<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>Transport Regulatory Agencies and Civil Law Tradition in Latin America: Some Issues from Recent Brazilian Experience</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810395</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper considers the regulatory arrangements and specifically looks at the establishment of new regulatory agencies such as the National Land Transport Agency and its roles for the transport sector of Brazil.  The paper addresses institutional issues regarding rail and road long haul public (and cargo) transport services and toll roads and takes into account the legal, economic and planning impacts brought by this kind of hybrid regulatory model.  The National agencies are, in fact, regulating and controlling not only the private relationship between operators and users, but also, the “administrative contracts”, mostly assuming tasks traditionally belonging to the direct Administration.  For instance, by means of the institutional reform, the transport agencies have gained legal competence to promote tendering procedures, to delegate services to selected operators, to sign contracts with operators.  The most important argument that favors this “competence shift” is that independent agencies would be able to protect operators and stakeholders from political changes that could provoke instability and mistrust for the private industry.  On the other side, this shift may be interpreted that elected government officials have lost a substantial power to develop the necessary transportation policies.  The paper examines these competence conflicts with respect to the impacts on the regulatory efficiency and to broaden consequences for the transportation policy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810395</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Institutional Arrangements in Berlin Public Transport: A Success Story in Innovation</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/809603</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper focuses on the thesis that institutional arrangements in Local Public Transport not only vary from city to city and country to country but that they are to a high degree a variable of historical circumstances – therefore being an equivalent to the history of the adaptation of a generalized technology (railway, omnibus) to local opportunities.  In order to illustrate this, the author goes back 15 years into the history of the Berliner Verkehrsbestriebe.  Re-unification was a big challenge for the Public Transport System in Berlin:  economically, politically and technically different Public Transport departments had to be integrated, and public payments were reduced drastically, the latter fact because the political “showcase” role of Public transport was no longer necessary.  The institutional reform contained two main elements:  the merger and restructuring of both departments into a “legal entity of its own right,” and the application of a “company contract” which brought public payments down to the lowest possible level by giving the owner much more transparency.  The paper describes how the results are encouraging: productivity and costs are now comparable with other European operators.  But BVG has now ambitious goals and strives for excellence, making further efforts necessary to run the best quality services.  In the end, the owner recently gave a guarantee for the existence of BVG, by awarding all transport services for a period until 2020 to BVG as an Inhouse operator in turn for severe wage reductions of BVG’s workforce.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/809603</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Efficiency and Regulation in the Taxi Industry – Implications of Waiting Time</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810388</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper considers the issues of expected uncertainty and waiting time for the consumer when booking a taxi.  A cost model for the customer is developed and different pricing regimes are considered.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810388</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Looking Forward: What Comes Next in Competition and Ownership of Land Passenger Transport?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/809595</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper provides a strategic overview of some major drivers in the ongoing reform of the land passenger transport sector, and speculates on what might be important themes in the future. The focus is as much on traditional themes of competition and ownership, including the growing of trusting partnerships and the sharing of risk and reward, as it is on the  role of technology enabling the much-promoted saver of public transport patronage, distance-based road use charges, of which congesting charging is a special case. Overlaying the transport challenges is the changing economic and demographic circumstances of many societies where the population is aging, the workforce is shrinking and the desire for increased accessibility and mobility remain insatiable.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/809595</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Incorporating Qualitative Elements in the Assessment of Railway Performance—Service Provision Outputs in Swiss Independent Railways</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810378</link>
