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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>Cost–Consequence Predictive Models for Hazardous Liquid and Gas Transmission-Gathering Corroded Pipelines</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2646048</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the United States, over 4.8 million km (3 million miles) of pipelines form a critical network in transportation of oil and gas. The failure of these pipelines can result in severe environmental, economic, and community consequences. Quantifying these consequences is of importance for effective risk management and maintenance planning of oil and gas pipelines. This study utilizes incident data reported by the US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) to develop predictive models for financial consequences of failures in hazardous liquid (HL) and gas transmission-gathering (GTG) pipelines due to corrosion. Multivariable regression with all-possible-subset model selection and symbolic multigene regression (SMGR) based on genetic programming (GP) are employed to develop prediction models, using pipeline and incident features as independent variables. The models developed based on regression and GP are compared in terms of model complexity and prediction performance. The sensitivity analysis shows the impact of key features on the consequence prediction, and the findings also highlight the discrepancies between financial consequences used in the literature and the failure costs predicted by data-driven models proposed in this model. Additionally, the impact of variation in the cost consequence of pipelines failures on total expected life-cycle cost and optimal maintenance planning of pipelines is shown through a case study.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 16:15:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2646048</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>National Transportation Atlas Database (NTAD): DOT Regions - Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Regions 2022-Present [dataset]</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2647015</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The DOT Regions - Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Regions 2022-Present dataset is from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and is part of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT)/Bureau of Transportation Statistic (BTS) National Transportation Atlas Database (NTAD). PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS) carries out a national safety program, including security matters, to protect against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce by all transportation modes. The PHMSA HazMat Regions layer contains polygon features representing each of the five regions— Central, Eastern, Southern, Southwest, and Western—that make up PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. Each region office is charged with overseeing the safe and secure movement of daily shipments of hazardous materials by all modes of transportation. Despite regional divisions the jurisdiction of PHMSA staff is nationwide and not limited to their regional area of responsibility.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jan 2026 09:13:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2647015</guid>
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      <title>Surface Transportation Reauthorization: Commercial Trucking Issues</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2642314</link>
      <description><![CDATA[With surface transportation funding authorizations set to expire on September 30, 2026, Congress may debate surface transportation bills that include policy provisions regarding the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). FMCSA and PHMSA—two agencies in the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)—are involved in the federal regulation of commercial trucking. This report discusses commercial trucking operational matters that Congress, in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58), requested experts to study, other issues Congress sought to address in prior surface transportation reauthorization legislation, and additional selected issues. These issues include truck lease-purchase agreements, classification of truck drivers as independent contractors or employees, detention time at warehouses, transparency of truck broker transactions, insurance costs, household goods moving fraud, cargo theft, and hazmat safety.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 09:52:49 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2642314</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>U.S. Department of Transportation: Background on Modal Administrations</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2596450</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Since the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT’s) creation, parts of certain modal agencies have been rearranged, as discussed below, but there has not been a realignment of the entire DOT. Reorganization efforts by past Administrations have sought to address a common observation about DOT—it is organized by transportation mode instead of by cross-modal functions, such as infrastructure planning and safety. In 1978, President Carter proposed to consolidate planning programs for highways and mass transit and sought to merge the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and other related agencies into a single surface transportation agency. Congress did not act on that proposal. In the Reagan Administration, the Grace Commission recommended that the land-based modal administrations be combined into one “Land Transportation Safety Administration” and the highway and transit administrations be combined into a “Surface Transportation Administration.” In 1991, the National Academy of Public Administration recommended, in a study requested by DOT, that the surface transportation modal administrations (concerning highways, transit, railroads, and traffic safety) be merged