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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>Highway Shakedown: How Local Road Users Are Subsidizing State Highway Investments</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2560857</link>
      <description><![CDATA[For decades, federal lawmakers have made states the dominant recipients of transportation spending. The vast majority of Highway Trust Fund (HTF) dollars are sent back to the states using formula apportionment programs, which deliver funds to achieve specific purposes such as interstate maintenance and flexible capital needs. The exact formulas change over time and vary between each program, but their common feature is promoting equity among the states, with lawmakers going so far as to include that word in the title of two authorizing laws. However, the formula system has a critical weakness: None of the current programs consider what kinds of roads generated revenue. Instead, the formula programs essentially give each state the authority to determine which capital projects should receive funding, with no requirements to further distribute funding down to the owners of local roads that also generate federal revenue. In other words, federal formulas require equity between states, but not within them.  Fortunately, federal reporting makes it possible to compare where driving occurs and what entities own the roads where the driving takes place. This document presents data on how much driving occurs on locally owned roads (measured in vehicle miles traveled, or VMT), how that driving compares to states’ spending patterns, and the physical condition of state versus local roadways. Those findings inform a set of policy implications for federal and state officials, each of whom can return a fairer share of tax revenue to the local owners of our national roadway network.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jun 2025 11:56:07 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2560857</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Green Bay Transit Service Cost Allocation Study for the Green Bay Urbanized Area</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1396152</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Green Bay Transit System is owned and operated by the City of Green Bay. Service is provided to the City of De Pere, Village of Allouez, and Village of Ashwaubenon under cost sharing service agreements. The purpose of this study is to analyze the current transit cost sharing formulas between Green Bay and the urban municipalities in terms of both operating and capital expenditures. The study report includes a detailed analysis of federal, state, and local operating and capital funding formulas and expenditures for the Green Bay Transit System from the 1974 public takeover to 1986. A survey of medium-sized public transit systems in Wisconsin was conducted in terms of local cost sharing formulas and service contracts. Study recommendations include a new depreciation "surcharge" for capital expenditures and written service contracts between Green Bay and the other municipalities.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 06 Mar 2016 16:48:19 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1396152</guid>
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      <title>Investigation of Rainfall and Regional Factors for Maintenance Cost Allocation</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/982128</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The existing formulas used by the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) to allocate the statewide maintenance budget rely heavily on inventory and pavement evaluation data. These formulas include regional factors and rainfall indices that vary by district to account for differences in environmental and soil factors across the state. The existing regional factors were developed in the 1990s and were intended to reflect differences in environmental and soil factors between districts. It is not known how these factors were calculated since no documentation is available that explains their development. Since the regional factors were introduced, the Texas Transportation Institute has completed a project in which a database of climatic and soil factors were compiled to characterize the variation of climatic and soil conditions across Texas. TxDOT’s Maintenance Division realized the potential value of using this information and directed an implementation project to re-examine the existing regional and rainfall factors with the objective of revising the current factors to better reflect differences in climatic and soil conditions between districts. This report documents the evaluation of the existing rainfall and regional factors and the development of a revised set of factors for maintenance cost allocation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Nov 2010 11:49:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/982128</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>ANALISIS ECONOMICO DE LA REFORMA DEL SISTEMA CONCESIONAL DE OBRAS PUBLICAS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/952362</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Este trabajo analiza, desde un punto de vista economico, la nueva Ley Reguladora del Contrato de Concesion de Obras Publicas. Sobre la base del texto del actual Proyecto de Ley, se estudian las aportaciones de la nueva regulacion al sistema de provision de infraestructuras, asi como las mejoras introducidas en el sistema concesional desde el punto de vista de la eficiencia economica. Como conclusion, se senala que la nueva Ley permitira aumentar la seguridad juridica del sistema concesional espanol, introducira mayor flexibilidad en las formulas de financiacion de las infraestructuras, atrayendo en mayor medida al capital privado, producira una mejora en la asignacion de riesgos en las obras realizadas bajo el sistema concesional, tendra un efecto positivo sobre el usuario de las infraestructuras al otorgar un mayor peso a la fase de explotacion de las concesiones y tener en cuenta los parametros de calidad de las obras durante dicha fase de explotacion, y, finalmente, consolidara la competitividad internacional de los grupos concesionarios españoles, situados ya entre los primeros del mundo en este campo. (A). Resumen en ingles: This article analyzes the new Public Works Concession Law from an economic point of view. The article examines the effect of the new law, in accordance with the text of the current draft of the same, regarding the procurement of infrastructures as well as the improvements made to the concessionary system ¡n terms of economic efficiency. The article concludes by stating that the new law will increase the legal safely of the Spanish concessionary system and introduce greater flexibility regarding financing methods for infrastructures, attracting greater private capital and increased risk allocation in the works carried out under the concessionary system. These changes will reap benefits for the users of infrastructures as it places greater emphasis on the operation stage of the concessions and the quality of the works during this stage. The new system will further consolidate the international competitiveness of Spanish concessionaries, who are already among the leading international players in this area. (A).