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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    <image>
      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Evaluation of Mitigation Strategies for High-Severity Derailments with Hazardous Materials</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2628304</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The transportation of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) by rail is a safe mode of transport and events with high-severity and/or high consequences from HAZMAT releases are rare. However, when high-profile events occur, they result in significant public pressure to modify the existing transportation practice and strengthen regulations to improve safety. The most recent example is the derailment on February 3, 2023, in East Palestine, Ohio that resulted in both a significant release HAZMAT and fires. As a result of the derailment, and subsequent National Transportation Safety Board and Federal Railroad Administration investigations, there is a renewed interest in evaluating and improving the safety of transporting HAZMAT in tank cars. The past regulatory responses to safety concerns for HAZMAT transport in railroad tank car safety have focused primarily on the tank car design and developed requirements for strengthening the tank shell. However, regulations that upgrade the tank structure are disruptive to the industry and expensive since it requires the replacement of a significant portion of the tank car fleet. This study investigates alternative mitigation strategies for high-severity railroad events involving HAZMAT transported in tank cars. In particular, the effects of the derailment speed on the release probability and consequences for tank car punctures are investigated. In addition, the effects of modifying the loading conditions to increase the outage volume (vapor space above the lading) are evaluated as a less costly alternative to increasing the tank car thickness to achieve an equivalent reduction in HAZMAT releases.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 15:07:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2628304</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Progress Toward Safer Rail Tank Cars Transporting Flammable Liquids: 2025 Report</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2601519</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This 2025 report summarizes the progress the railroad freight industry has made toward upgrading North American rail tank cars that transport Class 3 flammable liquids to meet DOT-117 specifications. Upgrades include a thicker, insulated or thermally protected tank; a full-height head shield; and top and bottom valve-fitting protections. The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act [Public Law 114–94] established a rolling phase-out schedule for rail tank cars. This schedule is organized by the type of rail tank car and Class 3 flammable liquid or liquids carried. All rail tank cars that transported Class 3 flammable liquids in 2024 were compliant with the FAST Act phase-out schedule. Compliance with the next phase-out deadline, May 1, 2025, will be documented in more detail in next year’s report. The number of rail tank cars built to DOT-117 specifications or retrofitted to DOT-117R specifications increased to 73 percent of all rail tank cars carrying Class 3 flammable liquids.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2025 11:54:47 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2601519</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Hazardous Materials Investigation Report: BNSF Railway Derailment and Hazardous Materials Release from DOT-112A340W Tank Cars, Manuelito, New Mexico, April 26, 2024</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2571873</link>
      <description><![CDATA[​On April 26, 2024, about 12:37 p.m. local time, westbound BNSF Railway mixed freight train H-BELPHX1-25 derailed 35 railcars at milepost 178.6 on the BNSF Railway Gallup Subdivision near Manuelito, New Mexico. The derailed equipment included six Department of Transportation Specification 112A340W tank cars loaded liquefied petroleum gas, a hazardous material. Four of these tank cars were breached (punctured or torn) during or after the derailment and released lading, which ignited. Because tank cars carrying liquified petroleum gas can explode when exposed to fire, the local fire department ordered an evacuation within a 2-mile radius of the derailment; 52 people were evacuated, and Interstate 40 was closed in both directions from milepost 10 to milepost 126. Sections of Interstate 40 remained closed for about 48 hours. The local fire department allowed the tank cars to burn overnight, and the fires were extinguished on April 27. The evacuation and road closure were lifted on April 28. No injuries were reported. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) launched an investigation into the thermal protection performance of the tank cars involved in the release. The investigation focused on the hazardous materials release and did not determine the probable cause of the derailment.​ ​This accident illustrated that cascading hazardous materials releases occur in trains other than high-hazard flammable trains. The NTSB has previously recommended that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration expand the definition of high-hazard flammable train as described in Safety Recommendation R-24-15.