functionally into a Surface Transportation Administration for infrastructure funding and a separate Transportation Safety Administration. The 1991 study also contained a section presenting DOT staff arguments against merging of the non-aviation modes. In 1995, the Clinton Administration proposed a consolidation of the non-aviation modal agencies into an Intermodal Transportation Administration (H.R. 1440, 104th Congress; introduced by request of the executive branch). This proposal included a consolidation of funding and trust fund revenue streams for transportation. Efforts to reduce staff within many of DOT’s modal administrations has been initiated, though the Trump Administration has not announced any specific reorganization plans. This report  identifies the modal administrations within DOT, their origin and statutory missions, and any statutory language that addresses transfer or organization of that agency’s functions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 08:57:02 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2596450</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Hazardous Material Commodity Flow: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2582124</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report focuses on the evaluation, testing, and implementation of systems for monitoring the transportation of hazardous materials (Hazmat) on roadways. This report details the current state of technology for hazardous material flow as well as approaches to increase public safety on roadways through the application of cost-saving automated monitoring systems employing Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance Hazmat identification, flow modeling, and flow monitoring on U.S. roadways. States collect and utilize Hazmat material data in a breadth of ways, including through visual collection and manual record keeping. These periodic collection methods are labor intensive, inconsistent and ultimately fail to allow effective cross state collaboration and hazard mitigation. The use of AI tools will allow states and the Federal government to quickly, consistently, and accurately identify HazMat loads for situational awareness, and during events and emergencies, enable effective direction of first responders and re-routing of traffic. AI will also enable the ability to route loads on and off roadways, prevent accidents, minimize exposure risks, and ensure compliance with regulations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Aug 2025 17:23:57 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2582124</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Clarifying the Roles of Joint Pipeline Office Agencies Would Enhance Safety Oversight</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2563729</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez spilled over 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. Since its formation in response to this incident, the Joint Pipeline Office (JPO) has played a critical role in coordinating Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) oversight among federal and state agencies. Almost 35 years after the spill, some stakeholders have expressed concern that JPO no longer effectively coordinates safety oversight. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review changes in JPO’s activities, as well as JPO’s collaborative efforts. This report (1) describes how JPO’s safety oversight activities have changed since 1990, and (2) evaluates the extent to which JPO’s safety oversight activities align with leading collaboration practices. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from four federal and four Alaska state JPO agencies. GAO conducted site visits in Valdez and Anchorage, Alaska. GAO also analyzed Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data on pipeline accidents; reviewed relevant statutes and regulations; and interviewed 13 stakeholders from industry, safety, environmental, and other groups. In addition, GAO compared JPO’s safety oversight activities with leading collaboration practices. GAO recommends that the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM), in collaboration with other JPO agencies, (1) redefine and document the intended outcomes of JPO’s safety oversight activities, and (2) clarify and document agencies’ roles and responsibilities, including identifying any potential gaps in safety oversight. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments on the report.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jun 2025 17:03:01 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2563729</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Task 15: UN Series 6 (c) External Fire Tests on Optimized Thermite-Additive Formulations [video]</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387070</link>
      <description><![CDATA[UN 6(c) tests for additives. For many years, the properties of thermites have perplexed test laboratories and regulators; one thermite manufacturer published on their website that they had provided a sample of their thermite to a well-known and respected international test laboratory that performed the UN Test N.1 Flammable solids test on the sample, only to have the thermite pass the test criteria; it was the conclusion of the test laboratory that the thermite was non-regulated for transport. Manufacturers, testing laboratories and regulators have been struggling together with the proper characterization and classification of thermites. U.S. DOT PHMSA, taking a very rational but extremely unpopular position, began regulating thermites, since they were being manufactured with the view to producing a pyrotechnic effect, under the same classification system as explosives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Aug 2024 09:14:05 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387070</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Task 15: UN Series 6 (a) Single Package Tests on Optimized Thermite-Additive Formulations in 11.4 kg (25 pound) Fiberboard Boxes [video]</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387071</link>