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 07 Oct 2010 14:31:10 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/952362</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Stimulus Express: The Economic Recovery Act Puts Amtrak and Transit-Rail Projects on the Fast Track</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/890154</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 promises to inject large amounts of money into transit and rail projects. Amtrak's stimulus allocation comes to $1.3 billion, the equivalent of one full year of funding. Transit is allocated $8.4 billion, with $6.9 billion for capital assistance formula grants, and $750 million each for fixed-guideway modernization formula grants and New Starts. Rather than create a new distribution system, the formula grants are based on pre-existing formulas that determine federal funding based on area population, as well as the number of route miles agencies operate over and number of passengers they serve. The legislation also does not waive any traditional requirements, such as environmental and labor reviews. Projects that agencies have filed for include new lines or facilities, track or facility upgrades, rolling stock purchases or improvements, and station rehabs. In the case of Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), which is in the middle of doubling its 45-mile light-rail system, it has chosen to spend nearly all its $61 million in stimulus money on the Orange Line project. The Regional Transportation District of Denver (RTD) is splitting its recovery act funds along the same lines it splits its sales tax revenue: 60 percent for the base system and 40 percent for the FasTracks expansion program. The Utah Transit Authority (UTA) has $48 million in stimulus funding and is using much of it for its rail expansion program known as the Frontlines 2015 program, which calls for 70 miles of new rail lines in seven years. Additionally, it plans to convert an old 250,000-square-foot furniture warehouse into a light-rail repair shop. Amtrak plans include major bridge upgrades along the East Coast corridor and improvements to facilities in Seattle, Los, Angeles, Chicago and Miami. A few stations, including the one in Wilmington, will receive major overhauls. The $8 billion for high-speed rail will only go to projects that have reached a certain level of commitment, though improvements can be made if they will eventually contribute to a high-speed rail operation. California is well-positioned, with the most advanced plans in place.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2009 08:32:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/890154</guid>
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      <title>SPECIAL REPORT: SAFETEA:LU - A Turn in a New Direction</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/771510</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article provides an analysis of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA:LU) in terms of its impact for federal public transportation and the end of the traditional relationship that began in 1991 under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). The author contends that the full impact of the changes will not be felt until SAFETEA:LU has expired in September 2009. A fundamental change is how the funding is handled. Under the previous legislation, split funding was used, which often resulted in a serious lag between allocation of funds and when they were available to be spent. As a result, some projects had to be delayed or not implemented at all. Beginning in FY 2006, the entire program (except for new starts, small starts, the research program and the Federal Transit Administration's administrative expenses) is being funded from the mass transit account which is derived from gasoline taxes. Part of the reason for the change is to steer more money to rural areas and other regions, such as the West and the Southwest, that do not have as much transit infrastructure. The new law also contains new programs that will fund transit in a wider range of communities and a changing mix of customers. Formulas are also reflective of a state's growth rate and density under the Growing States and High Density States program, which allocates about four percent of the overall formula program to states based on population trends, and urban areas whose density exceeds 370 persons per square mile. Funding for rural transit is significantly increased and will represent four percent of total formula funding. Some urban areas that shrank in size below the 200,000 threshold for some funding will be able to transition away from operating assistance while they secure support from other sources. The article describes other provisions, including discretionary capital programs, a breakdown of new starts programs in FY 2006 and 2007, and overall funding categories and amounts.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jan 2006 09:02:31 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/771510</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GUIDED TOUR THROUGH THE SECTION 15 MAZE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/270892</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Before the first year's Section 15 data were released hopes were high among academics, researchers, and policy makers. It was believed that this wealth of new, detailed, consistent, and accurate information would help answer conclusively questions about transit productivity and performance and about whether subsidies contribute to better performance or are simply wasted in inefficiencies and wage increases. In addition, the data base was eagerly awaited as a tool that would assist in making "peer" comparisons among transit systems, determine the reasons for performance variations, and possibly help in shaping future federal and state subsidy allocation formulas. After 4 consecutive years of data collection, however, Section 15 proved to be far from what was originally envisioned. Although the quality of data has been improving, for all practical purposes, a uniform reporting system that includes all transit properties receiving federal assistance does not yet exist because of numerous problems that may be classified broadly into four categories: (a) access and structural problems, (b) erroneous and missing data, (c) inconsistencies and definitional ambiguities, and (d) exclusion of important data elements. The problems that were encountered in these areas when using the first 4 years' Section 15 data are presented. Suggestions are also made about how users may solve some of these problems and how future editions of Section 15 data may be improved.