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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Efficient Aviation Security: Strengthening the Analytic Foundation for Making Air Transportation Security Decisions</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1216763</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Since the goal of aviation security is not just to reduce risk in the aviation system, but to do so efficiently—particularly in an era when fiscal constraints require difficult choices between spending resources on security or other important national priorities, this document examines a set of issues that are either overlooked or not well captured in analyses of the costs and benefits of security measures. The authors present a series of distinct analyses focused on tools and approaches they believed were missing and therefore hurting efforts to develop efficient security strategies, implement tactics, and get the best outcomes for the resources spent to ensure aviation security. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to this document. Chapter Two discusses terrorist risk to the aviation system, considering both historical and prospective future threats. Chapter Three examines uncertainty in the costs of security measures and approximate ways to address that uncertainty in policy analysis. Chapter Four focuses on layered security strategies and the assessment of performance of different security measures used in concert. Chapter Five examines the issue of deterrence, an important effect of security that is often neglected in cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis. Chapter Six looks at how intended and unintended consequences of security measures trade off and affect outcomes, focusing on the specific issue of a trusted traveler program to focus security screening activities. Chapter Seven looks at assessment as a system, exploring both the modeling challenges related to benefits estimation and integrative approaches for making security policy choices. Finally, Chapter Eight provides a set of conclusions derived from the preceding chapters.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 2012 10:21:39 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1216763</guid>
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      <title>Assessing the Security Benefits of a Trusted Traveler Program in the Presence of Attempted Attacker Exploitation and Compromise</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1106481</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper addresses the benefits of a trusted traveler program, which is described as a program that identifies those travelers at reduced risk of carrying out terrorist attacks.  Those travelers that are identified as trusted travelers are allowed to proceed with less security screening than travelers who are not so identified.  Benefits of this type of program include the ability to shift security resources from this population of travelers, to those - with a higher or an unknown security risk - who might be more likely to be terrorists.  It is thought that shifting resources to a population of unknown or a higher risk would better the chances of identifying people who would bring weapons through security checkpoints, and inflict harm on aircraft and aircraft passengers.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Jul 2011 07:25:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1106481</guid>
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      <title>Security After Insecurity: Toward a Rational Response to 9/11</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/894302</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In this article (Paragraph No. 5151), the author urges that the U.S. must implement a comprehensive system of registered users that employs elements of passenger profiling based on a perceived level of threat to ensure that the events of September 11, 2001 are not repeated.  According to the author, it is simply irresponsible and dangerous for the government to ignore the national origin characteristics of the terrorists implicated in the attacks of September 11th.  Similarly, the present system of searching all of the people all of the time in the same manner with frequent "random" checks wastes valuable resources by focusing its efforts on individuals that clearly are not threats.  From a human factors standpoint, the current system lessens the alert status of security personnel to those with a higher potential threat.  Labeling individuals as potential threats merely because of their ethnicity or country of origin seems wrong given the fundamental tenet in our society that discriminating against another is wrong both morally and legally.  The distinction here is that "passenger profiling" is not "racial profiling" or discriminating.  Instead, it merely involves assessing the clear and present threat that terrorism poses and focusing the nation's resources on eliminating the threat with the least amount of intrusion to those impacted.  This may involve limited privacy intrusions and even more vigorous searches if initial evidence suggests a potential threat exists.  On the other hand, the author urges that the scope of the searches be limited and a "trusted traveler" system be set up in an entirely voluntary manner.  At the same time, the Federal Government must not delve into our personal lives and violate the Constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment.  Data protection is the key and the Federal Government must ensure that it does not release sensitive or confidential information about an individual without clear standards.  Since September 11th, it is clear that the existing system, from INS to Customs, from intelligence to law enforcement and, yes, airport security, was too lax.  We became too complacent.  The perceived domestic risk level was far too low.  The answer, the author urges, entails a significant overhaul of the current computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system (CAPPS) and implementation of a state-of-the-art trusted traveler program or "registered user" system.  Focus on clearing the "good guys" and spare time to focus intensively on the bad guys -- the system needs to not just be bigger, but smarter, more efficient, and more effective, the author concludes.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jan 2010 12:03:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/894302</guid>
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      <title>CBP’s Trusted Traveler Systems Using RFID Technology Require Enhanced Security (Redacted)</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/786427</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited DHS and select organizational components’ security programs to evaluate the effectiveness of controls implemented on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems. Systems employing RFID technology include tags and readers on the front end and applications and databases on the back end. RFID is a wireless technology that stores and retrieves data remotely from devices. The technology allows sensitive information to be read and written to tags and for numerous tags to be scanned simultaneously from a distance. The flexibility and portability of RFID technology and devices, as well as the information that resides on the tags, increase the need for security and privacy controls. OIG's objective was to determine whether U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented effective controls to protect critical data processed by its trusted traveler systems. To address this objective OIG: (1) interviewed personnel at CBP’s National Data Center; (2) reviewed applicable DHS and CBP policies and procedures; (3) conducted vulnerability assessments of the databases that collect and process information; and (4) evaluated the effectiveness of physical security and assessed the security controls over the RFID readers and RFID-enabled cards and transponders at selected ports of entry (POEs) in Detroit, MI; Blaine, WA; El Paso, TX; and Nogales, AZ. CBP has implemented effective physical security controls over the RFID tags, readers, computer equipment, and databases supporting the RFID systems at the POEs visited. No personal information is stored on the tags used for CBP. Traveler’s personal information is maintained in and can be obtained only with access to the system’s database. Additional security controls would be required if CBP decides to store travelers’ personal information on RFID tags or migrates to universally readable Generation 2 (Gen2) products. However, CBP has not developed adequate policies and procedures to ensure that security controls are implemented consistently by all POEs to protect its trusted traveler systems. In addition, CBP has not implemented the necessary controls on the system’s back end to ensure that the data captured and stored for the trusted traveler programs are properly protected. In addition, OIG determined that CBP did not ensure that its trusted traveler systems fully comply with all Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requirements. For example, the systems reviewed did not have a valid authority to operate, interconnection security and user agreements were not reviewed annually, and security reviews of contractor facilities were not performed. For the systems utilizing RFID technology, OIG is recommending that the CBP Commissioner direct its Chief Information Officer (CIO) to: (1) Develop and implement procedures to strengthen user account and password management processes relating to the trusted traveler systems. Procedures should include periodic vulnerability assessments and reviews of all user access. (2) Ensure that all vulnerabilities identified for which risks have not been assumed be remedied. (3) Develop and implement policy and procedures that address security controls over all components of an RFID system. (4) Ensure that audit trails are reviewed, documented, and maintained on a regular basis. (5) Ensure that all FISMA requirements are implemented, including certification and accreditation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 2006 07:14:02 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/786427</guid>
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      <title>WHITE HATS / BLACK HATS : A PRE-SCREENED GROUP OF PASSENGERS MAY MAKE IT EASIER TO CONCENTRATE SECURITY EFFORTS ON THE REST</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/710847</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Pre-screening passengers, with the goal of creating the "trusted traveler," is attractive to airlines and frequent fliers, and there is technology to do it, but airlines want the U.S. government to lead the effort, and the new Transportation Security Administration is too busy to give the project the support it needs. A major barrier is lack of shared information among airlines, in the U.S. and around the globe. One commonly discussed model is a "smart card." Congress included the concept as a recommendation in a recent aviation security bill, but what information it should carry is far from agreed-upon. Overseas airline operators worry that the U.S. may act unilaterally and establish standards without adequate input from other sources. Airlines are considering similar devices to set up pre-screened employee cards.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/710847</guid>
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