      <description><![CDATA[UN 6(a) tests for additives. For many years, the properties of thermites have perplexed test laboratories and regulators; one thermite manufacturer published on their website that they had provided a sample of their thermite to a well-known and respected international test laboratory that performed the UN Test N.1 Flammable solids test on the sample, only to have the thermite pass the test criteria; it was the conclusion of the test laboratory that the thermite was non-regulated for transport. Manufacturers, testing laboratories and regulators have been struggling together with the proper characterization and classification of thermites. U.S. DOT PHMSA, taking a very rational but extremely unpopular position, began regulating thermites, since they were being manufactured with the view to producing a pyrotechnic effect, under the same classification system as explosives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jul 2024 13:53:13 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387071</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Task 6: Explosive Equivalency Testing of Exploding, Large-Scale Thermites [video]</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387077</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Explosive equivalency test: pentolite booster (checkout). Trial 1 - 325.6 grams, 2-in diameter x 4-in long cylinder. Initiated by a detonator. For many years, the properties of thermites have perplexed test laboratories and regulators; one thermite manufacturer published on their website that they had provided a sample of their thermite to a well-known and respected international test laboratory that performed the UN Test N.1 Flammable solids test on the sample, only to have the thermite pass the test criteria; it was the conclusion of the test laboratory that the thermite was non-regulated for transport. Manufacturers, testing laboratories and regulators have been struggling together with the proper characterization and classification of thermites. U.S. DOT PHMSA, taking a very rational but extremely unpopular position, began regulating thermites, since they were being manufactured with the view to producing a pyrotechnic effect, under the same classification system as explosives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jun 2024 09:26:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387077</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tasks 11-12: Hotwire Explosion Screening Testing of Modified Thermites: Large-Scale Mix ID's #1 and #4 [video]</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387075</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Hotwire explosion screening for additives. For many years, the properties of thermites have perplexed test laboratories and regulators; one thermite manufacturer published on their website that they had provided a sample of their thermite to a well-known and respected international test laboratory that performed the UN Test N.1 Flammable solids test on the sample, only to have the thermite pass the test criteria; it was the conclusion of the test laboratory that the thermite was non-regulated for transport. Manufacturers, testing laboratories and regulators have been struggling together with the proper characterization and classification of thermites. U.S. DOT PHMSA, taking a very rational but extremely unpopular position, began regulating thermites, since they were being manufactured with the view to producing a pyrotechnic effect, under the same classification system as explosives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jun 2024 09:26:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387075</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UN Series 6 (a) Single Package Test: Large-Scale Mix ID #7 and Large-Scale Mix ID #8 [video]</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387078</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Task 6: UN Series 6 (a) testing of exploding, large-scale thermites. For many years, the properties of thermites have perplexed test laboratories and regulators; one thermite manufacturer published on their website that they had provided a sample of their thermite to a well-known and respected international test laboratory that performed the UN Test N.1 Flammable solids test on the sample, only to have the thermite pass the test criteria; it was the conclusion of the test laboratory that the thermite was non-regulated for transport. Manufacturers, testing laboratories and regulators have been struggling together with the proper characterization and classification of thermites. U.S. DOT PHMSA, taking a very rational but extremely unpopular position, began regulating thermites, since they were being manufactured with the view to producing a pyrotechnic effect, under the same classification system as explosives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 09:38:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387078</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gas Pipelines: Oversight of Operators' Plans to Minimize Methane Emissions</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387097</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Methane, the primary component of natural gas, can be emitted from pipeline facilities through unintentional leaks or through intentional releases of gas, such as “blowdowns” associated with maintenance and emergency response activities. According to the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), emissions from gas pipeline systems are a risk to public safety and contribute to climate change. Operators are required to develop and follow manuals of written procedures for conducting pipeline operations, maintenance, and emergency response activities. The Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES Act of 2020) includes requirements for pipeline operators to update these operation and maintenance plans to address (1) eliminating hazardous leaks, (2) minimizing releases of natural gas, and (3) replacing or remediating pipelines known to leak. The act also includes requirements for PHMSA or the appropriate state authority to review these updated plans. The PIPES Act of 2020 also includes a provision for us to examine PHMSA’s and states’ reviews of pipeline operators’ updated plans. This report includes information on the process PHMSA and states used to review operators’ updated plans, operator and inspector challenges associated with updating and reviewing these plans, and selected stakeholders’ views on ways to further minimize natural gas emissions from pipelines without compromising safety.