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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <item>
      <title>The saddle effect of financial leverage in vessel acquisitions</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2635297</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This study examines the impact of debt financing decisions on return on equity (ROE) in vessel acquisitions. Shipowning companies rely heavily on debt capital to finance vessel purchases, even when sufficient equity is available, due to the benefits of financial leverage. To support decision-making, this study derives a formula that models ROE as a function of debt ratio, cost of debt, and debt tenure. The study reveals that ROE exhibits saddle points depending on specific combinations of cost and duration of debt. These points indicate that the application of debt capital will boost ROE up to certain project-specific inflection points related to combinations of cost of debt and debt tenure. Beyond these inflection points, the application of debt capital lowers ROE. These findings contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on corporate finance and maritime transportation. The study also provides financial managers with a formula to evaluate the effect of debt capital structure on the ROE of vessel acquisition projects. Ultimately, the study supports informed debt financing decision-making in the shipping industry.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2026 08:52:38 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2635297</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Valuation of Buyout Options in Comprehensive Development Agreements</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/912586</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This project investigates the feasibility of and develops an economic valuation model for buyout options in Comprehensive Development Agreements (CDAs). A CDA is a form of public-private partnership in which the right to price and collect revenues from toll roads is leased to a private entity for a finite but lengthy period of time in exchange for providing local and state governments with a quick influx of cash and/or additional infrastructure. Uncertainty associated with such long-term leases is of substantial public concern. In particular, there is a sentiment that the state and/or municipal governments may not be sufficiently compensated for the forfeited development opportunities and the possibility of lost revenue due to higher-than-expected future growth during the lifetime of the lease. An under-studied aspect of the problem is the feasibility and economic value of an option for the government to buy back the leased infrastructure at a future date prior to lease expiration. Such an option would give the public sector additional control over the future use of leased facilities and address potential concerns regarding long-run uncertainty and possible unforeseen windfalls for the private sector. The developed buyout option valuation model can aid transportation policymakers in decisions on leasing public infrastructure. Project deliverables include: feasibility assessment of buyout options, an economic valuation model for buyout option in a CDA, and identification of methods, data, and parameters required to apply the model to evaluation of buyout options in actual (planned or existing) CDAs.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 10:59:10 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/912586</guid>
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      <title>AVOIDING CUSTOMER AND TAXPAYER BAILOUTS IN PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: POLICY TOWARD LEVERAGE, RISK ALLOCATION, AND BANKRUPTCY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/703398</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Many private infrastructure projects mix regulation that subjects the private company to considerable risk, a government or regulator that is reluctant to see the company go bankrupt, and high leverage on the part of the company. If all goes well, equity holders make a profit, debt holders are repaid, customers pay no more than they expected, and the government is not called upon to bail the company out. If all goes badly enough, however, the prospect of bankruptcy will loom. Unwilling to see the company go bankrupt, however, the regulator will have to permit an unscheduled price increase, or the government will have to inject taxpayers' money into the firm. In other words, the combination means customers and taxpayers bear more risk than would appear from the regulations governing the private infrastructure project. This paper examines how these problems have played out in five cases. The cases examined include examples involving public transit franchises, air traffic services, toll roads, electricity and railroad tracks. Then the paper describes how governments and regulators can quantify the extent of the problems and, using option-pricing techniques, value the customer and taxpayer guarantees involved. Finally, it analyzes three options for mitigating the problem: making bankruptcy a more credible threat, limiting the private operator's leverage, and reducing the private operator's exposure to risk. The paper concludes that appropriate policy depends on the tax system, the feasibility of enforcing bankruptcy, and the benefits from transferring risk from taxpayers to the private sector.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Aug 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/703398</guid>
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      <title>COMPETITION IN SHIP HANDLING: A STUDY OF MARKET TURBULENCE IN NORTH EUROPEAN HARBOUR TOWAGE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/659489</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper addresses the issues of an increasingly competitive towage industry in Northern European ports.  Enhanced competitiveness reflects the trends in the global mobility of capital, labor, enterprise, and management within the context of deregulated port markets.  Up until the early 1990s, the long term trend in major North European ports had been toward market concentration.  Many small towage firms have been taken over, bought out, or merged.  Alternatively, a pattern of consortia has emerged with cooperation and market sharing seen as preferable to ruinous competition.  A contrasting trend has occurred in the 1990s, with new entrants into hitherto stable markets.  In a number of ports--Antwerp, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Southampton, Thamesport, and Bristol Channel--new fleets have brought competitive challenge to the incumbent towage fleets. The process of enhanced competitiveness raises questions of safety, reliability, investment, and professionalism.  The movement toward an openly competitive shipping industry has been in evidence from the 1960s onward.  The momentum of a dynamic shipping industry, with its competitiveness sharpened by the use of global supply factors, has intensified from that period.  The movement in European tonnage toward flags of convenience and global labor supplies began in the tanker and bulk carrier markets; more recently this has spread to deep sea liner, short sea, and even cabotage trade shipping.  The towage industry is the last North European shipping sector to make this transition, following the trends toward port deregulation in the 1990s.  From this perspective, this paper considers the impact on the towage market of global mobility and deregulation in North European towage markets--the impact of increased competition on the traditional operators and the likely effect on operational towage standards.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Sep 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/659489</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DRAMATIC EVENTS IN TOLLING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/657480</link>
