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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/243279</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Feb 1988 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/243279</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LUMBER TRANSPORT AND THE JONES ACT: A MULTICOMMODITY SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/243280</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Feb 1988 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/243280</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A MODEL OF TAXI SERVICE UNDER FARE STRUCTURE AND FLEET SIZE REGULATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/202533</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article presents a model of taxi service in a regulated market where radio dispatch and airport cabstand are the primary modes of operation.  Regulators have the potential to affect market performance through two means: changes in the number of licensed cabs and changes in drivers' mode choice incentives brought about by revision of the rate structure.  The model admits the possibility that certain regulatory reforms may benefit taxi drivers and customers simultaneously.  The questions of whether these possibilities actually exist in a particular market are addressed empirically.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 1984 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/202533</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WELFARE EFFECTS OF ICC RATE REGULATION REVISITED</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/174492</link>
      <description><![CDATA[An analysis is made of the welfare effects of ICC rate regulation for the U. S. surface freight transportation system.  An estimate of the deadweight loss under first-best and Ramsey pricing is provided.  Various alternatives to current rate regulation are discussed including partial and complete rate reform.  The major conclusion regarding piecemeal approaches is that solely deregulating motor freight will increase the amount of traffic misallocation. In the final analysis, the most desirable alternative appears to be deregulation of motor carrier rates accompanied by regulated rate reform in rail.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Mar 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/174492</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ON COMPETITION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION: THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/173908</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article considers Cournot-like competition among two public transit oligopolists (a rapid-rail system modeled on the Bay Area's BART, and a parallel bus system) in the presence of a competitively supplied third alternative. The oligopolists compete in both service quality and price, and do so myopically. With demand and cost data from the Bay Area numerically estimated equilibria are obtained and studied. The results indicate that: (1) with fares and product characteristics freely variable, neither mode need operate at a loss; (2) the rapid-rail mode can cover costs from the farebox even if the bus mode offers money-losing service; (3) the equilibria exhibit product differentiation, in sharp contrast to the presently observed situation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 27 Feb 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/173908</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RAILROAD RATES, PROFITABILITY, AND WELFARE UNDER DEREGULATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/168191</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Efforts to reform regulation of the railroad industry are supported by a substantial body of economic research which has described and measured the cost of the present regulatory regime.  In focusing on the defects of the status quo, economists have neglected to give sufficient attention to analyzing in detail the likely consequences of alternative regulatory policies, including deregulation. This paper draws on available estimates of the structure of rail demand and technology in an attempt to predict the impact of rate flexibility on rail prices, profitability, and economic welfare.  The effects of deregulation are simulated under a variety of alternative assumptions concerning the elasticity of demand for rail services, the degree of interrailroad competition, the presence or absence of truck deregulation, and the magnitude of rail cost reduction attainable with enhanced commercial freedom. The principal object of this exercise is to ascertain whether rate deregulation is likely to restore the rail industry to financial viability by generating a cash flow sufficient to maintain adequately and improve the physical plant and to provide high quality rail service.  A corollary aim is to determine whether present or potential railroad market power is sufficiently great to generate excessive increases in profits, prices, and associated static dead-weight losses.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/168191</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF ICC RATE REGULATION REVISITED</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/168192</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article analyzes the welfare effects of ICC rate regulation for the U.S. surface freight transportation system.  An estimate of the deadweight loss under first-best and Ramsey pricing is provided.  Various alternatives to current rate regulation are discussed including partial and complete rate reform.  The major conclusion regarding piecemeal approaches is that solely deregulating motor freight will increase the amount of traffic misallocation. In the final analysis, the most desirable alternative appears to be deregulation of motor carrier rates accompanied by regulated rate reform in rail.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/168192</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EARLY REGULATION OF THE RAILROADS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/167329</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In an earlier article R.  M.  Spann and E.  W.  Erickson (S-E) found that the welfare effects of early ICC regulations were negative.  Their calculations fail to include part of the relevant welfare surplus and incorrectly apply demand elasticity estimates.  Correct calculations, using S-E's basic data, result in positive welfare effects for 70 percent of alternative calculations across a range of assumptions.  For the S-E central case correct calculations indicate positive changes in both producer and consumer surpluses.  This ignores regulatory gains from price stability and fairness.  The question remaining is how the long-run costs of ICC creation could have been avoided while obtaining the short-run gains.