencies and 29 ambulances participated in the response, transporting 50 patients to 6 area hospitals.  Triage was effective despite lack of a structured system being applied.  The authors contend that a common regional EMS incident management plan was critical to the success of the response; successful response during the first 30 minutes hinged on paramedics following their regional Incident Response Plan rather than being directed by supervisors.  The authors identified challenges of this experience being poor situational awareness for the entire scene early in the event, communications issues, specific equipment and supply needs, behavioral health planning, and public information monitoring and management.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Nov 2008 08:06:58 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/874843</guid>
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