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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT - SIDE COLLISION OF NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY'S TRAIN NO. 86 WITH EXTRA 1589 WEST NEAR WELCH, WEST VIRGINIA, SEPTEMBER 6, 1980</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/169327</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 8:10 a.m., on September 6, 1980, while operating on the westbound main track, near Welch, West Virginia, eastbound Norfolk and Western Railway Company (N&W) freight train No. 86 collided with the sixth car of N&W Extra 1589 West. The accident occurred while Extra 1589 West was moving from the westbound main track on to an auxiliary center passing track at the east switch of the Farm Interlocking. The engineer, fireman, and front brakeman of train No. 86 were killed. Damage was estimated at $1,446,553. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the head-end crew of train No. 86 to reduce the speed of the train in compliance with the indication of the signal which displayed an approach aspect, which made it impossible for the fireman to stop the train short of the East Farm interlocking home signal when it was seen to be displaying a stop-and-stay aspect.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/169327</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>L&amp;N: A NEW LOOK FOR MANUAL BLOCK</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/168132</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A Manual Block Visual Display Board has been developed on Louisville and Nashville to augment the manual-block operation of a 204-mile single-track territory across northern Florida.  The board, generally resembling a CTC panel with its diagram of mainline and passing tracks, provides dispatchers with a picture of the location of all traffic on the line at a glance.  The self-contained board is interlocked to signal any conflicts as the dispatcher plugs in the block clearances for which he plans to transmit authorizations to train crews or vehicle operators.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/168132</guid>
    </item>
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      <title>FUNDAMENTAL SCHEME FOR TRAIN SCHEDULING (APPLICATION OF RANGE-CONSTRICTION SEARCH)</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/168973</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Traditionally, the compilation of long-term timetables for high density rail service with multiple classes of trains of the same track is a job for expert people, not computers. We propose an algorithm that uses the range-constriction search technique to schedule the timing and pass-through relations of trains smoothly and efficiently. The program determines how the timing of certain trains constrains the timing of others, finds possible time regions and pass-through relations, and then evaluates the efficiency of train movement for each pass-through relation. (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/168973</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AN ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR CALCULATING THE TRAFFIC CAPACITY OF RAILWAY LINES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/160368</link>
      <description><![CDATA[After rapid examination of the general structure and limits of existing models for calculating the traffic capacity of a railway line, the authors describe a new model which takes account, in calculating delays, of the minimum headway between trains and the availability of sidings and passing tracks.  They also give the results of the application of the model to a hypothetical section of line with trains belonging to 4 categories, with different speeds and priorities.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/160368</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT - REAR-END COLLISION OF TWO CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION FREIGHT TRAINS, MUNCY, PENNSYLVANIA, JANUARY 31, 1979</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/143893</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 5:08 a.m., e.s.t., on January 31, 1979, Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) freight train CNEN-O collided with the rear end of standing Conrail train SYEN-O at Muncy, Pennsylvania. The lead locomotive unit of train CNEN-O was destroyed and the second unit was heavily damaged; 14 cars were damaged. Four cars of train SYEN-O were destroyed, and one was heavily damaged. Two crewmembers were killed and three were injured. Total property damage was estimated to be $1,304,200. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the engineer and the front brakeman of train CNEN-O to operate the train at a speed required by signal indication that would have allowed the engineer to stop the train short of standing train SYEN-O. Contributing to the collision was the failure of the operating rules to require the conductor to be located in a position to properly supervise the safe operation of the train.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Feb 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/143893</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ROUTE SCHEDULER: A MACRO PLANNING MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF TRAIN INTERFERENCE AND SCHEDULING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/141357</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper presents a macro planning model which simulates train movements at a global level.  It measures the effects of peaks and other important elements on the overall train performance.  Train arrival times are not only affected by departure times but also by train speeds, meets and over-takes, station stops, crew changes and connections. Results from the model show numerically and graphically how changes in schedules, motive power and track or yard facilities affect transit time.  It is being used as a planning tool for the creation of time tables, the evaluation of motive power changes, the analysis of the economics of future plant expansion and for testing the effect of track improvement and repair programs on train services.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/141357</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TOGSIM: A SIMULATION MODEL FOR SINGLE TRACK RAILWAY OPERATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/87223</link>
      <description><![CDATA[TOGSIM is a tool used by NSB to compute the consequences of alternative ways of increasing the capacity of the railway lines.  TOGSIM provides a method for operating several train performance calculations at one time.  The model calculates the delays of each train running according to fixed schedules.  The main parameters are schedules, train sizes, power unit sizes, safety and signalling system, length and position of passing sidings, and the power feed system.  The model includes a statistical part for the analysis of train delays.  This program can also be used to analyse real operational results as well as simulation results.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/87223</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DISPATCHING BY COMPUTER: WHY? HOW MUCH? HOW SOON?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/85294</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Centralization and computerization of train dispatching have reached various levels on different railroads. Minicomputers and microprocessors are adding new dimensions to dispatching.  Examples of levels of sophistication on Chessie System, Louisville & Nashville, Frisco and British Columbia Railway are described, along with general observations on automation of train movements and planning.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 May 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/85294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>IMPROVEMENT WORK ON MAIN LINES IN RELATION TO TRAIN OPERATION AND LATE RUNNING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/79909</link>
