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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <item>
      <title>INTERNATIONAL MARINE NUCLEAR STANDARDS CROSS INDEX--VOLUMES I AND II</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/20489</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The National Maritime Research Center--Galveston set up a Task in April 1973, to Prepare International Standards for Commercial Nuclear Ships.  The objective was to prepare a cross-reference document which lists all of the available national and international standards and regulations for commercial nuclear ship construction and operation.  To implement this task, a world wide correspondence was initiated.  Replies from 53 addressees were received, of which 38 were considered useful and meaningful at this time. From these were chosen the following: IMCO & IAEA; South Africa Atomic Energy Board; New Zealand AEC; N.S. Savannah--Port Operation Criteria; Otto Hahn--Technical Safety Evaluation; Safety of Life at Sea Convention; Babcock & Wilcox; USAEC: United States Coast Guard; U.S. Navy; Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers; American Bureau of Shipping; Lloyds Register; Germanischer Lloyd; Registro Italiano; Bureau Veritas; Nippon Kaiji Kyokai; N.S. Savannah Safety Assessment; Brazil National Nuclear Energy Commission; U.S.S.R. Register of Shipping. Volume I (32 pages) consists of the resulting regulatory data and state-of-the-art information which has been divided into 30 broad headings with additional subheadings covering every phase of the nuclear ship concept.  A supporting compendium, Volume II (832 pages), consists of a linear, full text presentation of the principal sources previously listed, plus several additional sources related only to the Insurance, Liability and Indemnity Title.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/20489</guid>
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      <title>NS SAVANNAH NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION AND SAFETY SYSTEM. REVISION 1</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3332</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Information developed by the Savannah's nuclear instrumentation and safety system is vital for the intelligent and safe control of the reactor. In this text the operation and characteristics of the entire system are described for the reactor trainee. The text is divided into two parts:  Part 1, Radiation Physics and Nuclear Detectors, and Part 2, System Description.  Part 1 includes the principles of radiation detector operation and a description of the Savannah's neutron detectors. The function and operation of the nuclear instrumentation and safety system, including a description of each component, is covered in Part 2.  Detailed schematic diagrams of individual components are avoided where adequate knowledge can be gained without these diagrams. The function of the system is emphasized rather than the circuitry involved.  As a result, the reader needs only an elementary understanding of electronics. (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 May 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3332</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>SAVANNAH NUCLEAR POWER. NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION TESTING AND PERFORMANCE FROM PRE-FUELING CHECK TO 100 PERCENT POWER</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3133</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Pre-operational tests and operational calibration of the nuclear instrumentation and safety systems were carried out for the N.S. Savannah.  Pre-startup equipment check ensured proper function of instrumentation prior to reactor fuel installation, and provided calibration data for future operational evaluation.  Overlap between the various channels of nuclear instrumentation during initial rise in reactor power was determined sufficient to allow safe operation at any level.  Power range channels were calibrated using data derived from heat balance during power operation.  Nuclear instrumentation was adjusted following reactor stabilization at a power level determined by the heat balance.  The procedure was repeated at various levels from initial approach to full reactor power.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 13 Apr 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3133</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>NS SAVANNAH, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN REPORT ESI-2(B)-1</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3007</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A current summary of recommendations is made of a functional analysis report of the various reactor systems for the N.S. Savannah.  A summary of general recommendations includes controls, annunciators, instrument power supplies, thermocouple lead wires, and diaphragm operated valve indicating lights.  Detailed recommendations include nuclear instrumentation and safety, reactor control, cooling, buffer seal, sampling, waste collection and disposal, radiation monitoring, and primary and secondary systems.  Recommendations are given for the control air supply and measurement of steam generators and pressurizer water levels.  Equipment placement recommendations are also provided for the buffer seal system.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3007</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>FAIL-SAFE AND COINCIDENCE CIRCUITRY ON REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEM</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2924</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Proposed revisions for the safety system on the N.S. Savannah include fail-safe circuitry to ensure scram action whenever scram conditions exist, and coincident circuitry to require two of three signals prior to scram to prevent spurious outages.  Fail-safe circuitry will initiate a scram signal in the event a circuit or channel cannot carry one.  Applied to two out of three coincident circuitry, a scram must be initiated on an auctioneered basis involving the remaining two channels after failure of any one channel. Existing nuclear scram circuits are not considered adequately fail-safe for operation of the N.S. Savannah.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2924</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NS SAVANNAH CASUALTY ANALYSIS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2926</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A review is made of Babcock and Wilcox's "Casualty Analysis", dated July 15, 1959, for the purpose of determining whether the functions and conditons described in that document are correct, adequate, and in agreement with the interconnection wiring and control diagrams.  The extent of the review was determined solely by information supplied in the forementioned publication.  This review incorporates approved field changes, but no corrections to drawings are made though certain conditons are noted for future upgrading.  It is recommended that Babcock & Wilcox's "Casualty Analysis" be revised to bring it up to date, to correct specified errors, and to incorporate several omissions.  It also suggests that the systems be rechecked after the revisions are made to determine their safety.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 1974 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2926</guid>
