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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <item>
      <title>VESSEL DAMAGE SEVERITY OF TANKER ACCIDENTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/452096</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Are there effective policies, other than vessel design (which is addressed by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990) for reducing the vessel damage severity (and the subsequent oil spillage) of tanker accidents? This paper addresses this question by investigating determinants of accident severity. The results suggest that effective policies, other than vessel design, may not exist for tanker collision accidents, but do exist for accidents which involve grounding and/or materials/equipment failure. For grounding accidents, these policies are to: increase the regulation and/or regulation enforcement of foreign flag tankers, and increase the regulation enforcement of tankers when vessel repair prices and oil prices are relatively low. For material/equipment failure accidents, these policies are to: increase the regulation and/or regulation enforcement of older tankers, and require greater use of licensed manned operators.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/452096</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON AN EVALUATION OF DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES TO IMPROVE MANEUVERING AND STOPPING ABILITIES OF LARGE TANK VESSELS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/163174</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report is the final in a series of five that were initiated by the President in his 17 March 1977 message to Congress on the reduction of marine oil pollution.  The report presents the basic definitions of maneuvering and stopping abilities of existing tank vessels as a function of deadweight, compared to those of dry cargo vessels.  Using the methods for evaluating maneuvering abilities that are outlined, various devices that have been proposed were examined.  The initial evaluation was based on the degree of improvement in the maneuvering ability, the cost and the effect on the design of the vessel for each device.  A mathematical (simulation) model was employed to further evaluate the most promising devices.  A description of each operational technique has been included.  The evaluation of the operational techniques was performed primarily by reporting on various full scale tests.  The findings indicate that good maneuvering characteristics can be achieved for tank vessels, but without some guidance or requirement, this is not generally considered in the design cycle for new ship construction.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/163174</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>EVALUATION OF CONCEPTS FOR IMPROVED CONTROLLABILITY OF TANK VESSELS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/165453</link>
      <description><![CDATA[There is interest in the potential for reducing tank vessel Collisions, Rammings and Groundings (CRG) casualties by improving the inherent controllability of the vessel. This paper reports on studies conducted for the Maritime Administration in which various concepts for improving the controllability of tank vessels were investigated.  A detailed study of U.S. Coast Guard tanker CRG Casualty data and reports covering a five-year period was carried out to determine typical casualty situations and to make an initial assessment of the potential effects of improved controllability.  From this effort, various measures of controllability were identified.  In order to determine the performance of various concepts, studies with a baseline ship of about 84,000 DWT were carried out.  The matehmatical models used were based on model tests and/or analysis of information in the literature.  The concepts investigated included a conventional single propeller/rudder configuration as a baseline and modifications to this baseline including twin propeller/rudders, increased astern power, thrusters, high lift rudders and thrust vectoring devices.  The maneuvering performance was determined from evaluation maneuvers in shallow water including turns, accelerating turns, coasting turns and stops.  Some of the high lift rudder and thrust vectoring devices were identified as having significant benefits.  Suggestions for future efforts are presented.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/165453</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TANKER SPILLS, COLLISIONS AND GROUNDINGS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/143622</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The basic finding is that collisions are a communication and coordination problem rather than a detection problem. In nearly head-on encounters, with the ships displaced slightly to starboard, the Rules of the Road are ambiguous and the ships are maneuvering into a collision. Almost all past groundings occurred either entering harbor or bays within a very few miles offshore. The data indicates that conning or guidance errors are as important as navigational errors in causing groundings and many of the conning-related groundings are connected with pilot transfers. An estimate was made of the traffic pattern in U.S. continental shelf waters. A comparison of this traffic pattern with the collision and grounding data showed no correlation between the level of tanker traffic and tanker casualties. Simplistic arguments relating tanker traffic and tanker casualties are not supported by the casualty data which indicate that local factors appear to dominate. Therefore, whatever vessel traffic management scheme is adapted should recognize this fact.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Dec 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/143622</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LIBERIAN TANK VESSEL M/V SEATIGER EXPLOSION AND FIRE SUN OIL TERMINAL NEDERLAND, TEXAS, APRIL 19, 1979. MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/156834</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 2140 c.s.t., on April 19, 1979, the Liberian tankship M/V SEATIGER, which had suspended pumping seawater ballast into its cargo tanks because of electrical storms in the area, exploded, burned, and sank at a berth at the Sun Oil Terminal, at Nederland, Texas.  The SEATIGER was severely damaged in the area of its cargo tanks.  Two crewmembers were killed.  The total losses resulting from the explosion were estimated to be $35 million.  The terminal berth was out of service for 180 days.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the improper innstallation of the flame screen in the flame arrester aboard the SEATIGER which resulted in the propagation of fire through the cargo tank vent system after lightning ignited flammable gases at the top of the vent mast; and a partially open butterfly valve in the cargo tank vent pipe system which created a path for the flame to penetrate the cargo tanks.  The master's failure to require use of the available inert gas system to maintain a nonexplosive atmosphere in the cargo tanks contributed to the accident.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Nov 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/156834</guid>