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2025 08:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2571873</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Finite Element Model Validation of Cryogenic DOT-113 Tank Car Side Impact Tests</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2470786</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The U.S. Department of Transportation’s (USDOT’s) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has sponsored a series of four full-scale side impact tests on specification DOT-113 railroad tank cars. A DOT-113 is a specially designed tank car intended to transport cryogenic liquid commodities. For each side impact test, researchers at the USDOT’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) created a pre-test finite element (FE) model to estimate the overall force-time response of the impactor, puncture/non-puncture outcomes of the impacted tank car, global motions of the tank car, internal pressures within the tank car, and the energy absorbed by the tank car during the impact. While researchers have previously compared FE model results to test measurements for tank car side impact tests, there are currently no formal guidelines on what measurable level of agreement is an acceptable demonstration of FE model validation. This paper presents FE model validation of DOT-113 and DOT-113 surrogate side impact tests using a publicly available software named Correlation and Analysis Plus (CORA) which was originally developed for automotive crashworthiness using models of anthropomorphic test devices, i.e., crash test dummies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Dec 2024 10:33:51 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2470786</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>New methods and applications of structural dynamics modeling for railway freight liquid tank</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2465058</link>
      <description><![CDATA[As railway freight technology advances towards heavy-load, high-speed capabilities, the design of liquid tank products is evolving to prioritize high load capacity, lightweight, high-strength materials, low structural rigidity, and thin-walled construction. These changes result in pronounced nonlinear low-frequency vibrations during rail operation. Addressing these complex liquid-solid coupled vibrations requires accurate dynamic modeling of the structural system. This paper introduces a novel dynamic modeling method for liquid tank products based on acousto-elastic coupling. This approach considers the swaying of the free liquid surface and liquid-solid interactions, enabling precise characterization of these dynamics in a unified model. Specifically, it tackles the challenge of uneven node swaying forces caused by non-uniform liquid surface meshing, presenting a technique and program to adjust swaying recovery forces based on nodes’ actual coverage area. This method’s liquid sway frequency calculations showed a 10% precision increase over traditional methods, more accurately reflecting liquid vibration states. The paper applies these techniques to a single tank container and an LNG tank container on a flatbed trailer. Through theoretical, simulation, and experimental comparisons, the model’s accuracy and reasonableness were validated. This low-dimensionality, high-precision dynamic model is universally applicable, especially valuable in modeling complex engineering structures.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 16:58:18 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2465058</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Determination Of The Loading On The Open Wagon Body When Rolling On The Train Ferry</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2439987</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The higher efficiency of international transportation necessitates the introduction of combined transport systems. One of the most successful among these is train ferry transportation. And in order to provide safe transportation of wagons by sea, it is important to formulate the operational requirements for railway-sea transportation. And one of the loading modes for wagons is rolling on the train ferry. The article presents the results of determining the dynamic load of the open wagon body when rolling on the train ferry. The calculation was made for the open wagon placed on 18-100 bogies. A mathematical model was formed, which made it possible to determine the main dynamic indicators that characterize the movement of the wagon. The results of the calculations were used to determine the permissible inequality amplitude in the zone of interaction between the rail tracks of the bridge and the ferry deck so that the indicators of the car dynamics would be within the permissible values. The permissible value of the inequality amplitude was 0.021 m. The conducted studies will contribute to the database of developments on ensuring the operational safety of wagons used for international railway-sea transportation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2024 16:11:50 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2439987</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment, Anniston, Alabama, March 9, 2023</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2437362</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On March 9, 2023, about 6:19 a.m. local time, westbound Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) freight train 245A109 derailed 2 locomotives and 37 railcars on the Alabama East End District of its Gulf Division near Anniston, Alabama. The derailment involved two sections of the train, resulting in two derailment sites. The first derailment site was located at the front of the train and where 2 locomotives and 29 railcars derailed. At the second site, located near the rear of the train, eight railcars derailed. Three of the cars that derailed were tank cars carrying hazardous materials. These tank cars remained intact and did not release hazardous materials. There were no reported fatalities or injuries. NS estimated damages to equipment, track, and signal infrastructure to be about $2.9 million. At the time of the accident, visibility conditions were clear with early morning daylight; the weather was 57°F with no precipitation.​The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of this accident was the combination of the coupling together of two revenue waybill locomotives without alignment control couplers, in violation of Norfolk Southern Railroad rules, and excessive in-train forces created due to the build of the train. Contributing to the accident was the misidentification of couplers without alignment control during the Norfolk Southern Railroad inspection process.​​]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 15:48:15 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2437362</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Quantifying the Influence of Tank Car Position and Train Configuration on the Risk of Rail Transport of Class 3 Flammable Liquids</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2437837</link>