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/167329</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PRODUCTIVITY IN U. S. RAILROADS, 1951-1974</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/167338</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This study develops estimates of U. S.  railroad productivity by using methods based on the neoclassical theory of production.  We find that railroad productivity grew at the average annual rate of 1.5 percent per year during the 1951-1974 period.  Using conventional measurement procedures for comparison, we find productivity growth of 3. 6 percent per year.  The lower estimate of 1.5 percent is the result of using procedures which better represent the railroad production process.  These include using (1) estimated cost elasticities, rather than revenue shares, as output weights, (2) actual cost shares, rather than national income shares, as input weights, and (3) input and output weights which change annually.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/167338</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A CROSS SECTIONAL STUDY OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT DEMAND AND RAIL-TRUCK COMPETITION IN CANADA</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/166156</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article derives a rail-truck freight demand model that is consistent with the economic theory of modal choice in the price-speed-reliability space.  The translog model is estimated from the cross sectional data of Canadian interregional freight flows for the eight selected commodities.  Major empirical findings are: (i) The quality attributes of service sigificantly influence modal choice only for the relatively high-value commodities. (ii) Both the price and quality elasticities of demand and the elasticity of rail-truck substitution vary substantially from route to route as well as from commodity to commodity. This implies that CES models including Cobb-Douglas form should not be used for freight demand studies.  (iii)  For the relatively high-value commodities, short-haul traffic is largely dominated by the truck mode, and significant rail- truck competition exists only in the medium and long-haul markets. (iv) For the relatively low-value commodities, effective rail-truck competition exists only in the short- haul markets.  Hence, the medium and long-haul markets are largely rail-dominated. (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/166156</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RENT AND REGULATION IN UNIT-TRAIN RATE DETERMINATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/160064</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Railroads and utilities bargain over rates for hauling coal.  In the past, the price of alternative fuels has served to limit those rates.  Recently, these limits have been raised by regulation-induced shortages in natural gas, cartel-induced price rises for oil, and environmental opposition to nuclear power.  This article estimates a model of the rate making process and examines how the process has responded to increased prices of alternative fuels.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/160064</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>IN DEFENSE OF THE LONG-HAUL/SHORT-HAUL DISCRIMINATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/154193</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build.  The argument, applied to long-haul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to non-optimal construction decisions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Aug 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/154193</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WARNING ON THE USE OF LINEAR LOGIT MODELS IN TRANSPORT MODE CHOICE STUDIES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/153266</link>
      <description><![CDATA[It is argued that linear logit models are inappropriate to use for transport demand studies because they impose many rigid a priori restrictions on the parameters of price responsiveness of demand, such as the elasticities of substitution and cross price elasticities, and the structure of technology (or preference) underlying the linear logit models has severe irregularity and inconsistency.  This has a serious implication for the credibility of the findings of several recent studies which attempted to measure the welfare loss of traffic misallocation attributable to the Interstate Commerce Commission's railroad minimum rate regulation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/153266</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A CROSS SECTIONAL STUDY OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT DEMAND AND RAIL-TRUCK COMPETITION IN CANADA</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/146650</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article derives a rail-track freight demand model that is consistent with the economic theory of modal choice in the price-speed-reliability space.  The translog model is estimated from the cross sectional data of Canadian interregional freight flows for the eight selected commodities.  Major empirical findings are: (i) The quality attributes of service significantly influence modal choice only for the relatively high-value commodities.  (ii) Both the price and quality elasticities of demand and the elasticity of rail-truck substitution vary substantially from route to route as well as from commodity to commodity. This implies that CES models including Cobb-Douglas form should not be used for freight demand studies.  (iii) For the relatively high-value commodities, short-haul traffic is largely dominated by the truck mode, and significant rail-truck competition exists only in the medium and long-haul markets.  (iv) For the relatively low-value commodities, effective rail-truck competition exists only in the short-haul markets.  Hence, the medium and long-haul markets are largely rail-dominated.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Dec 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/146650</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR PRIORITY QUEUING PROBLEMS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/87171</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Development of an incentive mechanism to induce users of a service facility to reveal the parameters the system administrator requires to determine the optimal sequence of service to queued users.  First considered is using the taxation procedure recently suggested for public goods, and then develop a more efficient mechanism based on marginal delay costs.  It is found that setting the priority price for service equal to the marginal delay cost imposed on others structures a situation such that a user maximizes his individual welfare by revealing his true delay cost.  This work is pertinent to airports as well as maintenance shops and supply depots.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/87171</guid>
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