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Aug 2004 21:59:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/270892</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RIDERSHIP BIASES AND ALLOCATION OF TRANSIT FORMULA GRANTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/698205</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The paper compares unlinked passenger trips for individual agencies from 1993 through 2001 between direct counts from the American Public Transportation Association and ridership reported to the National Transit Database (NTD).  NTD ridership can be as high as 50% more than direct counts, and these significant deviations exist consistently over time across many agencies.  While some of these deviations are attributable to undercounting in the direct counts, much of them appear to be positive biases in estimated ridership that result from unintentional biases in procedures, and perhaps intentional manipulation.  The paper then quantitatively examines how these upward biases affect the allocation of two formula grants to Florida transit agencies:  the Urbanized Area Formula Grant Program at the federal level and Florida's Public Transit Block Grant Program at the state level.  The paper also discusses a strategy for reducing these biases.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/698205</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>STATISTICAL ISSUES IN ALLOCATING FUNDS BY FORMULA</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/730444</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Mathematical formulas are used to allocate more than $250 billion of federal funds annually to state and local governments via more than 180 grant-in-aid programs.  These programs promote a wide spectrum of economic and social objectives, such as improving educational outcomes and highways, and increasing accessibility to medical care, and many are designed to compensate for differences in fiscal capacity that affect governments' abilities to address identified needs.  Large amounts of state revenues are also distributed through formula allocation programs to counties, cities, and other jurisdictions.  The essential feature of a formula allocation program is that fund distribution is determined by the application of a formula that uses statistical information to calculate or estimate the values of its inputs. The allocation process consists of a basic calculation using a mathematical formula or algorithm; it often includes adjustments that place constraints on levels or shares (percentages of the total allocation) or on changes in levels or shares.  Allocation formulas are designed with one or more objectives and are developed in the context of a complex political process.  In addition to providing a mechanism for addressing changes in need and other formula components without Congress having to revisit the issue annually, formula-based allocations can help build consensus for and the credibility of a program.  However, when funds are allocated according to a formula, there is no guarantee that objectives will be fully met.  This report identifies key issues concerning the design and use of formulas for fund allocation and advances recommendations for improving the process.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 06 Feb 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/730444</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SURPLUS REDIRECTION 'DEAD ON ARRIVAL'</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/503854</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A major controversy erupted when the Clinton administration FY2000 budget transportation plan was released.  The budget plan contains $1.3 billion in extra revenues, over and above the trust fund income projected in the annual revenue estimates that were incorporated in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21).  These additional monies are known as the revenue-aligned budget authority (RABA) funds.  Rather than follow, the provision of TEA-21, which requires any extra funds that exceed the statutory projects to be added to the state apportionment's and distributed according to existing program formulas, only $388 million (29%) of the total surplus would be distributed according to the existing program formulas.  An informal poll among congressional watchers produces a near unanimous verdict:  the administration's plan is 'dead on arrival.']]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jun 1999 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/503854</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FEDERAL ALLOCATION FORMULAS: EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR INTERMODAL SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT REAUTHORIZATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/578153</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In 1997, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) will be reauthorized, and the formula for distributing federal highway funds to states is likely to be a key issue in the reauthorization process.  One reason for the upcoming formula debate is that the current allocation process is not reflective of current federal objectives in transportation.  Alternative proposals for distributing federal highway funds have already been introduced to Congress.  ISTEA reauthorization will provide Congress with an opportunity to review the federal objectives in transportation and to reflect these objectives in the distribution of federal highway funds to states.  In preparation for this debate, alternative scenarios for distributing federal highway funds are explored, and the scenarios are evaluated on the basis of the present overarching federal objectives in transportation.  Included in this process is an evaluation of formula factors, such as lane miles and vehicle miles traveled, that make up individual scenarios.  The goal is to encourage debate on and add to the discussion of how federal highway funds are or should be distributed to states.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Nov 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/578153</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MAINTENANCE BUDGET ALLOCATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/575438</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Many Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) District Engineers had expressed a concern to the Senior Management team about not having enough maintenance funds.  