      <description><![CDATA[An objective measure of what railway companies attempt to do is central to any assessment of the effectiveness of their management. When reviewing the literature on the efficiency of railways the authors use one of two measures of output; either some combination of passenger and ton kilometers, or some combination of passenger and freight train kilometers.  Train kilometers measure the capacity supplied, while passenger kilometers and ton kilometers indicate the level of output consumed by users.  However, the adequacy of either of these physical measures to judge railway management performance can be questions.  This paper uses the Swiss rail industry as an example of the impact such qualitative measures are like to have on the technical efficiency calculation.  This done through firstly estimating the efficiency of operators using both simple physical outputs and then including service provision elements. Two methods are employed, a parametric Cobb Douglas production for purely exploratory purposes and then a more formal two stage DEA estimation.  The results of both of these approached are then analyzed and conclusions are drawn.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810378</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tactical Level Partnerships: A Context of Trust for Successful Operation</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810283</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Melbourne, Australia, a city approaching 4 million people, has one of the world’s most extensive train and tram networks.  These networks were planned and operated by the Victorian State Government until the late 1990s, when their operation was franchised to the private sector.  The city also has an extensive private route bus network, whose origins date back to the 1830’s in horse-drawn form and early 20th century in motorized form.  That network is subject to government regulation, services receiving funding support under contracts with the State Government.  The paper begins with a short reference to the failure of the initial rail franchising process.  It explains how lessons from the failure have informed the re-franchising process, emphasizing the role that partnerships at the Tactical level are playing in the new arrangements.  An overview of changing paradigms of public sector management follows.  Particular attention is devoted to the development of a trusting partnership and lessons are drawn for formation of public transport (PT) partnerships at the Tactical level.  The paper then outlines how thinking is developing for the 2007 round of Melbourne bus contracts that focus on building solid partnership relationships that are founded on trust and buttressed by an appropriate contractual environment.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810283</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Creative Problem Solving in Developing Countries</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/809597</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper begins with two important points. First, it must be recognized that the term “developing country” covers such a wide spectrum of income levels, social and political systems that it is unrealistic to expect to make generalizations which fit all. Second, and from the first point, it must be recognized that policies which are successful, and may be considered creative, in some situations, may not be appropriate to all. This paper will assert and address a set of issues found to be sufficiently widespread to merit generic attention, taking a particular example to illustrate each category. In each case the paper describes the perceived problem and typical responses to address the symptoms of the problem. In each case, however, governments have typically failed to properly diagnose and treat the fundamental defects which were causing those symptoms. In each case the paper identifies a more fundamental diagnosis of the problem and describes some more creative ways in which these real problems have been addressed or might be addressed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/809597</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How Regional Authorities Improve Public Transport Governance</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810392</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper describes how public transport in Europe is in transition.  Many national and federal governments in Europe are revising their regulatory regimes for public transport.  Though formulated differently, the goals set share two common directions:  improved efficiency in the face of rising costs and improved effectiveness as mobility has come under pressure.  At the regional level, public transport authorities are currently trying to redesign their governance structures to adapt to the new environment and increasing pressure.  The paper presents findings from a long-term study on how regional public transport authorities deal with changes initiated by their national governments.  The study analyzed four different public transport authorities and the ways in which they have improved governance for public transport.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810392</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Estimation and Implementation of Optimal Performance-Based Subsidies in Norwegian Intercity Rail Transport</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810381</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper describes how Norwegian rail services that are regarded as unprofitable are subject to passenger service obligation (PSO) purchases.  This applies to local and intercity services, and some inter-regional lines. The Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications (MoT) purchases these services from the Norwegian State Railways (NSB), a state-owned limited company.  In 2005 PSO purchases total about 1.5 billion, which is a 50 percent increase from 2001.  This paper shows how the optimal levels of incentives, which combine the social surplus maximizing objectives of the MoT with NSB’s commercial goals and which stimulate X-efficiency, have been established.  They are recommended as part of a PSO contract.  Other necessary contractual arrangements are also presented in the paper.  MoT implemented a performance-based contract for intercity traffic in 2003, and this paper describes the key features of the contract, how the agreement between MoT and NSB was reached, and some of the weaknesses and challenges that lie in the design of the contract.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810381</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Performing Russian Railways: Introduction of Competition and New Regulatory Challenges</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810389</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper describes how railway reform in Russia aims at opening the room for competition.  The paper assesses the impact effect of new tariff structure on-track competition and investigates its’ state at the early stage of reform.  It shows how the lack of tariff flexibility makes the emerged industry structure unsustainable when vertically integrated state-owned infrastructure company serves the downstream market.  This provides strong incentives for the infrastructure owner to establish “daughter” (unregulated) train operating companies in order to prevent cream-skimming by competitive fringe.  Thus the industry gravitates toward  complete vertical separation with access to infrastructure charged likewise Ramsey formula and the final services becoming unregulated.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What Have the Countries of Eastern Europe to Learn from Experiences in Reforming Regulation and Control of Land Transport in Western Europe?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810723</link>
