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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>Bilevel Optimization in the Context of Intermodal Pricing: State of Art</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1370539</link>
      <description><![CDATA[With the rising interest to stimulate intermodal transport, determining pricing strategies can be intrinsically challenging. The authors provide a review on the current state of research in intermodal pricing, through which they identify a peculiar gap in optimization approaches. A suggestion to exploit the bilevel optimization technique is presented, as well as an account of its widely successful application to price setting problems. The different approaches to express the network users’ behavior, regarded as the lower level problem, are highlighted together with the particular modeling aspects of intermodal networks.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2015 18:02:47 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1370539</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>The myth of traffic-responsive signal control: Why common sense does not always make sense</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1356092</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Intuitively, one is inclined to think that traffic-responsive signal control is the most efficient control policy. In this paper, however, the authors show that for an intersection of two routes connecting one origin–destination pair where only one route is subject to congestion, anticipatory signal control performs better than traffic-responsive signal control. Furthermore, the unfolded logic behind this result suggests that the superiority of anticipatory signal control also extends to other networks.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2015 13:43:58 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1356092</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Toward System-Optimal Routing in Traffic Networks: A Reverse Stackelberg Game Approach</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1342448</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the literature, several road pricing methods based on hierarchical Stackelberg games have been proposed to reduce congestion in traffic networks. The authors propose three novel schemes to apply the extended reverse Stackelberg game, through which traffic authorities can induce drivers to follow routes that are computed to reach a system-optimal distribution of traffic on the available routes of a freeway, e.g., to minimize the total time spent of traffic in the network and to reduce traffic emissions in urban traffic networks. In this game-theoretical approach, the leader player representing the traffic authority communicates with the followers (drivers) via an onboard computer, in which the main instrument of the leader is the so-called leader function. This function maps the follower's decision space into the leader's decision space, resulting in a leader decision that is directly dependent on the follower's decision variables. Compared with the original game, solution methods developed for the general reverse Stackelberg game can be relied on and show that a system-optimal behavior can be reached, while taking heterogeneous driver classes into account.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2015 09:54:57 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1342448</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Urban Parking Space Management via Dynamic Performance-Based Pricing</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1336899</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In congested urban areas, it remains a pressing challenge to reduce unnecessary vehicle circling for parking while at the same time maximize parking space utilization. In observance of new information technologies that have become readily accessible to drivers and parking agencies, the authors develop a dynamic non-cooperative bi-level model (i.e. Stackelberg leader-follower game) to set parking prices in real-time for effective parking access and space utilization. The model is expected to fit into an integrated parking pricing and management system, where parking reservations and transactions are facilitated by sensing and informatics infrastructures, that ensures the availability of convenient spaces at equilibrium market prices. It is shown with numerical examples that the proposed dynamic parking pricing model has the potential to virtually eliminate vehicle circling for parking, which results in significant reduction in adverse socioeconomic externalities such as traffic congestion and emissions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:48:11 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1336899</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Optimizing intersections</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1334934</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In this paper the authors optimize the regulation of an intersection of two routes connecting one origin–destination pair and study the effects of priority rules, traffic lights and tolls. The authors show that when the intersection is regulated by a priority rule the optimal policy is generally to block one of the two routes. When the intersection is regulated by traffic lights, it can only be optimal to leave both routes open when both routes are subject to congestion or if a toll is levied.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2014 12:09:56 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1334934</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>A Bi-level Formulation for the Combined Dynamic Equilibrium based Traffic Signal Control</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1259102</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper formulates the combined dynamic user equilibrium and signal control problem (DUESC) as a bi-level optimization problem. The signal control operator in the upper level optimizes the signal setting to minimize the system travel time whereas the road users in the lower level minimize their own costs (by changing departure times, paths or both) leading to dynamic user equilibrium behavior. Three components of the bi-level formulation are discussed including network loading model, the dynamic user equilibrium model and the signal control model. Then the combined problems are formulated as a Nash-Cournot game and a Stackelberg game. A solution technique based on the iterative optimization and assignment (IOA) method is proposed to solve the DUESC problem. The authors use the projection algorithm to solve the lower level and the mixed integer programming solver to solve the upper level. Extensive numerical results demonstrate the benefits of using this model.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2013 17:23:22 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1259102</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A Dual Variable Approximation-Based Descent Method for a Bi-level Continuous Dynamic Network Design Problem</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1118612</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The transportation network design problem (NDP) considers modifying network topology or parameters, such as capacity, to optimize system performance by taking into account the selfish routing behavior of road users. The nature of the problem lends itself to a bi-level formulation of a problem that represents a static case of a Stackelberg game. The NDP is complex because users’ individual objectives do not necessarily align with system-wide objectives and it is difficult to determine the optimal allocation of limited resources. To solve the bi-level dynamic NDP, this study develops a dual variable approximation-based heuristic. This dual variable identifies the system-wide gradient as a descent direction and designs an iterative solution framework. Descent direction-based approaches designed to solve bi-level programming problems typically suffer from non-differentiability, which can hamper the solution process. The proposed method addresses this issue by approximating the descent direction with dual variables that correspond to cell transmission model constraints and using the constructed rational direction to iteratively decrease the upper-level objective while maintaining the feasibility of the lower-level program. The proposed method was empirically applied to three networks of various sizes. The results obtained from this empirical solution were compared with the results from an exact Kth-best algorithm and a genetic algorithm. The results demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed descent method.