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      <title>NS SAVANNAH SCRAM SEQUENCE INDICATOR. INSTRUCTION MANUAL AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3334</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The N.S. Savannah scram sequence indicator system determines the sequence of the first seven scram signals received from the nuclear instrumentation alarm and scram panels. This solid-state, digital system comprises 20 modules (18 sequence display modules, one counter module, and one driver module) and has three power supplies. The system and its individual components are described in this manual. The functions of the various components in system operation are detailed, along with maintenance and test instructions for components and circuitry.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 Jun 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3334</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FEASIBILITY STUDY OF METHODS FOR DETERMINATION OF KINETIC STABILITY IN THE NMSR</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2994</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Presented is a review of the theoretical studies and analogue simulation studies of the NS Savannah power system which predict that the NMSR will be a stable reactor under normal and some accidental operating conditions. Investigation indicates that of possible measurements which may be performed on shipboard to determine the NMSR stability experimentally, a pile noise analysis is the most desirable.  This would give a semi-quantitative evaluation of the power coefficients, and would involve a minimum of reactor time.  Two approaches are discussed: the direct measurement of pile noise performed for frequencies above about 1 cps; and autocorrelation techniques which could be supplemental for lower frequencies and which would conserve reactor time at the expense of calculation time. If the noise analysis exhibited any tendency toward instability, then a pile oscillator analysis could be used to obtain a precise measurement of the total transfer function.  The NS Savannah rods can be oscillated suitably for frequencies below 1 cps. Final analysis of the detailed transfer function would aid in discovering the cause of any such instability.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2994</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>MARVEL-SCHEBLER CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM-ELECTRONICS REPAIR GUIDE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3277</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report covers the various circuits of the drive system, giving description of circuit operation and trouble shooting steps.  Included are circuit diagrams and tables of circuit characteristics.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3277</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NS SAVANNAH HIGH-TEMPERATURE SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENT MANUAL AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3313</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Babcock & Wilcox hightemperature safety system for the N.S. Savannah reactor monitors and indicates temperature conditions at four locations in the primary loop of the reactor.  It reacts to excessive temperatures, which lead to reactor scram, and causes the reactor to shut down before damage occurs. The system and its individual components are described in this manual. The functons of the various components and circuits in system operation are detailed, along with maintenance and adjustment instructions required for normal operation. Layout diagrams for the various modules land manufacturer's data sheets for those units fabricated by B&W) are included in the appendix at the back of the manual.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 May 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3313</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MARITIME NUCLEAR STEAM GENERATOR</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3221</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The current status of the 630A Nuclear Steam Generator is reported.  The 630A Nuclear Steam Generator consists of an air-cooled, water-moderated reactor using metallic fuel elements, a once-through water tube boiler, two axial-flow blowers, lead and water shielding controls, and necessary auxiliary equipment.  The design, safety features, overall configuration, and operating cycle for a 27,300-SHP version of the 630A are summarized. Information is included on the design and characteristics of the reactor shield plug assembly, boiler, pressure vessel, shield containment vessel, shield, nuclear steam generator accessories, handling and service equipment, fuel elements, control systems, control rods, cooling systems, critical experiments, power cycles, and blower systems.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 04 May 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3221</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE MARVEL-SCHEBLER CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM DESIGN REVIEW</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3222</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The results and conclusions of a design review of the Marvel-Schebler control rod drive system are presented. The review included studies of mechanical design, electronic and electrical circultry, component reliability, system reliability, system logic, component and logic failures, and system relationship to reactor safety.  Work was not completed on the fault analysis, system packaging, and test recommendations.(Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 04 May 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3222</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NS SAVANNAH INSTRUMENTATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3247</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The complex instrumentation and control systems initially installed aboard the N.S. Savannah obtained large amounts of unnecessary data for routine operation.  A new instrumentation program improved plant operations and safety, increased efficiency, and reduced maintenance.  A plan was developed for overall plant instrumentation simplification directed toward propulsion system automation. The main control console would then be reduced to a one-man operation, reducing the number of instrument maintenance personnel required by providing a system of modular construction.  The value of each indicator on the control console was evaluated on an individual basis.  A preliminary design provides throttle control of a nuclear propulsion plant from the navigational bridge.  A replacement bridge console and control station is being developed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3247</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NS SAVANNAH, EVALUATION OF INSTRUMENTATION FOR DETERMINATION OF POWER LEVELS AND FUEL DEPLETION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/3099</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The adequacy of existing instrumentation for measuring reactor power levels is evaluated along with study methods for improving this accuracy.  Assessment is made of the possibility of using a computer coupled with a recorder for computing and recording power levels for use in determining fuel depletion in the reactor core.  The two general investigation categories of power level determination are non-nuclear instruments measuring flow, temperature, and pressure with the possible use of a computer and recorder, and nuclear instruments with a computer and recorder.  The extent and estimated degree of accuracy which may be expected with the use of existing and recommended instrumentation equipment is outlined for determining core-depletion rate.  An analysis of all pertinent facets of a nuclear instrumentation approach to core-depletion measurement serves as a comparison with existing instrumentation and provides an alternate method for core-depletion rate determination.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/3099</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SAFEGUARDS REPORT, ADDITIONAL DESIGN FEATURES, NS SAVANNAH, SUPPLEMENT TO VOLUME 1</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2946</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Additional safeguards cited refer to reactor compartment ventilation and the monitoring of reactor compartment leakage.  A continuous monitoring system for containment vessel leakage is also considered.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 1973 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2946</guid>
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