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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Resources Deployed and Challenges Faced in Securing the Northern Border</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2669550</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary responsibility for securing the 4,000-mile border between the United States and Canada. Border Patrol, within CBP, reported that apprehensions in this region more than tripled from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2024, the agency has not met agent staffing targets in recent years. For this study GAO analyzed Border Patrol data on apprehensions and drug seizures, as well as CBP data on staffing and resources since fiscal year 2019. GAO visited six CBP units along the northern border, selected based on apprehension levels, among other factors. GAO also interviewed CBP officials from the other units along the northern border. Border Patrol’s efforts to secure the nation’s borders include apprehending people suspected of illicit activity such as entry without inspection and drug smuggling. From fiscal year 2023 to 2024, the number of people Border Patrol apprehended along the northern border increased sharply. From fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024, the number of Border Patrol’s drug seizures in this region varied. CBP uses aircraft, vessels, and surveillance technology—such as cameras, radar sites, and sensors—as part of its efforts to secure the northern border. From fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024, CBP’s deployment of this technology increased. In this same 5-year period, the number of agents staffed along the northern border decreased, but CBP has initiatives underway to address this issue. In addition, there was a decrease in the staffing rate for Law Enforcement Information Systems Specialists who monitor surveillance technology. The staffing rate for this key position along the northern border has been below its target, and the agency does not have a plan with strategies to address the staffing gap. Developing such a plan could help Border Patrol better carry out its responsibility to secure the northern border.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2026 09:15:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2669550</guid>
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      <title>Supply Chain Security: Actions Needed to Improve CBP Management of the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2659356</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The U.S. economy depends on the quick and efficient flow of millions of tons of cargo each day throughout the global supply chain. However, U.S.-bound cargo can present security concerns, as there is a risk that terrorists could use cargo shipments to transport a weapon of mass destruction or other contraband into the U.S. The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) Pilot Program Act of 2023 includes a provision for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess the effectiveness of the program. This report examines (1) the number and types of security incidents that occurred in the cargo supply chain in fiscal years 2020 through 2024 and the extent to which CTPAT participants were involved; (2) enforcement actions against CTPAT participants involved in security incidents during this timeframe; and (3) the extent to which the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) meets certain statutory requirements in its management of the CTPAT program. GAO analyzed CBP data on CTPAT participant involvement in security incidents and CTPAT’s enforcement actions against these participants in fiscal years 2020 through 2024. GAO also reviewed CBP procedures for addressing program participant involvement in security incidents and interviewed CBP headquarters officials. GAO is making six recommendations to CBP, including to improve the completeness, consistency, and accuracy of the CTPAT program’s data and update guidance to include clear, documented decision criteria for determining enforcement actions against CTPAT participants involved in security incidents. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with the recommendations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 13:53:32 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2659356</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Border Security: Improvements Needed to Increase Vehicle Scanning at Land Ports of Entry</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2657954</link>
      <description><![CDATA[To help detect illegal drugs and other contraband, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses large- and small-scale non-intrusive (NII) systems, like X-ray machines, at land ports of entry (POEs) to enable officers to inspect travelers and their belongings, and vehicles and their contents, without the need for unloading or disassembly. Since 2019, CBP’s NII program has received over $2 billion for NII systems, which it has used to enhance inspections of commercial and passenger vehicles and trains, and to increase the number of vehicles that are scanned using large-scale NII systems as they enter the United States. In 2021, the Securing America’s Ports Act required CBP to develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems. This statement by Hilary M. Benedict, Director, Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) discusses (1) how CBP assesses large-scale NII system performance, (2) the status of large-scale NII system deployment, and (3) CBP’s plans for future large-scale NII system deployments. This statement is based primarily on a report GAO published in September 2025 in response to a request to review the implementation and effectiveness of CBP’s NII program. To inform that report, GAO analyzed NII program documentation, including inspection procedures, performance data, and deployment plans, and interviewed program officials. GAO also interviewed and observed CBP officers conducting inspections at land POEs where large-scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 14:13:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2657954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Land Port Inspections: CBP Should Improve Performance Data and Deployment Plans for Scanning Systems</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2598746</link>
      <description><![CDATA[U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems, such as X-ray machines, to inspect vehicles and travelers at land ports of entry (POE). As part of this process, CBP officers use large-scale NII systems to scan entire vehicles and their contents. These scans produce images that CBP officers review to help detect illegal drugs or other contraband. In 2020, to increase vehicle scans, CBP began deploying these systems to preprimary inspection areas—before a traveler is interviewed by a CBP officer. Previously, NII systems were generally used only when an officer determined that further inspection was required after the interview. Since 2019, CBP has received over $2 billion that they have used to deploy additional NII systems to land POEs, which are a key drug smuggling route. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review the implementation and effectiveness of CBP’s NII program. This report examines (1) how CBP uses NII systems during inspections at land POEs, (2) CBP’s assessment of large-scale NII performance, and (3) the status of large-scale NII system deployments. GAO analyzed NII program documentation, including inspection procedures, performance data, and deployment plans, and interviewed program officials. GAO also interviewed and observed CBP officers conducting inspections at land POEs within all four field offices where large-scale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas. These POEs included a variety of large-scale NII systems and types of crossings (passenger and commercial vehicles, and rail) along the southwest border. GAO also interviewed officials at a northern border field office that was in the process of deploying new large-scale NII systems. GAO is making two recommendations, including that CBP clearly define and report results for its key performance parameters, and determine how to include deployment of large-scale NII systems to all southwest land border ports of entry in updates to the deployment plans. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agreed with both recommendations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2025 09:51:01 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2598746</guid>
