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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>DERAILMENT OF ELECTRIC PASSENGER TRAIN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6506</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The derailment of the last coach of an electric multiple-unit down passenger train on December 13, 1963, which subsequently came into glancing contact with the side of another passenger train, was caused by axle fatigue. This fatigue would have been detected if the prescribed frequency for ultrasonic inspection had been observed.  It was suggested that no axle be tested less frequently than every 18 months.  One passenger was killed and 31 injured.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6506</guid>
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      <title>ACCIDENTS ON BRITISH RAILWAYS IN 1960</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6543</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A comparison of accidents, deaths, and equipment failures for the years 1959 and 1960 show that there were a total of 1213 train accidents in 1959 (1175 in 1960).  Out of these, passenger and freight trains were involved in 416 in 1959 (415 in 1960).  The total accidents at level crossings were 231 (1959) and 242 (1960).  Deaths at level crossings totaled 37 (1959) and 35 (1960).  Railway personnel deaths were 160 (1959) and 143 (1960).  Failures, including engines, couplings, and rails amounted to 1271 in 1959 and 1395 in 1960.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6543</guid>
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      <title>ACCIDENTS ON RAILWAYS, 1948</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6878</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In all, there were 1293 train accidents on British Railways in 1948.  Causes were listed as: failure of the human element, 639, defective apparatus, 188, other (track obstructions, passenger or other person misconduct), 466. The report, from which this article was taken, contains a number of summarized tables which cover the past 34 years and gives the total casualties in all movement on rail, with information about traffic carried, staff employed, etc.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6878</guid>
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      <title>ACCIDENTS ON THE RAILWAYS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6940</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A condensed accident report is presented, showing passenger deaths and injuries by year, from 1938 to 1944 in Great Britain.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6940</guid>
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      <title>ACCIDENTS ON BRITISH RAILWAYS IN 1950</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6945</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The number of train accidents declined from 1,176 in 1949 to 1,156 and compared favourably with the 1946-1950 average of 1,250.  The improvement would have been greater but for the increase in accidents at level crossings, although casualties there did not rise in proportion.  Collisions and derailments for which signalmen were responsible were 34--small compared with the amount of traffic handled safely daily.  A serious aspect of the report is in the position it reveals regarding shortage of permanent way staff and the loss of men from other departments, such as locomotive running or signal and telecommunications.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6945</guid>
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      <title>BURSTING A CROSSING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/11354</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Doncaster derailment attracted great attention, not only because of the resultant causalties but also from the fact that the train had just started and was not traveling at any speed.  The train was passing through a scissors crossover, up slow to up main, where superelevation had to be such that the run-up of the cant was very steep -- in certain circumstances a disagreeable necessity.  Of recent years a speed limit of 10 mph has been in force over the slow line approach from the station and through this connection, but unfortunately, as in so many places, it has been indifferently observed.  The conclusion, supported by practical tests, was that the train concerned passed at from 20 to 25 mph.  There was no reason for supposing that the condition of either locomotive or train contributed to the accident.  It was concluded, from a review of all those cases and every relevant fact revealed by the inquiry, that the disaster was initiated by the bursting of the crossing.  All crossings form inherently weak points in the track and their components are subject to constant shock.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/11354</guid>
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      <title>ACCIDENTS IN 1954</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/11489</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The number of train accidents increased slightly in Great Britian, over 1953; however, there were no passenger fatalities and the total fatalities in all rail movements was the lowest recorded, 0.5 per million train miles.  The total main-line train mileage decreased slightly over 1953. The progressive decline in cases due to failure to obey signals was maintained.  An encouraging trend was again recorded in accidents resulting from technical defects, probably reflecting better attention to detail in routine maintenance and examination.  Warnings to children in schools and at home, and improved fencing of the lines, have led to a continual decline in the number of trespassers killed or injured by contact with live rails.  Accidents at grade level crossings continue to be a problem.  New signalling methods are briefly introduced.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Dec 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/11489</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>THE U.S.A. ACCIDENT SITUATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/11378</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In 1941, 5,086 persons were killed and 37,811 were injured on the lines covered by the report, the figure for fatalities shows an increase of 10-28 percent over 1940 nearly the same percentage increase 10-87 as in the number of train-miles the total for which was 969,000,000--making a fatality rate of 5.25 to one million train-miles.  These injuries increased, however, by 27.78 percent to 39 in every million train-miles, a higher rate than for the previous three years.  The distribution of casualties by types of accidents shows that the highest figures were caused by accidents at level crossings and to persons who were struck or run over at other points.  Over 3,600 train accidents in 1941 were attributed to defects of some kind, and over 4,000 to negligence.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/11378</guid>