      <description><![CDATA[When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe abandoned communism the decision did not commit the governments to switch to a fully deregulated privatized system along the lines of the Washington Consensus. Nor did it imply that the governments would embrace approach favored by Western European states in the 50’s and 60’s which was characterized by massive intervention in the economy and direct control of all major public utilities. Different countries have taken different approaches to different sectors of the transport industry. This paper will consider two areas of importance: urban and local transport and railways pose the question of whether the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and control models are appropriate for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Consideration is given to the relevance and any lessons to be drawn from recent experience in the ECMT Member States and Observer Countries for effective regulatory structures and patterns of control further East. The paper concludes with an outline of requirements of effective regulatory structures for deployment in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810723</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Privatization and Decentralization in Network Utilities: What Lessons Can We Learn?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810288</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper describes how, particularly in the area of transportation, there in no doubt that both privatization and decentralization (P&D) offer great potential benefits in the area of network public services.  The uncritical and systematic endorsement of these moves, however, can be dangerous.  Badly conceived or hastily carried out P&D reforms can backfire and do more harm than good.  The experience gathered in these areas over the past two or three decades can help avoid some of these pitfalls.  This paper puts emphasis on two main ideas.  One is that in most cases, it is desirable to unbundle the service that one intends to privatize or to decentralize, in order to identify what part of the service can most easily be privatized or decentralized, and how.  The other idea is that it would be a mistake to think that privatization implies less government intervention, and that decentralization implies less central government intervention.  They imply different kinds of public intervention, in ways that are always delicate and not yet fully understood.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810288</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reestructuring, Regulation and Institutional Design: A Fitness Problem</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/809602</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper describes how the evolution of urban areas that has occurred over the past decades has changed the patterns of mobility from a radical concentric shape towards a typical interaction spread across peri-urban areas and very often ignoring the city center.  This new pattern of interactions led the mobility services to extend beyond the administrative borders of the city and, consequently, the need to extend the scope of intervention of the mobility authority to all communities with a direct stake in the mobility system becomes more obvious.  Despite the easy understanding of the rationale behind the functional enlargement of the scope of intervention for the urban mobility systems, the concrete definition of the specific territorial limits, or the respective financial autonomies of the organizing authorities are still a problem that is difficult to solve given the diversity of current legal, administrative and financial frameworks existing in Europe.  Some attempts for harmonization of the concept exist, such as the one undertaken by Eurostat, which defined the urban and central areas for statistic purposes, but these attempts have no relation to mobility needs.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/809602</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>“Organizing Trust”. On the Institutional Underpinning and Erosion of Trust in Different Organizational Forms in Public Transport</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810373</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Competitive tendering of local bus operations is spreading further in Europe, affecting changes in both interorganizational as well as personal relationships. When contractual relations between people and organizations are changing, the mutual expectations in terms of what is negotiable are changing. Since negotiations rest on trust, these changes imply a restructuring of what can be trusted. This paper will give an overview of these developments, develop an analytical framework distinguishing the new and the old contractual relations, and discuss observed and anticipated potentials and unforeseen side effects of these developments in relation to different ways of organizing trust.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810373</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Attribution Process of Delegation Contracts in the French Urban Public Transport Sector: Why is Competitive Tendering a Myth</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/810375</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper analyses the recent experience of French franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of transaction cost economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidences explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of expertise of local authorities and the existence of serious operators collusive practices.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2007 11:55:41 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/810375</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>