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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>Delivering effective &amp; affordable train protection</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1300717</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The design and implementation of an effective yet affordable Train Protection System should be underpinned by a robust safety assurance methodology.  In the UK, once it became clear in the early nineties that the intended British Rail Automatic Train Protection (ATP) was not affordable, a project was undertaken that led to the development of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS).  TPWS, rather than attempting to provide full protection for all situations, was focused on the statistically highest causes of train accidents &ndash; Signals Passed At Danger (SPAD&rsquo;s) and over-speeding. At the same time, the safety culture in the UK rail industry was maturing and the development of the TPWS product was one of the early projects to travel through the industry&rsquo;s &lsquo;Yellow Book&rsquo; safety proving process.  Very similar processes are now contained in European standards which at first sight may appear to provide projects with a daunting set of onerous requirements which threaten to result in extended project timescales and increase project cost significantly.  The temptations with safety systems in the rail environment is to demand excessive safety integrity levels &ndash; often those of the primary signalling system for everything connected with train control.  Whilst this produces system safety requirements which are easily defendable it often leads to overly engineered and unaffordable systems which are not implemented and therefore fail to deliver the primary intention, a safer railway. The TPWS project demonstrated that it is possible to deliver an affordable product implementation developed using the now almost universally recognised safety proving processes applied in an appropriate way.  This enabled cost-effective yet robust development and proving and demonstrated that the application of such standards need not add an excessive overhead to the development life cycle.  After all, unless implemented, safety systems provide no safety benefit at all. Today TPWS is a testament to the success of the &lsquo;Yellow Book&rsquo; process and is a clear demonstration that &lsquo;safe enough&rsquo; can be appropriate in a rail environment.  The benefits of TPWS in preventing and mitigating serious accidents can clearly be seen from publicly available reports.  It is also clear that delay in implementation of the system would have probably resulted in further loss of life on the UK railway.  This paper describes the practical application of the processes used; the issues faced and tips for success.  It uses the UK experience to provide recommendations for others faced with the challenge of implementing world-class safety standards on an existing rail network.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2014 19:59:35 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>Maintaining a safe railway</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/873418</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The recent safety record of British railways is exceptional; this is in part due to the Train Protection Warning System (TPWS). TPWS has thus reduced the safety justification for the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) in Britain. ERTMS is an EU requirement which brings benefits of rail system integration across Europe, in addition to safety considerations; train drivers benefit greatly from the in-cab technology of ERTMS, helping them to interpret signals. Costs for the ERTMS on-train equipment will likely fall on the passenger. A pilot scheme is being installed on Cambrian lines. Automatic Half-Barrier (AHB) crossings are highlighted as points for potential disasters, due to collisions with normal traffic and suicide attempts. On-train and station announcements should be carefully evaluated for actual benefits to passengers; the author questions the usefulness of repetitive safety information announcements, beyond their legal context. The government is urged to look closely at building high-speed lines, and nuclear or renewable electricity generation to power them.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 12:11:41 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/873418</guid>
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      <title>FATAL TRAIN ACCIDENTS DUE TO SIGNALS PASSED AT DANGER</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/651625</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article is a sequel to the author's article estimating train accident risk on the British railway network (see IRRD E104434). It uses the same methods as in the previous article to examine in more detail the 23 accidents due to signals passed at danger (SPADs). This new analysis was undertaken because the observed frequency of SPAD accidents, involving trains making conflicting movements, has a different pattern over time from those involving trains proceeding in the same direction on the same track. This leads to estimates of current risk that are somewhat higher than those given in the previous article, and to substantially higher projections on current trends. This in turn leads to higher estimated safety benefits from the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS). Tables in the article show: (1) fatal accidents due to SPADs in the UK from 1967 to October 1999; (2) train-kms, fatal train accidents, and accident rates due to SPADs during this period; (3) estimates for mean accident and fatality rates for 1999; and (4) projections of mean numbers of accidents and fatalities in 2000-24. A chart shows trends in fatal train accident rates due to SPADs in 1967-99. The fall in fatalities due to TPWS is now projected to be about 40, due to 11 accidents prevented, with 3-5 fatalities per accident.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Apr 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/651625</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>ATP OPTIONS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/651691</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Recent rail accidents in London have sharply focused the need to provide more effective train protection systems. This article examines the technologies available to help improve the safety of rail travel in the UK. Automatic train protection (ATP) systems are additional to lineside signals, and aim to prevent movement of trains across tracks unless the signals are also set correctly. The earliest form of ATP appeared around 1900. In the 1950s, British Rail began to introduce automatic train control (ATC), which would automatically apply the brakes within 4s if the train passed a caution signal. The form of ATP used by London Underground Ltd (LUL) has a mechanical 'trainstop' operated for each signal. The London Docklands Light Railway introduced automatic train operation (ATO) in the mid-1980s, using principles like those introduced by LUL in the 1960s. Automated train operations, including ATP and ATC, later moved away from fixed to moving block signalling, then to cab signalling based on transmission and communications. Several recent systems integrate with both block signalling and transmission-based signalling; they include TVM, LZB, ZUB, IMU, and SACEM. One of the most successful ATP systems is Sweden's ABB Ebicab. ETCS ATP modules have been developed at the heart of the emerging European ATP standard.