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      <title>COMPUTER "SPLITS" ON TANKER FAILURES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/160028</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Engineers in a ship repair yard in Singapore and a London firm of marine consultants may have an answer to the mystery of why 10 large tankers carrying crude oil have been lost in the past year.  The engineers, during a routine check discovered small cracks in the hull of a very large oil tanker and promptly informed two naval architects working for Fraser & Co.  They recently completed a computer simulation of the way one 10-year old VLCC was loaded with various grades of oil.  They concluded that changes in the way this ship is now used--to carry different densitites of oil rather than just one grade as was the practice 10 years ago--have caused it to be unevenly loaded, seriously weakening its structure.  This conclusion is disturbing for operators and crews of other large tankers built at the same time; the Betelgeuse and the Ocean Concentration (which broke in two in Rotterdam harbour recently) were nearly identical ships of the same age.  The two naval architects, David Jones and David Adam, have made known the results of their study.  The most serious result was that during one "normal" loading of oil the tanker was overstressed along its length by 58 per cent for a short period.  When the loading was complete, the crude instruments built into the ship indicated that everything was back to normal.  No one on the ship--including the chief officer responsible for loading the different grades of oil around the seven main tanks--could possibly have had a precise idea of what was happening to the ship's structure.  One way to prevent the insidious weakening of these older ships, Jones and Adams say, is to equip them with a simple and relatively cheap computer.  The computer could also continuously monitor the position of the loads on board, sounding a warning when overstressing seemed imminent, and providing a "black box" record of every time the ship was loaded.  Such a computer might cost about 13000 pounds sterling.  No further information in article.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/160028</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>MAJOR OFFSHORE OIL SPILL ACCIDENTS AND THE TANKER ACCIDENT DATA BANK (1955-1979) OF THE INSTITUT FRANCAIS DU PETROLE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/154150</link>
      <description><![CDATA[After describing the main problems associated with offshore oil spills and reviewing various data presented in past reports, the author describes the results of Institut Francais du Petrole's efforts to gather information relevant to this field.  The Institute's documentation lists accidents involving oil spills of more than 500 tons from various sources (tankers, platforms, pipelines, coastal facilities).  The Institute's data bank concerning tanker accidents is also dealt with in detail, covering over 400 accidents which occurred between 1955 and 1979.  Maps showing these accidents and oil spills are included in the back pocket.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/154150</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DEVELOPING TANKER CASUALTY AND TANKER TRAFFIC DATABASES FOR 1969-1977</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/155562</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report presents the results of a program to develop and analyze two databases. The first was to extend the existing Coast Guard Tanker Casualty File (1969-1973) for an additional four years (1974-1979). Incorporated with the extension of the data was an expansion of database to include a broader range of information related to the sequence of the casualty, extent of pollution, damages incurred, and identification of the source of the casualty information. The second database developed was a file of tanker movements, based on a computerized version of the 'Lloyd's Voyage Record' for the year ending December 1976. This file contains a series of records listing dates and location changes for each tanker during this year. The development of this second database permits the casualty statistics to be related to various vessel and crew measures of exposure, e.g., polluting casualties per ton of oil transported per mile, etc. Finally the report contains a trend analysis of the tanker casualty database. Oil outflow from polluting casualties is examined from the standpoint of tanker size, tanker age, geographic location, area (pier, harbor, open sea, etc.) and flag of registry. The distribution of repair costs by casualty type and the sequence of events preceding tanker sinkings are also examined. (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/155562</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PERFORMANCE OF OPEN REGISTRY BULK FLEETS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/152101</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of this study is to analyse the reasons for the growth of open registry and other bulk fleets (UK, Japan, Norway and Greece) during the 1970's.  This is done in PARTS 1 and 2 which examine the growth of the tanker, combined carrier and dry bulk fleets as well as the shipping legislation of FOC and other flags with particular emphasis on the tax position of vessel ownership under different flags.  The operating experience of the bulk fleet is analysed in PART 3, focussing on the accident and loss records of the major fleets during the 1970's.  As well as HPD's own casualty analysis, studies on the problem by other organisations are also discussed.  The Study concludes in PART 4 by examining the ways of controlling and eliminating substandard vessels under all flags but with emphasis on measures aimed at flag states with particularly bad loss records, and the ways other maritime nations may bring pressure to bear on the operators of such vessels.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/152101</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE LNG TANKER AND CARGO--CONSIDERATIONS OF CASUALTY CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHIP SALVAGE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/145270</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The recent history of casualties is examined to develop an understanding of the more likely circumstances that an LNG tanker may experience in accidents.  A detailed evaluation is also made of recent accidents involving major tankers/bulk carriers and an extrapolation is attempted to projected circumstances had the cargo been LNG.  Certain conclusions are presented with some recommendations for mitigation of an LNG casualty.  Order from BSRA as No. 52,177.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/145270</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COLLISION OF LIBERIAN TANKSHIP M/V STOLT VIKING AND U.S. CREWBOAT CANDY BAR IN GULF OF MEXICO, JANUARY 7, 1978--MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/82095</link>
