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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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    <item>
      <title>What price bunkers?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1345203</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Next year, the price of fuel may well be uppermost in shipowners' thoughts. Damian Brett explains why.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2015 11:45:01 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1345203</guid>
    </item>
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      <title>Fueling with natural gas : when will the Great Lakes have LNG bunkering</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1344962</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2015 11:41:24 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1344962</guid>
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      <title>MARINE HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL ERROR: A DATA EVALUATION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/448072</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper details the strengths and weaknesses of available data and proposes specific expansions to aid studies of Human and Organizational Error (HOE) in the marine environment.  Although this paper is closely targeted to the marine oil transportation industry and oil spills, it should be considered relevant to all marine activities involving hazardous materials.  Applicability of data to the current  research in loading and discharge operations (LDO) is noted; however absence of LDO information does not necessarily imply that the data is not useful for HOE in other operations.  We have endeavored to find all possible sources of information though it is possible some have been overlooked.  Missed sources are likely to be either of minor importance to oil spills, or are original sources which have been combined into higher level of summary reports.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 20 Oct 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/448072</guid>
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      <title>ENTRAINMENT METHOD ENHANCED TO ACCOUNT FOR OIL'S WATER CONTENT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/450731</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A method for estimating minimum oil-flow velocity in an oil-water multiphase stream sufficient to entrain all free water has been improved to account for water volume in the flowing oil. Removing all free water in a flowing oil-water stream eliminates a separated settled-water phase which could cause corrosion damage to the transfer lines. Such harmful oil field impurities as hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide dissolved in the free-water phase can contribute to the problem. The method is reviewed here as a basis for presenting the improved approach for calculating the minimum flow velocity that takes into consideration water content already in the oil.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Sep 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/450731</guid>
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      <title>DIGITAL SENSOR PROVIDES NEW METHOD FOR OIL CUSTODY TRANSFER</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/427129</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A joint field verification test showed that a digital level sensor was an acceptable alternative in oil custody transfer for tank truck sales. The sensor, manufactured by Remote Operating Systems (ROS) of San Antonio, sends a digital signal that can be transmitted through a telephone modem to any desired office. Union Pacific Resources (UPRC), the operator, conducted the study with Scurlock Permian Corp. (SPC) during 1993. In 1994, the oil and gas division of the Railroad Commission of Texas accepted the digital level controller as an alternative measurement device to tank gauging and lease automated custody transfer in Texas. The sensor is installed in oil storage tanks and consists of a 1.5-in. sealed tube surrounded by a circular float.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/427129</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>LIBERIAN TANK VESSEL M/V SEATIGER EXPLOSION AND FIRE SUN OIL TERMINAL NEDERLAND, TEXAS, APRIL 19, 1979. MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/156834</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 2140 c.s.t., on April 19, 1979, the Liberian tankship M/V SEATIGER, which had suspended pumping seawater ballast into its cargo tanks because of electrical storms in the area, exploded, burned, and sank at a berth at the Sun Oil Terminal, at Nederland, Texas.  The SEATIGER was severely damaged in the area of its cargo tanks.  Two crewmembers were killed.  The total losses resulting from the explosion were estimated to be $35 million.  The terminal berth was out of service for 180 days.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the improper innstallation of the flame screen in the flame arrester aboard the SEATIGER which resulted in the propagation of fire through the cargo tank vent system after lightning ignited flammable gases at the top of the vent mast; and a partially open butterfly valve in the cargo tank vent pipe system which created a path for the flame to penetrate the cargo tanks.  The master's failure to require use of the available inert gas system to maintain a nonexplosive atmosphere in the cargo tanks contributed to the accident.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Nov 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/156834</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OIL POLLUTON RESPONSE PLANNING GUIDE FOR EXTREME WEATHER</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/152196</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This Guide is intended to provide the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) with information and guidance useful in developing action plans and contingency plans for conducting oil pollution response operations in open water.  The Guide considers two general categories of response operations at sea: 1. Prevention of (further) spillage from tanker and other vessel casualties.  2. Oil Spill mitigation and cleanup.  The following types of information are presented in the guide: 1. Outlines for Action Plans.  2. Planning guidance.  3. Requirements for initial casualty assessment. 4. Roles of ship's Master, Salvor, other key personnel. 5. Description of response system and equipment options. 6. Data needs for use in selecting appropriate response approach.  7. Selection criteria for deciding between alternative response approaches.  8. Checklists for various types of the response operations.  9. Sources for additional information.  Background is provided on state-of-the-art (SOA) techniques and systems that can be employed in pollution response situations.  This document also provides a decision-making guide in certain cases for selecting the preferred approach in view of the sea state, casualty parameters, and other environmental conditions.  The examples given and the criteria stated may be combinations of parameters that may be encountered in actual operations. Therefore, the action of the OSC must be based on the actual conditions that exist, or that are expected to exist within the time frame of the response operation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/152196</guid>
