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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF TRACK ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN THE RAILWAY INDUSTRY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/687750</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper reports on results from a test of differing auctioning mechanisms used to allocate railway track, deciding which departure- arrival time slots are sold and their price. Four different rules are compared using pricing and stopping. The authors suggest they can be used as countries seek to restructure their railway operations in the face of large losses and poor performance. Rather than selling corridors as defined by their owners, the authors suggest allocating track capacity by auctioning paths over the network. The authors study iterative auctions as well as one-shot bidding, since that is less vulnerable to collusion. They find that first- and second-price auctions have roughly the same efficiencies and that efficiency is high, which gives the regulator a choice of mechanisms. They are highly robust in producing efficient allocations when there are fewer competing bidders. The first-price, one-shot bid works least well. The four mechanisms are all roughly equivalent in terms of revenue production, which gives regulators more flexibility.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Feb 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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