      <description><![CDATA[At 2125 c.s.t. on January 7, 1978, the Liberian tankship M/V Stolt Viking collided with the U.S. crewboat Candy Bar amidships and cut it into two pieces.  The accident occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 110 miles south of Lake Charles, Louisiana.  The Stolt Viking was not damaged.  Two crewmen escaped from the Candy Bar and were rescued 4 hours after the accident.  The other two crewmen are missing and are presumed dead.  The bow section of the Candy Bar sank soon after the accident; however, the stern section remained afloat until 0900 on January 8, 1978.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the Stolt Viking and the Candy Bar to keep an adequate lookout both visually and on radar.  Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Stolt Viking and the Candy Bar to sound for signals. Contributing to the loss of life was the lack of lifejackets in the wheelhouse of the Candy Bar.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/82095</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE LIVERPOOL UNDERWRITERS' ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT (YEAR)</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/84768</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The annual report of the Liverpool Underwriters contains a summary of casualty statistics listed in the Association's loss book for the year.  The data are also presented in graphic form.  Particulars of the information provided in the report include gross tonnage totally lost, with a breakdown of the tonnage by vessel type, by flag, and by cause of casualty; a 15-year summary of annual losses by tonnage; a 15-year summary of total losses (number of ships); a 2-year summary of laid-up tonnage; a 5-year summary of world total losses; a list of total losses for the year by age, size, and nature of casualty; a 15-year summary for tankers and other ships of losses by age at time of loss; and a 5-year summary of reports of fires and explosions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/84768</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TANKERS IN U.S. WATERS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/85310</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Reliable figures on oil spills from tankers can be obtained only through detailed editing and correcting of Coast Guard data, coupled with a knowledge that statistics in some of the fields should be discarded due to ambiguities.  About 200 U.S. flag tankers operate between U.S.  ports; the import trade consists of about 30-40 more U.S. tankers and 600-700 foreign tankers.  U.S. ships have about half as many spills per port call as Liberian tankers, and 1/3 to 1/5 as many as foreign tankers as a whole.  There is mounting evidence that ships are prone to have a rather constant number of spills per year irrespective of variations in port call exposure.  When spill incidence is measured per ship time, the U.S. tanker margin over foreign fleets is only 2-3 instead of 3-6.  For 1973-75, 76% of all U.S. tanker spills were less than 100 gal, compared to 65% of all flag of convenience spills.  The probability of no tanker losses can be expected to occur in conditions favorable to a spill in coastal waters.  In any given year, the U.S. tanker fleet of 235 vessels greater than 1,000 GRT can be expected to have about 100 spills in U.S. waters, while foreign flag ships will contribute another 250 spills.  About half the time the largest U.S. tanker spill in a 1 yr period will be less than 5,000 gal; the median value for the largest spill from foreign tankers will be closer to 50,000-100,000 gal.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/85310</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (OVTM) STUDY. VOLUME II. TECHNICAL ANALYSES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/78093</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The objectives of the study were: (1) to analyze the causes of tanker and other vessel casualties that could potentially result in oil pollution, and (2) to evaluate various alternative vessel traffic management systems and techniques for the prevention of oil-polluting casualties in the U.S. offshore waters. The geographical areas of interest are the waters from the U.S. coast out to 200 NM around the contiguous 48 states, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Alaska, except the area north of the Aleutian Islands. Three types of casualties are addressed in the study: groundings, collisions, and rammings. Vessels included in the study are tank vessels (tankers and tank-barges) over 1000 gross tons. The analysis of the causes of tank vessel casualties is performed mainly with the Coast Guard Merchant Vessel Casualty Report (MVCR) data base covering the period from July 1971 to October 1977. Other data sources surveyed include: the Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports, the Tanker Casualty Library of Marine Management Systems, Inc., and the Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System. The nature and characteristics of tank vessel casualties that occur in the U.S. offshore waters are described. Systems and techniques considered as alternatives for preventing these casualties are identified, evaluated against each casualty and given an overall rating of casualty prevention effectiveness based on criteria which are defined. The promising systems are selected and conceptual descriptions are presented including the operational features, technical description, cost, staffing and training required, and legal implementation considerations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/78093</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (OVTM) STUDY. VOLUME III. APPENDIXES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/78773</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Contents: Appendix A - Examples of Merchant Vessel Casualty Reports; Appendix B - Merchant Vessel Casualty Computerized Data Base; Appendix C - Index and Listing of the Data Base Cases; Appendix D - Vessel Traffic Services; Appendix E - Eastern Canada Traffic Regulation; Appendix F - The LORAN-C System and Applications to the OVTM Study; Appendix G - Shore-Based System Design Considerations; Appendix H - Satellites for Offshore Vessel Traffic Management; and Appendix I - Evaluation of Operational Features and Systems.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/78773</guid>
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