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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>USE OF THE ELECTRONIC COMPUTER IN THE DESIGN OF THE ELECTRIC CENTRAL ROUTING CONTROL POINT: FIRST PHASE--DEFINITION OF THE TABLE OF INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN THE ROUTINGS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/167660</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The procedure, named PRACEI, is suitable to represent any station, no matter how complex, also of networks which do not adopt FS diagrams and circuits, in that it is based solely on geometric elements, like track and point circuits, present in all types of installations.  The PRACEI procedure has been applied with satisfactory results, to ACEI (electric central routing control points) already in operation for the definition of the table of incompatibilities between the routings.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/167660</guid>
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      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT--COLLISION OF PORT AUTHORITY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY TROLLEY CAR NO. 1790 AND BUS NO. 2413, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, FEBRUARY 10, 1978</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/81351</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 8:03 a.m., on February 10, 1978, a trolley car and a bus owned by the Port Authority of Allegheny County collided in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, when the trolley car suddenly turned into the path of the oncoming bus.  Four persons were killed, 37 persons were injured, and damage was estimated to be $48,000.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the operator's inadvertent and untimely operation of an unprotected track switch, which caused the trolley car to be routed into the path of the approaching bus.  Contributing to the accident was the operator's operation of the car at a speed too great to permit stopping when he detected the turning movement of the car, and the lack of protective devices to control the switch operation.  Two recommendations were made to the Port Authority of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, about the means by which the track switch can be operated from the trolley car and about providing protection against the switch operating when another vehicle is in a danger zone.  A recommendation was also made to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, urging the State to encourage communities that have emergency response facilities to establish emergency procedures for disasters.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/81351</guid>
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      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT - HEAD-END COLLISION OF AMTRAK TRAIN NO. 392 AND ICG TRAIN NO. 51, HARVEY, ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 12, 1979</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/150906</link>
      <description><![CDATA[At 9:05 p.m., c.s.t., on October 12, 1979, northbound Amtrak passenger train No. 392 was traveling at 58.5 mph on track No. 4, at Harvey, Illinois. Illinois Central Gulf Freight Train No. 51 was waiting on track No. 3 to crossover to track No. 4 after train No. 392 went north. The switchtender on duty at Harvey aligned the crossover switch on track No. 4 seconds before train No. 392 arrived. Train No. 392 entered the crossover and struck train No. 51. The engineer and head brakeman on board train No. 51 were killed, and all 6 crewmembers and 38 passengers on board train No. 392 were injured. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the switchtender's manual misalignment of a switch, immediately in advance of a train, which caused train No. 392 to be directed into a crossover and collide with a standing freight train on the adjacent track. The misalignment was made possible by the lack of an interlock or other positive means to prevent its movement. Contributing to the accident was the lack of training and limiting experience of the employee assigned as switchtender.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/150906</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>ON THE ANALYSIS OF RAIL SWITCH INTERLOCK</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/79368</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Performance of a sliding interlock in the rail track switch is analyzed theoretically.  The friction forces in the lock during switching are assessed.  Imperfect lock is shown to appreciably increase the switching resistance.  Reasons for this effect are outlined.  The analysis can constitute a starting point to perform tests on both current and improved locks.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Oct 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/79368</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>THE EFFECT OF POINT BLADE JOGGLE ON POSITION AND RESISTANCE TO THROWING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/73905</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Results of a study of the relationship between the joggle of a switch points 60-300-1:9 and its position against the base plate.  It appears that the joggle stipulated in standards should not be considered as valid for all lengths of points especially those with an ordinary lock as this may be contrary to the need for play, which may be small, between the blade and the base plate.  Joggle has a considerable effect on the mechanical characteristics of the blade and determines its elastic resistance when points are thrown.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jul 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/73905</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NEW MANUAL DEVICE FOR LOCKING POINTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/45920</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A new system for looking points by means of a manual device was developed because of the heavier profile of the UIC 60 rail and because of the need to replace point locks and switch tongue locks by a single manual locking device with open and closed points.  The author explains the method of installing and operating and the new manual system for all types of switches.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/45920</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>REFINEMENT OF THE TECHNIQUE OF SIGNAL BOX MAINTENANCE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/36837</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article provides a scientific basis to the methodology for signal box preventive maintenance work.  It also presents the test results (bench tests) obtained with the electric control mechanism of SP-3 type switches, in connection with high-speed train operation.  The article goes on to explain a method of determining the period for verifying adhesion of the switch tongue to the stock rail.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/36837</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>BIBLIOGRAPHY -- NEW YARD TECHNIQUES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/9870</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Bibliography covering the following areas: yards and terminals, switch point control, eddy current retarders, hydraulics, cable systems, herringbones, marshalling yards in Japan, and simultaneous switching.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 04 Jan 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/9870</guid>
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