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2024 11:08:37 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2387097</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Gas Pipeline Safety: Better Data and Planning Would Improve Implementation of Regulatory Changes</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2362089</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 300,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines across the United States carry products from processing facilities to communities and other large-volume customers. Pipelines are a relatively safe mode for transporting natural gas, but incidents can still occur that result in death, injury, and property and environmental damage. The Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) sets the federal minimum safety standards for these pipelines. In 2003, PHMSA established integrity management—a risk-based approach to managing certain gas transmission pipelines—as an addition to its existing pipeline safety regulations. Under this approach, operators are required to assess pipelines in high consequence areas (HCA)—generally, areas where an incident could have the greatest impact to public safety or property—to identify threats and mitigate risks. In October 2019 and August 2022, PHMSA issued final rules that both strengthened its gas transmission pipeline safety regulations and expanded some integrity assessment requirements beyond HCAs, including to newly defined moderate consequence areas (MCA). The Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016 includes a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to examine gas transmission integrity management programs following PHMSA’s completion of a specific pipeline safety rulemaking. GAO is providing information on potential changes to the methods operators use to identify HCAs; how selected stakeholders, including pipeline operators and state inspectors, view the regulatory changes to gas transmission pipeline safety; and how PHMSA is overseeing the implementation of the 2019 and 2022 final rules stemming from the rulemaking.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2024 08:37:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2362089</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ensuring Timely Pipeline Shutdowns in Emergencies: When to Install Rupture Mitigation Valves</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2339970</link>
      <description><![CDATA[As of April 2022, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) requires installation of rupture mitigation valves (RMVs) on newly constructed and replaced segments of hazardous liquid and gas transmission pipelines. This study assesses regulatory standards and criteria for deciding when automatic and remote-control shutoff valves (i.e., RMVs) should be installed on existing pipelines in high consequence areas. The report includes coverage of pipeline incidents, an overview of the regulatory framework, and criteria for making decisions for when to install valves on existing pipelines. Lastly, observations about the current regulatory direction and guidance are provided to pipeline operators for deciding when to install RMVs on existing pipelines and for inspectors to verify that all obligations for deliberate and informed decisions are being met. Conclusions based on this assessment are presented along with recommendations for strengthening the guidance provided and verification methods used for ensuring sound decisions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Feb 2024 14:55:20 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2339970</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Environmental risk of oil pipeline accidents</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2143271</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Oil spills from pipeline accidents, caused by either material degradation or improper operation, can result in long-lasting environmental damage to soil and water. Assessing the potential environmental risks of these accidents is crucial for effective pipeline integrity management. This study calculates the accident rate using Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data and estimates the environmental risk of pipeline accidents by factoring in the cost of environmental remediation. Results show that crude oil pipelines in Michigan pose the highest environmental risk, while Texas has the highest environmental risk for product oil pipelines. On average, crude oil pipelines have a higher environmental risk (56,533.6 US dollars·times·mile⁻¹·year⁻¹) compared to product oil pipelines (13,395.6 US dollars·times·mile⁻¹·year⁻¹). Factors affecting pipeline integrity management are also analyzed, including diameter, diameter-thickness ratio, and design pressure. The study finds that larger pipelines with higher pressures receive more attention during maintenance and thus pose a lower environmental risk. Furthermore, underground pipelines pose a much higher environmental risk than pipelines in other environments, and pipelines are more vulnerable in the early and mid-stages of operation. The leading causes of environmental risk in pipeline accidents are material failure, corrosion, and equipment failure. By comparing environmental risks, managers can better understand the strengths and weaknesses of their integrity management efforts.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2023 10:12:37 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2143271</guid>
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