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Oct 2011 12:52:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1118612</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Games &amp; Their Applications in the Optimal Toll Design Problem, the Energy Markets Liberalization Problem, and in the Theory and Incentives</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/901195</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This book describes how inverse (or reverse) Stackelberg games have become the subject of recent game theory research, as a special type or as an extension of Stackelberg games. So far, there is very little theory about inverse Stackelberg games available and the available theory is still in its development stages. This book focuses on theoretically solving such problems and it proposes to treat several challenging problems in various fields inside this framework. In Stackelberg games, a so-called leader determines actions for one or more so-called followers. The problem of finding an optimal strategy for the leader in these games is in general very hard to solve, and often completely unsolvable. Starting from simple static problems and proceeding to more difficult dynamic ones, the book shows how to find the optimal strategy for the leader in a heuristic manner. This book proposes the application of game theory in the following domains: (1) the optimal toll design problem; (2) the electricity markets liberalization problem; and (3) the theory of incentives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2009 07:53:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/901195</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Bi-Level Optimal Toll Design Problem Solved by the Inverse Stackelberg Games Approach</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/793753</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper considers the special type of Stackelberg games known as inverse (or reverse) Stackelberg games and their application to the problem of bi-level optimal toll design in road traffic systems. On a given strongly connected network the paper assumes a non-cooperative game with two levels of players: the road authority as a leader and travelers as followers. The paper considers the road authority with two possible objectives: It either tries to maximize the total toll revenue or to minimize the total travel time of the network by setting tolls on toll roads, while the travelers minimize their travel costs by choosing their travel behavior. In the analysis of traffic systems, link-travel times are modeled as link performance functions, relating travel time to the volume of traffic on the link. These functions are typically smooth, nonlinear, positive, and strictly increasing with link flow. The paper defines link tolls as functions of one or more link flows of the network. Starting from small networks with several origin-destination pairs we analytically find the optimal toll functions for the road authority with the lower level defined by the deterministic user-equilibrium model. The main contributions of this paper are the application of the new field of inverse Stackelberg games in traffic problems and finding the solution to these problems analytically. In order to define the toll as a function of the link flows seems to be very practical and can help to solve, for example, the congestion problems in densely populated areas.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2006 09:15:41 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/793753</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Economic Analysis of Collecting Parking Fees by a Private Firm</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/783596</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of this paper is to show the possibility of a co-existence of public and private parking management systems even when all the parking spaces are owned by the government. This study focuses on the issue of collecting parking fees by a private firm that has been used by some local governments in Taiwan. We assume that the government behaves as a leader and a private firm as a follower in a Stackelberg three-stage game. At stage 1, the government selects its parking space. At stage 2, the government and the firm set their parking fees simultaneously. At the final stage, consumers (drivers) choose the parking lot between the space of the government and that of the firm by considering the full costs, consisting of the parking fee and the searching (with congestion) time cost. The objective of the government is to maximize welfare and that of the firm is to maximize profit. The model is constructed at first and a simulation analysis is then made. The result supports the strategy of adopting the franchise of collecting parking fees if the private firm is more efficient than the government. Moreover, the government may keep fewer parking spaces and release more parking spaces to the firm under the goal of maximizing welfare.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Jul 2006 09:42:57 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/783596</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Integrating Prospect Theory and Stackelberg Games to Model Strategic Dyad Behavior of Information Providers and Travelers: Theory and Numerical Simulations</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/777891</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Existing policy models of optimal guidance strategies are typically concerned with single-objective optimization based on reliable forecasts in terms of the consistency between predicted and observed aggregate activity–travel patterns. The interaction and interdependencies between policy objective and individuals have not received much attention. This paper considers how one specific activity schedule choice—namely, the start time of an activity chosen by individual travelers under guidance information—aggregates to form an equilibrium distribution, which in turn influences guidance generation and determines the best possible achievement of the policy objective. These choices are formalized as the outcomes of a Stackelberg game in which a traveler’s behavior model is integrated with prospect theory. The properties of the model are examined by using numerical computer simulations. The results of the simulations support the face validity of the formulated model.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Mar 2006 14:02:02 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/777891</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Applicability of Noncooperative Game Theory in Transport Systems Analysis</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/776241</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Various models that incorporate concepts from Non-Cooperative Game Theory are described in the transport literature. Game Theory provides powerful tools for analyzing transport systems, but these tools have some drawbacks, which should be recognized. This paper reviews the games that describe transport problems and discusses them within a uniform context. Although the paper does not introduce new tools, it presents insights concerning the relations between transport models and games. The paper divided existing games into groups and show that some common features characterize multiple games. It distinguished between games that make a conceptual contribution and games that are suitable for application. Compact or symmetric game structures make remarkable observations but often do not support actual decision-making. Less aesthetic formats, most of which are Stackelberg games between authorities and travelers, are stronger as instruments that assist in determining real-life policies; these formulations can be treated by practitioners as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and not as games.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Mar 2006 10:18:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/776241</guid>
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