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      <title>NIGERIAN DERAILMENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6704</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The accident report findings for a derailment of a Nigerian Railway passenger train between Lalupon and Odo-Oba, on September 29, 1957, are summarized.  The accident was fatal to 66 of the 370 passengers.  Seven cars out of the 16 derailed due to track erosion.  The track buckled under the weight of the locomotive. Erosion was caused by a sudden flood following several days of heavy rain.  As a result of the investigation, main lines sections subject to folding will be patrolled four times a night.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6704</guid>
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      <title>DERAILMENT AT CHEADLE HULME</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/11281</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The train which consisted of a steam locomotive and nine coaches ran on to a temporary underline bridge immediately before Cheadle Hulme Station, at a speed in excess of the 10 mile/h restriction, burst the track, derailed, and parted between the fourth and fifth coaches.  Two children and a railway representative were killed and 27 injured.  Standard indicators had been provided at the beginning and end of the restriction but the warning board near Branhall Loop was non-standard.  The train ran on to the bridge where the speed restriction was 10 mile/h at a speed of at least 45 mile/h.  The warning board was not as conspicuous as it should have been.   Such boards should be of standard design and brightly painted.  The weakest point of the temporary bridge design was shown to be the fastening of the track to the waybeam by transoms and clamps to every other sleeper.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/11281</guid>
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      <title>A CHAPTER OF AMERICAN ACCIDENTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6572</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Causes of several serious accidents in the United States during 1943 are reviewed.  The City of Denver of the Chicago and North Central and Panama Limited of the Illinois Central were sabotaged.  The Twentieth Century derailed due to the bursting of the boiler through low water level and overheating of the crown sheet.  The Congessional of the Pennsylvania derailed as the result of a burned-out journal on one of the cars.  A number of collisions, especially on single lines, have been due to failure to adhere to rules of the timetable and train-order method of working laid down in the Standard Code.  A disturbing feature of other collisions is that they have occurred on lines provided with the latest automatic signaling and train-stop apparatus.  Two accidents which occurred despite the automatic signalling and train-stop apparatus are mentioned.  The advisability of slowing down express trains during the war emergency is discussed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6572</guid>
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      <title>SAFETY ON THE RAILWAYS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6535</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The article comments on the improvement of railway safety on the German Federal Railways over the past 15 years. Between 1954-1960 a relatively short period, passenger deaths dropped from 115 to 72 and the number of passenger injuries decreased from 830 to 531.  The improvement in railway safety is attributed to a general improvement in technical standards.  Many improvements have been or are proposed to meet the demand for higher maximum speeds and to cope with the higher bending stresses and slightly higher axle-loads produced by diesel and electric locomotives as compared with the heaviest steam locomotives.  An important measure is the introduction of the S54 rail which may supercede the S49 standard profile. Also, improvements in bridge and tunnel construction, the redefinement of clearance gauges and signalling techniques have enhanced safety operation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6535</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>DERAILMENT NEAR HITHER GREEN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6620</link>
      <description><![CDATA[An express passenger train, consisting of two six-coach diesel-electric sets, derailed near Hither Green at about 70 mph, when the leading pair of wheels of the third coach struck a wedge-shaped piece of steel that had broken away from the end of a running rail, and became derailed.  The initial derailment was caused by the fracture of a rail as the train was passing over it.  The fracture was caused by excessive working of the joint resulting from unsatisfactory support conditions including: inadequate clean ballast under the two original concrete joint sleepers; the absence of a rubber pad under the rail seat; and substitution of a wood sleeper for the running-off concrete sleeper which cracked because the pad was missing.  Due to unsatisfactory track maintenance, a speed restriction of 60 mph was placed on the track.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Dec 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6620</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DERAILMENT AT CONNINGTON</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/6608</link>
      <description><![CDATA[An express passenger train formed of 11 bogie vehicles, approached Connington South on the down main line at about 75 mile/h, and when passing over the facing connection to the down goods line, the rear five vehicles became derailed and the train divided between the seventh and eighth coaches.  This derailment was caused by the movement of a pair of facing points under the train.  The points could only have been opened as a result of deliberate irregular actions on the part of the signalman, who was solely responsible for the derailment.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Dec 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/6608</guid>
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