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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI : THE HEART OF THE FRISCO, 1955</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/682826</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article profiles Springfield, Missouri, which was the hub for the St.  Louis-San Francisco (Frisco) Railway in its heyday. When the Frisco merged with the Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis shortly after the turn of the 20th century, Springfield became the point where the north-south and east-west lines merged. The Frisco emerged from a 14- year bankruptcy in 1947, Clark Hungerford was elected its president. It flourished in the 1950s, as industries sprang up all around and its markets extended into the Southwest and other parts of the region. Much of the plant and improvements from that era remain, now under the control of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe, which still operates trains through the junction, mainly intermodal trains and unit trains of coal headed from the Powder River Basin to power plants in the southeast.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2003 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/682826</guid>
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      <title>DISPATCHING BY COMPUTER: WHY? HOW MUCH? HOW SOON?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/85294</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Centralization and computerization of train dispatching have reached various levels on different railroads. Minicomputers and microprocessors are adding new dimensions to dispatching.  Examples of levels of sophistication on Chessie System, Louisville & Nashville, Frisco and British Columbia Railway are described, along with general observations on automation of train movements and planning.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 May 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/85294</guid>
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      <title>RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: COLLISION OF ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY TRAINS 3210 AND 3211, MUSTANG, OKLAHOMA, SEPTEMBER 1, 1974</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/28841</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On September 1, 1974, at 1:44 to 1:46 p.m., the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company's eastbound freight train 3210 and westbound train 3211 collided head-on 1.7 miles west of Mustang, Oklahoma. The trains were scheduled to meet in Mustang. However, train 3211 passed Mustang ahead of schedule. As a result of the collision, 4 locomotive units were destroyed, 23 cars derailed, and hazardous materials caught fire in the wreckage. As a result of the fire, eight families were evacuated from their homes. A brakeman on train 3211 was killed, and the three other crewmembers of that train were injured seriously. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the crew of train 3211 to take preventive action after the train passed Mustang ahead of schedule.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Oct 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/28841</guid>
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      <title>RAIL WEAR TESTS ON THE ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/18765</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Two curves on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway were selected for rail wear tests.  The section having a slightly lower rate of wear in past service was not lubricated.  The other curve had a "Meco" single rail lubrication using graphite grease at the far end of its two curves.  The effectiveness of the lubrication was gaged by taking rail profiles at various intervals of time.  These profiles show the amount of steel worn from the heads of the rail gage. Elevation and curvature of the high rail were measured at each point where a profile was taken.  Seven sets of profiles were taken of the rails undergoing the tests.  The profiles show significantly less wear on the curve with the track lubricator than on the curve with no lubrication.  The effectiveness of molybdenum-disulphide was tested as a rail lubricant.  Its application showed less wear rate.  These service tests definitely show that track lubricators are effective and can double the life of the outer rail in the presence of heavy sanding.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Jul 1976 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/18765</guid>
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      <title>PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC (PAT) ON THE ST. LOUIS- SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/15635</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The primary objective of this computer system is to measure the profitability of all carload and TOFC linehaul traffic handled by the Frisco system.  It utilizes data from a number of computer systems, including revenue data from the Revenue Accounting System, operating and equipment data from the Frisco Management Information and Control System NMICS), equipment utilization and cost data from the Equipment Accounting System, and cost data from the Cost Accounting System.  Costing is unique, as the system links actual physical activities and equipment requirements to each carload or trailerload of freight handled.  For example, each load costed reflects the actual.  a) empty return ratio; b) equipment turnaround; c) Frisco liability for equipment hire; d) linehaul costs for actual route moved, including backhauls and out-of-route moves; e) switching costs, by terminal and function; f) TOFC terminal costs, by terminal and function; g) tare weights of equipment; and h) net weight of contents.  After processing to determine profitability, all data is stored on magnetic tape.  Users can secure an analysis of any traffic movement, defined as broadly or as narrowly as desired.  Primary uses are in pricing decisions, analysis of equipment utilization and profitability, and meeting information requirements in regulatory proceedings.  Concept, design, and development of the system were entirely by Frisco Railway personnel.  The system was implemented late in 1972.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/15635</guid>
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      <title>THE ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/10914</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The book's subtitle, "The Thirty-Fifth Parallel Project, 1853-1890," indicates the aspirations of organizers of the pioneer company.  The goal was establishment of a snow-free route to the coast followed by a push north to San Francisco.  Five different railway corporations attempted to do this between 1850 and 1890; all failed due to accidents of timing, faulty administration, labor troubles, fickle public sentiment and apparently the whims of fate. Santa Fe took control of the Frisco in 1890 and itself went into receivership in 1893.  In the reorganization, Santa Fe retained A&P's Western Division which is today the Santa Fe main line across New Mexico and Arizona.  Some years previoulsy Frisco had been forced to relinquish the land grants that had led to the building of this isolated western section.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/10914</guid>
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      <title>THE SOUND ENVIRONMENT IN LOCOMOTIVE CABS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2139</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Measurements of the sound environment in locomotive cabs including audible warnings perceived by crew members are described.  Data was collected during two different test runs under diverse conditions, one on the Long Island R.R. and the other on the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway.  The crew's working environment was found to approach the exposure limits set in the Walsh-Healey Public Contract Service Act.  Tape recordings from each run indicate the following elements as significant: engine noise, horn sounds and air brake application noise.  Data indicate sound level readings taken under various operating conditions in the cab.  The study does not include a definition of legal exposure from observed data.  The study suggests that because measurements of noise level in a typical locomotive cab approach the limits allowed in the Walsh-Healy Act, a more detailed survey would be desirable to determine whether exposure do exceed legal limits, and if so under what conditions.  Forms of frequency analysis used in the study are also explained.  (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 21 Jan 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2139</guid>
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