      <description><![CDATA[As the amount of high-hazardous materials (hazmat) being shipped in high-hazard flammable unit trains (HHFUT) increases, mitigating the risks associated with railway transportation of hazmat remains an industry priority. Compared with HHFUT configurations, the placement of hazmat railcars in high-hazard flammable trains (HHFT) and the number of classification yards they traverse can affect the risk of derailment and subsequent hazmat release for HHFTs. This paper evaluates hazmat release risks associated with the transportation of U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) Class 3 flammable liquids by tank cars. Specifically, it compares the risks of HHFUTs and HHFTs for shipping a designated amount of hazmat and considers both mainline and yard operations in alignment with existing regulations and practical guidance. The methodology quantifies the transportation risk in total expected release consequence (i.e., casualties) given the total amount of Class 3 flammable liquids transported in HHFUT and HHFT configurations with different tank car placement strategies. Based on the case study, we find that using five 100-railcar HHFTs, each with 20 tank cars in positions 66 through 85, is both practical and generates the lowest transportation risk. Some hazmat railcar placement strategies in HHFTs lead to a higher release risk than HHFUT operations, while others result in a lower release risk. The proposed methodology could be extended to diverse operating scenarios to better understand the impacts of train configuration and tank car placement on the risk of rail transport for flammable liquids.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2024 16:31:18 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2437837</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The working environment of drivers of road tankers</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2431400</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The environment in which drivers of a road tankers perform their work is becoming increasingly complex and thereby less safe. Almost inconspicuously and often without drivers being fully aware of this, every aspect in the working environment changes incrementally and progressively in complexity. Furthermore, drivers of road tankers are increasingly held responsible for coping with this while not receiving any dedicated training nor working instructions thereto. Relevant topics of such working environment include: the increasingly higher safety and environmental standards of the (off-)loading locations; the expansion of automation, digitalization and communication being implemented; being subject to more legislation and liabilities; truck technology, tracking, tracing and planning; training of driving non-secured, dynamic liquid loads with increasing pay loads over total truck weight ratio’s and increasing engine power of the trucks; driving behaviour of other road users and the architecture of road infrastructures. This paper reflects an on-going study being conducted in the Netherlands. The study focusses primarily on Dutch working environment conditions and changes therein. Initial observations allow for the intermediate conclusion that such conditions and changes therein occur similarly elsewhere in Europe and the World.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Sep 2024 14:47:09 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2431400</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The unchallenged acceptance of road tanker accidents</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2431398</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The topic of “unchallenged acceptance of road tanker accidents” is controversial as “rationally / objectively” (bulk) liquid transportation in road tankers is safe and as people in general, emotionally / subjectively perceive such transportation to be safe. Despite this, accidents with liquid carrying road tankers happen. Some of these do not involve any other party, the so-called “one-sided” accidents, like “keeling-over” accidents. The cause of the accident is, often and (too) quickly, assumed to be a “driver error”, “everything else is after all “safe”. This (abstract / full) paper will identify the various details of the relevant but wrongly-assumed safety aspects which remain rather unquestioned” in the widely “accepted” manner in which larger quantities of (dangerous) liquids are being transported in road tankers.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Sep 2024 14:47:07 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2431398</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Full-Scale Shell Impact Test of a DOT-105J500W Tank Car Designed to Carry Liquid Carbon Dioxide</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2401720</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On March 6, 2024, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) sponsored a full-scale shell impact test (Test 14) of a DOT-105J500W (DOT105) specification tank car at Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, CO. The DOT-105 tank car was designed for service with refrigerated liquid carbon dioxide (liquid CO₂) and included different design features from other DOT-105 tank cars due to the cold temperature (-20°F) of the refrigerated commodity. The tank car featured 5 inches of foam thermal insulation around the tank and a full-length center sill instead of the typical stub sills due to thermal expansion of the tank during loading and unloading. The tank car had a volume of approximately 21,500 gallons. During the test, a ~297,000-lb ram car equipped with a 12x12-inch impactor struck the tank at its mid-height and longitudinal center. Researchers filled the tank car to approximately 95.2 percent by volume with water as a stand-in for refrigerated liquid CO₂. The remaining (i.e., outage) 4.8 percent volume contained a mixture of air and nitrogen. The outage was pressurized to 225 psig, typical of conditions in liquid CO₂ transportation. Researchers targeted a test speed of 16.0 ± 0.5 mph, intending to puncture the tank car. However, the impact did not result in puncture of the tank car. The measured impact speed was 15.5 mph. This speed and ram mass corresponds to 2.4 million ft-lb of impact kinetic energy. The peak force developed by the impact was approximately 1.8 million pounds, and the impactor indented the tank car to a depth of approximately 35 inches. The impactor rebounded at a speed of 8 mph after making contact with the tank car.