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Apr 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/651691</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RAILTRACK FOCUSES ON SAFETY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/650204</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Since the major railway accident at Ladbroke Grove, London in October 1999, Railtrack has been focusing fully on delivering safety improvements that will restore public confidence in the safety of the British rail network. The Government recently agreed that the new train protection warning system (TPWS) would be installed on the network to provide greater protection at key junctions before 2003.  Railtrack is already considering the feasibility of introducing TPWS one year early. TPWS will be a great improvement on the present Automatic Warning System (AWS), and can be implemented much more quickly and robustly than any alternative form of automatic train protection; it is easy to design and install. At the same time, Railtrack is developing leading technology for a modern signalling and control system for the West Coast Main Line (WCML), Phase 1 of whose modernisation is making good progress. It now expects to favour the use of ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) Level 2, which meets European standards, and provides automatic train protection and improved capacity and line speed. Railtrack is increasing its investment in rail, including improved safety; it has a treet27,000M spending programme for the next decade. Safety plays a key part in its new projects such as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Mar 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/650204</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ESTIMATING THE TRAIN ACCIDENT RISK AFTER LADBROKE GROVE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/638718</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article updates the author's previous estimates of train accident risk in the UK, allowing for the train collision and fire in West London on 5 October 1999. It was the most serious British railway accident for over a decade, and by far the most severe with modern rolling stock. It confirms, rather than alters, the previous estimate of the frequency of fatal accidents that could have been prevented by the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) of about one in two years before the implementation of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS). However, it raises the previous estimate of the average number of fatalities per accident to just under four per year. The risk estimates are based on all fatal accidents on running British Rail or Railtrack Lines from 1967 to late October 1999. Each accident is classified by whether ATP could have prevented it and, if so, whether it was due to a signal passed at danger (SPAD), excess speed, or buffer overrun. It is also classified by whether a passenger train was involved and, if so, by the type of passenger rolling stock. The risk estimation method combines estimates of mean accident rates and mean fatalities per accident. The article discusses the three stages of this method, then provides projected mean numbers of accidents and fatalities.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Feb 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/638718</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ESTIMATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS: THE CASE OF AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION IN BRITAIN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/458633</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper considers estimates of the number of fatalities per year on rail lines operated by British Railways that could be expected to be saved by the installation of automatic train protection, based on historical data.  The authors' preferred estimate is 3.66 fatalities per year, with an estimated confidence interval of 1.44-5.89.  It is possible to find orthodox probability distributions that fit the distribution of numbers of fatalities well.  FN-graphs are not a suitable means of fitting such distributions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 14 Apr 1996 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/458633</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION ON BRITAIN'S RAILWAYS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/451195</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The author discusses the safety of the British railway system, outlining improvements made since the Second World War. The feasibility of introducing Automatic Train Protection (ATP) is discussed. It is pointed out that many accidents would not have been prevented by ATP. Other areas are identified where the expenditure would be more useful. Costs for installing ATP over the whole or part of the network are presented. It is suggested that to make an impact on already low accident figures, a 300-400 million pounds initial outlay would be required, representing between 10 and 20 million pounds per life saved. This is compared with life valuations made by other authors of between 3/4 and 4 million pounds. Alternative techniques for preventing 'Signal Passed at Danger' accidents are described.  For the covering abstract of the conference see IRRD 872231.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/451195</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>VALUE FOR MONEY IN TRANSPORT SAFETY MEASURES. A RECORD OF A ONE DAY CONFERENCE HELD AT THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE, 1 WIMPOLE STREET, LONDON ON 26 JULY 1994</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/450437</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This conference was sponsored by Railtrack plc and British Railway's Board, who had completed studies of one important specific safety measure, Automatic Train Protection (ATP).  The aim of the conference was to present the results of that particular study in the context of a wider professional and public discussion covering general principles and approaches to the evaluation of safety measures and case studies of safety evaluation in transport and industry.  For abstracts of individual papers see IRRD 872232-872238.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/450437</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE RAIL CONTEXT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/426852</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper presents the British Rail Safety Programme, and case studies of two of its specific applications. British Rail started to implement Total Quality Management from 1988, and began to apply similar thinking to its safety management, using lessons learned from rail accident enquiries. It published its first annual Safety Plan in 1991, and adopted numerical, risk-based strategic safety objectives in 1992. After consultation, Railtrack Safety & Standards Directorate published a Railway Group Safety Plan in April 1994, whose objectives cover employee, individual passenger, societal and public risks. Levels for risks of fatalities and major and minor injuries were calculated for each group of people at risk. Rail safety priorities were set, and cost-benefit analysis was used to assess the priority for expenditure of safety compared with spending on other business areas. Railtrack's Railway Safety Case was submitted to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) at the end of 1993, and accepted in March 1994. The paper gives detailed case studies of the safety policy for:  (1) Automatic Train Protection (ATP), a new precaution against train driver errors; and (2) improvements to door locks on passenger trains. For the covering abstract see IRRD 871191.