On March 11, 1996, the Executive Director developed a "Continuous Improvement" team and charged them with extensively evaluating the Routine Maintenance Budget issue and developing a formula driven process, by category of work, to equitably distribute the routine maintenance budget.  The team was to develop an allocation method that would reduce reliance on the use of historical expenditures in the allocation process.  The team developed "needs-based" formulas for most individual maintenance activities.  Individual formulas were then developed for each of the functions.  By combining these individual formulas, an overall allocation formula was developed.  The budget allocation was made by using FY 95 data in the formulas.  The data needed for the formula is to be updated annually.  The budget formulas developed are based upon inventory and condition, making the process dynamic.  As inventories increase or pavement scores change, the funding levels change.  The districts with the problems get more money.  The budget formulas were developed at a "Tolerable" level of funding.  The system can be utilized to develop a "Tolerable" estimate of needs.  Slight modifications can produce an "Acceptable" or "Desirable" needs estimate.  The quantities of work identified in the budget process compare favorably with the existing quantities of work by district. This process results in an equitable level of funding for all districts.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/575438</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FINANCING FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAYS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/386028</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Because of a continuing demand for information concerning the financing of Federal-aid highways, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) prepared a report, "Financing Federal-Aid Highways," in January 1974 to describe the basic process involved.  The report was modified and updated in July 1976, May 1979, October 1983, and November 1987.  These updates were prepared following enactment of new highway or surface transportation acts to reflect changes made through those acts. Enactment of Public Law 102-240, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), has made it necessary to update the November 1987 version to incorporate the significant changes in the program structure and financing procedures brought about by that act.  As with previous versions, this report follows the financial process from inception in an authorization act to payment from the Highway Trust Fund and includes discussion of the congressional and Federal agency actions that occur throughout.  The report is organized as follows:  Introduction; Congressional Procedures (Hearings, Draft Bills, Committee Action, Floor Action/Conference Committee, Enactment, Title 23 of the United States Code); Federal-Aid Highway Act (Programs, Program Changes, Studies, Authorizations); Federal-Aid Financing Procedures (Authorizations, Reimbursable Program, Deductions, Apportionments and Allocations, Earmarking, Special Conditions, Availability, Transferability, Obligations, Federal Share, Reimbursement); Limitations on Obligations (Limitations, History of Highway Limitations, Summary); Appropriations (Appropriated Budget Authority Accounts, Contract Authority Accounts, Limitations on Obligations, Other Appropriations Actions, The Federal Budget and Appropriations Acts); The Highway Trust Fund (History, User Taxes, Collection, Pay-As-You-Go Fund, Balance of the Highway Trust Fund).  The following appendices are included:  (A) Glossary; (B) Authorizations; (C-1) Specific Dollar Takedowns; (C-2) Percentage Takedowns; (D-1) Apportionment Formulas; (D-2) Surface Transportation Program--Sub-State Distribution; (E) Funding Equity Categories; (F) Allocated Funds; and (G) Federal Share and Availability for Significant Programs.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/386028</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UNJUST EQUITY: AN EXAMINATION OF CALIFORNIA'S TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENT ACT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/359622</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Federal subsidies of public transit, particularly transit operations, are declining and the responsibility for supporting transit is falling increasingly on states and localities.  In California, the Transportation Development Act (TDA) has become the state's principal source of transit operating subsidies.  It is found that the strict per capita allocation formulas of the TDA strongly favor lightly patronized suburban transit service over more heavily patronized service in the central cities.  Transit riders in San Francisco, for example, receive a TDA subsidy of $0.13 per trip, whereas the TDA subsidy to transit patrons in suburban Livermore is over $5.00 per trip.  The built-in suburban bias of the TDA is the result of partisan compromises made to secure passage of the Act in 1971--compromises to assuage a Republican governor opposed to new taxes--and to include the interests of rural and suburban counties.  The result has been a proliferation in California of new, well-funded, and expanding suburban transit operators that attract few riders whereas older, heavily patronized central city transit operators are forced to cut service because of funding shortfalls.  This paper concludes by proposing a more efficient and equitable method for allocating TDA funds than the current formula, which, in the name of equity, provides all Californians with a "fair share" of public transit whether or not they use it.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 1991 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/359622</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FUND ALLOCATIO: POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/358826</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The article discusses some recommended alternate financial formulas for allocating federal highway funds.  These recommendations were made by the Policy Review Committee of AASHTO, with specifications that the allocation formula should consist of statewide urban and rural lane miles, statewide urban and rural vehicle miles of travel (VMT), and other appropriate factors. factors.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 31 Aug 1991 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/358826</guid>
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