      <description><![CDATA[TransCore, the largest tolling system integrator, is buying Amtech, the largest toll systems manufacturer, in the most dramatic consolidation in a decade.  It puts together in TransCore the largest toll systems company in the world.  Regular battery-powered toll transponders are already being used to pay for McDonald's hamburgers and other items in drive-through lanes in southern California.  In Texas, Amtech has been active promoting the use of toll transponders for parking payment and access to gated communities and employee parking lots.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 02 Jul 2000 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/657480</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>NORTHWEST CRISIS A TEST FOR LBOS.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/530400</link>
      <description><![CDATA[8 ASIDEBAR: CHAPTER 11 "MOST LIKELY."]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 May 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/530400</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE LEVERAGE TREATMENT.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/515565</link>
      <description><![CDATA[8 ASUBTITLE: WHEN NORTHWEST AIRLINES WAS TAKEN OVER BY AL CHECCHI AND HIS INVESTOR GROUP WINGS HOLDINGS, THE AIRLINE'S DEBT INCREASED ALMOST FIVEFOLD OVERNIGHT: IS THIS IMPEDING THE CARRIER'S GROWTH?]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Sep 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/515565</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ABF THRIVES AFTER LEVERAGED BUYOUT WITH LEAN ATTACK ON BIG THREE CARRIERS.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/528181</link>
      <description><![CDATA[8 ASIDEBAR: ABF FORMS LTL MEXICAN ALLIANCE.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Sep 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/528181</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ABF THRIVES AFTER LEVERAGED BUYOUT WITH LEAN ATTACK ON BIG THREE CARRIERS.</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/528182</link>
      <description><![CDATA[8 ASIDEBAR: ABF FORMS LTL MEXICAN ALLIANCE.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Sep 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/528182</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WINGS -- THE LBO LEGACY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/347270</link>
      <description><![CDATA[HOLDING COMPANY OWNER OF NORTHWEST AIRLINES TABLES: NORTHWEST'S BALANCE SHEETS (PRE-LBO NWA END '88, POST-LBO NWA END '89, JULY 1991 WINGS HOLDINGS). -- WINGS HOLDINGS INC : PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (FEB. 23-DEC. 31, 1989, YEAR 1990, JAN.-JU- LY 1991)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 1992 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/347270</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, AND EXCESSIVE DEBT ON THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/351907</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Within the past several years, takeover bids for airline carriers have been in vogue.  The individuals bidding for these airlines have been attracted by the high level of concentration which has occurred since the advent of deregulation.  A handful of mega-carriers which have amassed enormous market power now dominate the skies.  By developing hubs at major airports, the airlines have in essence created "mini-monopolies" in which they can maintain relatively stable prices.  This concentration is reinforced, moreover, by the incumbents' use of frequent flyer programs and ownership of computerized reservation systems.  This, coupled with an industry-wide increase in cash-flow and a belief that carriers' assets are undervalued, make these companies prime takeover targets.  The recent trend in hostile takeover bids for airlines, however, may bring the industry to the precipice of economic catastrophe.  An industry which has been marginally profitable during most of the 1980's cannot afford to be saddled with the mountain of debt which can result from hostile takeovers or leveraged buyouts.  This paper examines this situation in greater detail, pointing out the key factors which reinforce such a situation and presenting examples of the detriment of excessive debt and takeover speculation on the airline industry and the national economy.  It is concluded that the airline industry needs limited regulation which will help return to it the element of stability.  The following recommendations are made:  (A) Formulate legislation giving the government broader oversight of debt-financed takeovers; (B) Provide tax incentives favoring the use of equity instead of debt; and (C) Require airline acquirers to disclose their intent, subject to fines if they make false statements.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Jan 1991 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/351907</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON THE DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/348180</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article discusses the negative impacts of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) on the U.S. domestic airline industry.  An overview of LBOs concludes that, rather than increasing management efficiency, there is growing evidence that the leverage binge is beginning to hobble management.  During the 1980s corporate America has retired nearly $500 billion in equity while taking on almost $1 trillion in debt. Currently, interest payments absorb 30% of cash flow.  An outline is presented of the potential financial, safety, labor relations and competitive impacts of LBOs.  In conclusion it is pointed out that, despite the riskiness of their financial profile, airlines currently make attractive LBO candidates for three main reasons:  (1) Industry consolidation means fewer companies control larger market shares, resulting in potential sustained profitability and cash flows for the remaining firms; (2) Airlines now have enormous amounts of asset value, especially companies that own fleets of aircraft; and (3) Most other industries have already restructured, leaving airlines as one of the few remaining opportunities to realize major gains.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Oct 1990 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/348180</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DRAWING A LINE ON AIRLINE OWNERSHIP</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/331783</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Oct 1990 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/331783</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EXPERTS DIVIDED ON VIABILITY OF UNITED BUYOUT PROPOSAL</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/332525</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Oct 1990 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/332525</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AMTRAK BILL GETS RAIL BUY-OUT RIDER : DOT, OMB RECOMMEND PRESIDENTIAL VETO</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/332854</link>
      <description><![CDATA[RIDER ON AMTRAK AUTHORIZATION BILL REQUIRING ICC REVIEW OF THE PURCHASE OF CLASS I RAILROADS BY NONCARRIERS]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Oct 1990 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/332854</guid>
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