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Aug 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/426852</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NEWTON: THE HSE'S RECOMMENDATIONS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/379066</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article summarises the recommendations of the report by the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) into a fatal railway accident at Newton, on the outskirts of Glasgow.  On 21 July 1991, there was a head-on collision between two electric multiple units there, in which both drivers and two passengers were killed and 22 other passengers were injured.  The report raises serious questions about the safety of single-lead junctions; when combined with a starting signal passed at danger (SPAD), they can be disastrous.  Its authors consider that automatic train protection (ATP), which guards against SPAD, would have prevented the accident; it endorses previous accident enquiries making similar recommendations.  The new layout leading to the disaster was adopted to enable faster express journey times between Glasgow and London.  It was intensively used and had some strict operating procedures. The accident could not have occurred under the previous double-track layout. After the enquiry, British Rail (BR) agreed to reinstate that layout, even though it had previously considered single-lead junctions to be sufficiently safe.  The HSE commends BR's study of SPADs, but considers that this problem is likely to persist until more advanced technology, such as ATP, reduces the effect of human errors.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/379066</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AUTOMATIC TRAIN PROTECTION ON BRITISH RAIL: PRESENT PLANS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/365338</link>
      <description><![CDATA[British Rail has embarked on a 3-year effort to test and select an automatic train protection (ATP) system for national implementation beginning in 1992.  Two systems are being pilot tested--one on a high-speed mainline, the other on a suburban railway.  For economic reasons, both give intermittent ATP coverage with information transmitted at each signal, rather than continuously as with some metro or high-speed applications in continental Europe.  Whichever system is chosen, it must be possible to fit the equipment to a wide variety of vehicles and lineside signaling with minimum disturbance to existing equipment.  British Rail plans to finalize its national ATP specification late in 1991 and is committed to a 10-year installation program. Although the program will require considerable investment, British Rail expects the ATP system to yield a number of benefits besides reversing the rail system's rising signals-passed-at-danger (SPADs) statistics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 1992 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/365338</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WIDENING USERS' OPTIONS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/353640</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Developments in rail technology are reviewed.  With increasing emphasis on the environment and transfer of traffic to rail, many technological advances are emerging. France, Germany and Japan are developing faster high speed trains.  With the widespread availability of gto thyristors, asynchronous three phase traction drives are set to become standard (except in France).  With the adoption of open rather than closed loop control, tilting trains are becoming a commercial possibility.  Partial compensation has been found to be most comfortable for passengers and examples are given from Sweden, Switzerland, Italy and Germany. Challenges presented by the Channel Tunnel are outlined including modelling of air flows, temperature build-up and fire hazard.  Multimodal transport is dominating railfreight technology and details are given of French, Italian and Spanish systems.  The decision by British Rail to choose an Automatic Train Protection system and the experience of other countries in this field is described.  The advanced track design required by high speed running is outlined. The increased use of computers for ticket issuing, access control, accounting and management is noted.  The development of low floor vehicles is a key feature of the urban transit schemes fashionable in Britain.  Details are given of low floor programmes in France, Switzerland and Germany.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 1991 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/353640</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DORTMUND UNIVERSITY'S FULLY AUTOMATIC H-BAHN SYSTEM--PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS AND INITIAL EXPERIENCE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/216580</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On 2 May 1984, the H-Bahn (suspended railway) system connecting two university centres was opened in Dortmund. It is the first fully automatic and driverless local transport facility in the Federal Republic of Germany. Favourable expeprience has been gained during the first few months of public service.  The paper describes the automatic control and protection problems encountering in connection with the complete automation of the system and the solutions implemented.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 May 1985 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/216580</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE SPDRS 600 TRACK-DIAGRAM SIGNAL CABIN: EXPERIENCE AND PROVING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/194259</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The main objective in developing the new SpDrS 600 signal-cab was to obtain a route protection system of particularly high availability together with accelerated operating sequences. Decisive in this respect are not only the circuitry requirements but also such aspects as planning, design, construction, acceptance procedure and maintenance, and these are accordingly discussed in this report. The individual complexes were, on the basis of experience, considered in accordance with qualitative and -- where already possible -- quantitative criteria. It can be stated here that the development objectives were achieved and that the DB has been provided with an efficient signalling system of high availability. During the next twelve months further SpDrS signal cabins will be added to the system until 850 are in operation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 Jul 1983 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/194259</guid>
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