      <description><![CDATA[One of the central problems of railway operating sciences is the presentation of the theoretical relationships between system size, train-running schedule and the standard of timekeeping.  In the present article a simulation model for main lines with high-speed traffic is put forward which can be used to determine qualitative line carrying capacity. Examples of its application show methods of formulating decision aids for track work and train operation.  The starting point in each case is an uncontrolled operating condition in which, with respect to traffic hinderance, a natural equilibrium comes about between the train-running schedule and the state of route work, by way of which the compatibility of speed groups, mix ratios and traffic density can be made apparent.  From this information it is possible to derive favourable intervals between passing places and also the number of passing tracks at each of them.  Then the effects were tested of control algorithms which--starting from the natural equilibrium of uncontrolled operation-allow the operating quality with fast trains to be improved step by step until a hinderance-free condition is attained.  With this simulation model, which exactly calculates a train's time-distance and speed-distance lines, the train-running schedule and the state of the route can be studied not only in normal working; also under extreme conditions the reaction of the latent forces in an operating system can be made evident.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 03 Dec 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/79909</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>INSTRUCTIONS FOR RAILROAD TRAFFIC AND SWITCHING ON SOVIET RAILROADS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/31890</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This handbook covers the following information: (1) Train traffic during automatic blocking; (2) Train traffic on sections equipped with centralized dispatching; (3) Train traffic during semiautomatic blocking; (4) Train traffic in an electrical rod system; (5) Train traffic with telephonic communication means; (6) Order of train traffic during interruption of the action of all established means of signaling and communication; (7) Traffic of maintenance trains (railway motor cars), fire trains, and auxiliary locomotives; (8) Train traffic (railway motor cars) during work production on railroad tracks and constructions; (9) Reception and departure of trains; (10) Operation of the train dispatcher; (11) Shunting operation at the stations; (12) Sequence of distributing warnings; (13) Reception and departure of trains under conditions where normal operations of the automatic blocking system are suspended at the stations; (14) Train traffic with demarcated time. The appendices are: (1) A list of solutions for train departures from the station with various means of signaling and communication during train traffic; (2) Norms and fundamental regulations for securing rolling stock by means of brake shoes and hand brakes; (3) Procedures for setting up in the train wagon loads which require exceptional caution and special rolling stock.  Finally; (4) The sequence of trolley traffic.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Nov 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/31890</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OVER-THE-ROAD TRANSIT TIME FOR A SINGLE TRACK RAILROAD</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/50642</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper models the mean running time for trains in both directions on a single-track railroad.  Trains operating at different speeds in each direction are permitted.  A priority system is included which prescribes the delay to each train when meets and over-takes do occur.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Aug 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/50642</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RURAL RAILWAY OPERATION IN WEST GERMANY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/66626</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A study of methods on the Westfalische Landeseisenbahn. Dispatching, manning, operation and integration with affiliated highway service are described.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Feb 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/66626</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: HEAD-ON COLLISION OF TWO PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY FREIGHT TRAINS NEAR PETTISVILLE, OHIO, ON FEBRUARY 4, 1976</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/62563</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 11:52 p.m. on February 4, 1976, Penn Central freight train NY-12 collided head-on with freight train BM-7 near Pettisville, Ohio.  The 3 locomotive units and 21 cars of train NY-12, and the 4 locomotive units and 4 cars of train BM-7 were derailed.  One locomotive unit of each train was destroyed and the derailed cars were heavily damaged.  The two crewmembers in the lead locomotive of both trains were killed and one crewmember on each train was injured as a result of the collision.  The estimated cost of damages was $1,165,000.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the engineer to stop train NY-12 west of signal 3272E as required by signal indication, and the inability of the crew in the caboose of train NY-12 to take preventive action.  As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board submitted three recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/62563</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ATC HELPS LAMCO MOVE INCREASING TRAFFIC</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/66004</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Controlling 12,000-ton trains of iron over the Lamco Railroad's undulating 267-km line in Liberia requires a high degree of precision to assure safety.  With the possibility of annual movements exceeding the current 13.5 million tons, it was decided that safety and operating flexibility could be improved by supplementing the existing CTC with automatic train control.  Integra's ISR72 system provides speed supervision and passing sidings and on open line where permanent or temporary speed restrictions are in force.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/66004</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: COLLISION OF ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY TRAINS 3210 AND 3211, MUSTANG, OKLAHOMA, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/28841</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On September 1, 1974, at 1:44 to 1:46 p.m., the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company's eastbound freight train 3210 and westbound train 3211 collided head-on 1.7 miles west of Mustang, Oklahoma. The trains were scheduled to meet in Mustang. However, train 3211 passed Mustang ahead of schedule. As a result of the collision, 4 locomotive units were destroyed, 23 cars derailed, and hazardous materials caught fire in the wreckage. As a result of the fire, eight families were evacuated from their homes. A brakeman on train 3211 was killed, and the three other crewmembers of that train were injured seriously. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the crew of train 3211 to take preventive action after the train passed Mustang ahead of schedule.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Oct 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/28841</guid>
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