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      <title>Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Address Coordination and Operational Challenges Hindering Federal Efforts</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2562327</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Securing the nation's borders against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) mission. While there is increased attention to the southwest land border, criminal organizations continue to use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons into the United States. The U.S. government has identified transnational and domestic criminal organizations trafficking and smuggling illicit drugs as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national security. In March 2021, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) added national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from drug misuse to its High Risk List. This statement by Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, discusses (1) key DHS resources to counter illicit maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related to its efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement is based primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April 2025. In prior work GAO made dozens of recommendations in the reports covered by this statement, including 23 to DHS. DHS generally agreed with the recommendations. As of May 2025, four of the recommendations have been implemented. GAO continues to monitor the agency’s progress in implementing open recommendations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2025 17:08:24 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2562327</guid>
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      <title>Trusted Traveler Programs: DHS Has Enrollment Processes, but CBP Should Provide Additional Information on Reconsiderations</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2344973</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The summer of 2023 marked one of the busiest travel seasons on record. According to Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) data, each day approximately 2.5 million passengers boarded a commercial flight, and approximately 1.1 million travelers entered the U.S. through a port of entry during that period. Congress included a provision in statute for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the DHS trusted traveler programs and reconsideration process. This report addresses (1) DHS’s trusted traveler programs and enrollments and (2) the extent to which DHS provides reconsideration for travelers it denied or revoked from its programs. GAO analyzed relevant regulations, policies, and program data from fiscal year 2020 through the second quarter of 2023; interviewed headquarters and field officials involved in the trusted traveler programs; and conducted in-person and virtual site visits to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) enrollment centers that processed the highest volume of program applications in fiscal year 2022. While not generalizable, these visits provided program insights. GAO recommends that the CBP Commissioner include written instructions in trusted traveler program denial and revocation decision letters on how travelers can seek additional information regarding the specific reason(s) for the decision. DHS concurred and identified steps to implement the recommendation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 Mar 2024 08:59:57 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2344973</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>U.S. Ports of Entry: Update on CBP Public-Private Partnerships</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2326216</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Since 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has entered into public-private partnerships with stakeholders under its Reimbursable Services Program (RSP) to cover CBP’s cost to augment services it provides at U.S. land, sea, and air ports of entry (POEs) or other facilities. This augmentation is for services beyond those CBP provides as funded by its annual appropriations. Stakeholders include port authorities or local municipalities that own or manage the ports or private companies that conduct business through the ports. Services include those supporting customs, agricultural processing, border security, or immigration inspection matters. The Donations Acceptance Program (DAP) is a second public-private partnership program. The DAP enables partners to donate personal or real property or non-personal services to CBP. The program also enables partners to provide funding related to land acquisition, design, construction, repair or alteration, and operations and maintenance to CBP alone or in consultation with the General Services Administration (GSA), as applicable, at POEs. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is required by statute to biennially review the agreements, along with the funds and donations that CBP has received under the RSP and DAP. The scope of this work is to generally update GAO's most recent report, which was issued in January 2022. To examine the status of RSP and DAP agreements, including the purposes for which CBP has used funds and donations from these agreements, GAO collected and analyzed information on any new Reimbursable Services Agreements, Donation Acceptance Agreements, and memorandums of understanding (MOU) for the RSP and DAP for 2022 and 2023. GAO also collected and analyzed CBP data on the use of these agreements, such as overtime hours paid to CBP. In addition, GAO interviewed CBP headquarters officials about any significant changes to how RSP and DAP are administered. GAO conducted this performance audit from September 2023 to January 2024 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 12 Feb 2024 10:31:11 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2326216</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Traveler Inspections: DHS Mechanisms to Help Prevent Discrimination and Address Complaints</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2321534</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On a typical day, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers inspect hundreds of thousands of travelers entering the U.S. CBP is responsible for inspection activities that facilitate the flow of legitimate travel and trade while also keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and contraband, and inadmissible individuals out of the country. Some travelers and stakeholder organizations have raised concerns about CBP inspections, including concerns related to potential discrimination based on race, religion, or other characteristics. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review CBP’s efforts to help prevent and address potential discrimination during the traveler inspection process. This report describes (1) CBP’s mechanisms to help ensure that its inspection practices at air and land ports of entry do not result in discrimination against travelers based on race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and other characteristics; (2) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP mechanisms for receiving complaints related to potential discrimination during traveler inspection process; and (3) mechanisms for investigating complaints related to potential discrimination and the outcomes of those investigations. GAO interviewed DHS and CBP headquarters officials and CBP officials at seven field locations selected based on a mix of criteria including geographic location and volume of travelers. GAO also conducted in-person observations of traveler inspections at four of these locations to gain firsthand knowledge of the traveler inspection process.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Jan 2024 08:53:10 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2321534</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Maritime Security: Coast Guard and CBP Efforts to Address Prior GAO Recommendations on Asset and Workforce Needs</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2141252</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Securing the nation’s borders against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS’s) mission. With increased attention to overland routes in recent years, such as along the southwest border, criminal organizations use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons into the U.S. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) share responsibility for securing the nation’s maritime borders. This statement by Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, discusses: (1) Coast Guard and CBP resources for maritime security and related federal coordination, (2) challenges these agencies have faced managing assets, and (3) related workforce challenges. This statement is based on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO’s) prior work on a variety of asset and workforce issues. For that work, GAO analyzed Coast Guard and CBP documentation and data and interviewed officials. For this statement, GAO also obtained updates on actions DHS has taken to address GAO’s recommendations as of March 2023. For a full list of the reports, see Related GAO Products at the conclusion of this statement. GAO made 35 recommendations in the reports covered by this statement, including to improve comparability of asset operating costs and workforce assessment processes. As of March 2023, nine of 35 have been implemented, and 26 remain open. GAO continues to monitor the agencies’ progress in implementing them.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 13:45:15 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2141252</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Maritime Cargo Security: CBP's Efforts to Address the Impacts of COVID-19</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2022995</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The U.S. economy is dependent on the flow of millions of tons of cargo each day throughout the global supply chain—goods moving from manufacturers to end users. Cargo shipments can present security concerns, as individuals have used cargo containers to smuggle narcotics, stowaways, and other contraband. Within the federal government, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) , a component within the Department of Homeland Security, has responsibility for cargo security. CBP has developed programs that focus resources on identifying U.S.-bound cargo shipments that may be at high risk of transporting terrorist weapons or other contraband and examining those shipments. In addition, CBP provides benefits to Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) members that employ cargo security practices that meet CBP’s criteria. Such benefits include expedited processing of their U.S.- bound shipments. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act includes a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report on monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report addresses how COVID-19 impacted CBP’s maritime cargo security programs. GAO analyzed data on CBP’s maritime cargo security mission activities, reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and interviewed CSI and CTPAT officials. GAO also interviewed selected members of the international trade community. The Department of Homeland Security and CBP reviewed a draft of this report and CBP provided technical comments that have been incorporated into the report, as appropriate.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Sep 2022 16:31:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2022995</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Maritime Cargo Security: CBP Should Provide Additional Guidance for Certain Non-Containerized Cargo Inspections</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1997816</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In 2020, non-containerized cargo accounted for about 32 percent of the $1.5 trillion total maritime cargo value. Non-containerized cargo includes goods, such as liquids, grains, and those transported individually or packaged and shipped on pallets or crates. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) policies and procedures for securing non-containerized maritime cargo. This report examines the extent to which CBP’s inspections of inbound non-containerized maritime cargo vary across selected U.S. seaports. GAO reviewed CBP policies, procedures, and documentation for inspecting inbound non-containerized maritime cargo. GAO also interviewed CBP headquarters and field officials to gather information about how the agency implemented the policies and procedures. This included interviewing officials from a non-generalizable sample of 11 U.S. seaports and four field offices. GAO selected seaports that varied based on port size (i.e. total volume of cargo processed), types of non-containerized maritime cargo processed, and geographic location. GAO recommends that CBP (1) identify additional actions that CBP personnel at seaports should take to address the identified risks of crated cargo and (2) update national maritime cargo processing guidance to reflect the identified actions. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with these recommendations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2022 09:17:37 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1997816</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Facial Recognition Technology: CBP Traveler Identity Verification and Efforts to Address Privacy Issues</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1999404</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged with the dual mission of facilitating legitimate travel and securing U.S. borders. Federal laws require DHS to implement a biographic and biometric data system for foreign nationals entering and exiting the U.S. In response, CBP has been pursuing facial recognition technology (FRT) to verify a traveler’s identity in place of a visual inspection of travel identification documents. This statement by Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, addresses the extent to which CBP has (1) incorporated privacy principles in and (2) assessed the accuracy and performance of its use of FRT. This statement is based on a September 2020 report (GAO-20- 568), along with updates as of July 2022 on actions CBP has taken to address prior Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations. For that report, GAO conducted site visits to observe CBP's use of FRT; reviewed program documents; and interviewed DHS officials. In September 2020, GAO made five recommendations to CBP regarding privacy and system performance of its FRT. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has implemented two of them. CBP is taking steps to address the remaining three recommendations related to (1) current and complete privacy signage, (2) implementing an audit plan for its program partners, and (3) capturing required traveler photos.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2022 09:17:37 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1999404</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>U.S. Ports of Entry: Update on CBP Public-Private Partnership Programs</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1906174</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On a daily basis in fiscal year 2021, over 491,000 passengers and pedestrians and nearly 87,000 truck, rail, and sea containers carrying goods worth approximately $7.7 billion entered the United States through 328 U.S. land, sea, and air ports of entry (POEs), according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). To help meet demand for CBP inspection services, since 2013, CBP has entered into public-private partnerships under the Reimbursable Services Program (RSP) and the Donations Acceptance Program (DAP). Section 482 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by the Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2016, and amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, includes a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to biennially review the agreements along with the funds and donations that CBP has received under the RSP and DAP. Under the prior annual reporting requirement, GAO issued four annual reports on the programs—in January 2021, January 2020, March 2019, and March 2018. This fifth annual report updates key information from GAO's January 2021 report by examining the status of CBP public-private partnership program agreements, including the purposes for which CBP used the funds and donations from these agreements in 2020 and 2021. GAO collected and analyzed information on any new RSP agreements, DAP agreements, and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for both programs for 2020 and 2021, excluding those analyzed in GAO's January 2021 report. GAO also analyzed data on use of the programs and interviewed CBP officials to identify any significant changes to how the programs are administered.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Feb 2022 09:41:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1906174</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1870312</link>
      <description><![CDATA[According to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)—which is responsible for ensuring the security of air cargo transported to the United States—the threat from explosives in air cargo remains significant. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Modernization Act includes a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review DHS’s processes for securing U.S.-bound air cargo and efforts to use computed tomography (CT) technology for air cargo screening. This report addresses, among other things, how DHS secures inbound air cargo, and the extent to which TSA’s field assessment of a CT screening system included key practices for design and evaluation. GAO reviewed TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) air cargo security procedures and documents and analyzed a random sample of air cargo shipment data from calendar year 2019. GAO also interviewed TSA and CBP headquarters and National Targeting Center officials, and interviewed TSA field and air carrier officials regarding operations with two foreign airports, selected based on TSA risk data and the amount of air cargo transported from these airports to the United States. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2021. Information that DHS deemed sensitive was omitted. In the May 2021 report, GAO made four recommendations, including that TSA ensure it collects all necessary data for field assessments of explosives detection systems for air cargo screening prior to qualifying the systems for use by air carriers. DHS agreed with all four recommendations and said TSA and CBP are taking or planning actions to address them.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Aug 2021 11:41:10 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1870312</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Border Security: CBP’s Response to COVID-19</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1859038</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The COVID-19 pandemic impacted nearly all aspects of society, including travel to and from the U.S. In response to COVID-19, the administration issued executive actions with the intention of decreasing the number of individuals entering the U.S. and reducing transmission of the virus. Within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for implementing these actions at ports of entry through which travelers enter the U.S., and Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling the areas between ports of entry to prevent individuals and goods from entering the U.S. illegally. Based on their role in facilitating legitimate travel and trade and securing the borders, CBP employees risk exposure to COVID-19 in the line of duty. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review how CBP managed its field operations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report describes: (1) available data on the number of CBP employees diagnosed with COVID-19 and unable to work; (2) actions CBP has taken related to protecting its workforce and the public from COVID-19; and (3) the extent to which CBP adjusted operations in response to the pandemic and related travel restrictions. GAO reviewed key guidance documents and analyzed data on travel and trade at ports of entry, Border Patrol enforcement, and COVID-19 exposures among CBP employees. GAO also interviewed officials at CBP headquarters, employee unions’ representatives, and 12 CBP field locations, selected for factors such as geographic diversity, traffic levels, and COVID-19 infection rates. According to data from the CBP, through February 2021, over 7,000 OFO and U.S. Border Patrol employees reported being infected with COVID-19, and 24 died due to COVID-19-related illnesses. In addition, over 20,000 OFO and Border Patrol employees were unable to work at some point due to COVID-19-related illnesses or quarantining in the same time period. OFO officials noted that employee absences due to COVID-19 did not generally have a significant impact on port operations, given relatively low travel volumes. In contrast, officials interviewed by GAO at three of four Border Patrol locations said that COVID-19 absences had impacted operations to some extent.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jun 2021 09:25:45 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1859038</guid>
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