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jul 2024 19:13:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2401720</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Tank Car Vent and Burn Process Study: Phase I</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2394481</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), under Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA's) Hazmat Transportation Safety Research and Development Strategic Plan, conducted a study of vent and burn as a method of hazardous materials incident mitigation. The purpose of the study was to develop guidelines and tools to aid emergency response personnel in determining when to use the vent and burn method and to help guide them through the procedure. TTCI reviewed past incidents and mathematically modeled various explosive charge parameters. TTCI evaluated commodities and tank car materials and configurations for applicability to the vent and burn method. TTCI developed a process map and an itemized checklist for responder use. The study concluded that, when carefully planned for and properly applied, vent and burn could be an effective method of mitigating a serious incident. TTCI made recommendations for process improvements and future testing.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 22 Jun 2024 18:06:24 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2394481</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Modeling and Analysis of Phase Change in a DOT-113 Tank Car Surrogate Filled with Liquid Nitrogen</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2348176</link>
      <description><![CDATA[As part of a series of impact tests, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) sponsored a research team from Transportation Technology Center, working with Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe), to analyze the side impact puncture performance of a surrogate DOT-113 tank car filled with cryogenic liquid nitrogen (LN2). This was the third test in a planned series of four tests on DOT-113 tank cars and surrogates. Researchers performed pre-test analyses of the DOT-113 surrogate filled with LN2 (Test 12), and the research team conducted the impact test on July 24, 2021. The surrogate tank car was impacted by a 297,200-lb ram car fitted with a 12 x 12-inch impactor traveling at 18.3 mph. The impact resulted in a significant amount of deformation but did not puncture the tank car. After the test, the team updated the pre-test finite element (FE) model to represent the measured speed of the ram car but observed some discrepancies between the test measurements and simulation results. The testing and modeling effort is described in detail in a separate FRA Technical Report; this report is focused on a phase change discrepancy noted during Test 12.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 03 Mar 2024 14:16:19 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2348176</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fire Performance of a Cryogenic ISO UN-T75 Storage Tank Using Analytical Methods and Fire Testing, Phase 2: Testing with LNG in ISO Tank</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2348175</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) sponsored a study by Southwest Research Institute to conduct research and testing of a cryogenic storage tank in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) service and evaluate its thermal safety performance under fire conditions using analytical methods and fire testing. This report documents the second phase of this research. In Phase I, the team filled the test tank with liquid nitrogen (LN2) in place of LNG and the pressure relief system was evaluated and determined to work properly in the specified test conditions. Based on those results, researchers in Phase II essentially repeated the same test with the tank filled with LNG. The report provides additional detail of the test tank, the flatcar supporting the tank, the development of a safety plan, characterization of the fire exposure source, description of the instrumentation used in the experiment, test results, and detailed data analysis.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 03 Mar 2024 14:16:19 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2348175</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Improving Crash Energy Management (CEM) of Tank Cars</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2334637</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Federal Railroad Administration sponsored a 2-year research effort between August 2020 and August 2022 to investigate multiple mitigation concepts for hazmat tank cars, aimed at improving their puncture resistance. The team first developed and validated a finite element (FE) model of a full-scale tank car subject to shell (i.e., side) impact. Researchers then evaluated the effectiveness of different mitigation solutions by exercising the validated FE model. Validated FE models were used to explore different solutions including key material properties of tank car steel, the effects of changing shell thickness, the effects of splitting a single thick plate into multiple plates, and internal liner solutions. Results indicated the key parameter to improving puncture resistance is to increase total steel thickness; however, a double-tank arrangement offers improved benefit over an equivalent monolithic shell because of the high strength or high ductility steel used for the outer layer. Moreover, FE analyses indicated the ductility of steel in plane strain bending reduces with increasing plate thickness; the resistance of thick shells may be over-estimated if this is not considered.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 16:52:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2334637</guid>
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