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      <title>CARGO TANK OVERPRESSURIZATION AND PROCEDURES FOR VENT SYSTEM EVALUATION AND DESIGN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/152170</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Venting systems are employed on marine vessels to relieve pressure differences which arise between the cargo tank and atmospheric pressure.  In the case of closed gauging or a vapor recovery system, there will be a pressure rise in the tank which depends upon the cargo pumping rate and the vapor relief capacity of the vent system.  If the system does not have the proper capacity, or if there is an accidental overfill, tank failure may occur.  Analytical methods determining the pressure rise in marine cargo tanks during cargo transfer were developed and confirmed by scale-model experiments.  A study of typical vent systems in use today shows that these systems have more than adequate capacity for gas venting, but inadequate capacity for liquid overfill.  Cargo volatility has a relatively small effect on hazard evaluation, but many cargo transfer operations currently equal or exceed permissible overfill loading rates.  Furthermore in these instances of tank overfill, tank failure is expected within a very short time (less than one minute).  A method for evaluating overpressure hazard during cargo transfer operations is presented.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/152170</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>MARINE TERMINAL/VESSEL OIL TRANSFER REGULATIONS EFFECTIVE MARCH 3, 1980. USCG-FINAL RULE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/152478</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The U.S. Coast Guard, in the Federal Register of January 31, 1980, pp. 7156-79, has published 23 pages of comments and final regulations covering the prevention of pollution from oil terminals and vessels during marine oil transfer operations.  All oils -- petroleum, animal fats and oils, vegetable oils, etc. -- are covered.  These revisions to existing rules (33 CFR, Parts 154, 155, and 156) were proposed June 27, 1977.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/152478</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OIL POLLUTION PREVENTION-VESSELS AND MARINE OIL TRANSFER FACILITIES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/145320</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This amendment changes the Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations.  Changes are necessary due to public and industry comments, Coast Guard experience in enforcing the existing regulations, the availability of economical and practicable pollution control and monitoring equipment, and new requirements accepted as necessary by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) during the 1978 International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention (TSPP).  The primary reason for revising the regulations is that frequent operational oil spills remain the greatest source of damage to the environment, rather than the occasional catastrophic spill. Cargo tank cleaning, bilge pumping, ballasting, faulty equipment and personnel errors cause more spills than the major catastrophes.  These spills can be prevented by proper equipment, personnel and procedural requirements.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 20 Mar 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/145320</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EFFECTIVENESS OF OIL SPILL RESPONSES IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/145340</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In 1977, San Francisco Bay experienced more than 600 spills, of which 254 were oil from vessels or wharf facilities. Significant elements in oil spill responses that determine overall effectiveness of a particular spill response are identified, and an oil transfer operation method is discussed in some detail.  Spill responses apparently are not very effective.  The elements of spill response effectiveness are prompt reporting and reasonably accurate estimation of the type and volume of material spilled; ability of the spiller or oil transfer facility to provide immediate containment; response time for cleanup personnel and equipment; availability, proper use, and maintenance of cleanup equipment; and physical properties of the spilled petroleum product.  Greater emphasis should be placed on spill prevention; a method is proposed that could eliminate or greatly reduce the incidence of personal negligence-the cause of most spills of this type.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Dec 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/145340</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SHIPBOARD OILY WATER POLLUTION--A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE OWNER AND DESIGNER</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/87846</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper is presented as an aid in understanding the U.S. and International (IMCO) regulations with regard to shipboard oil pollution and as a guide for selecting and installing an oily water separating device as it pertains to a particular situation.  The information presented is based upon recent projects in which various type vessels have been upgraded to comply with oil pollution regulations.  The latest information regarding IMCO and US Coast Guard regulations as applicable to new and existing vessels are presented as well as means for complying.  Covered are the various areas of possible shipboard oily water contamination such as machinery bilges, tank cleaning and oil transfer operations.  Commercially available oily water separators are discussed and presented to assist the reader to judge the applicability for this particular case.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/87846</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FUTURE OF OIL PORTS IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/84647</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A discussion is presented of how the increase in sea traffic and the increase in ship size have affected the ports and terminals of central western Europe, the United Kingdom, Scandinavia and southern Europe.  North Sea production and new pipelines are also examined in terms of their impact on the various ports.  It is shown that an important element in defining the future of oil ports is the present situation of the world oil fleet.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 Jun 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/84647</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PETROLEUM INDUSTRY YELLOW PAGES. ANNUAL DIRECTORY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/84906</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Yellow Pages are published in 10 regional issues: Western United States and Alaska; Mid-Continent and Hugoton; Permian Basin; Gulf Coast; Ark.-La.-Tex.-Miss, and South; North Eastern, Midwest and Appalachian; Canadian; Latin America; Afro-European; and Indo-Pacific.  Each directory lists, for the respective region, the name, address, and phone number of companies involved in petroleum exploration, drilling, production, processing, construction, pipeline construction and operation, marine operations, and transportation, including ship brokers, chandlers, and shipyards.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/84906</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TEXAS DEEPWATER PORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/84939</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Texas Deepwater Port Authority (TDPA), an agency of the State of Texas, was created to design, construct, own and operate a public port facility capable of offloading supertankers (Very Large and Ultra Large Crude Carrier). The Authority will be supported by tax-exempt revenue bonds that will be repaid solely from tariffs paid by the Port's users.  Neither tax money nor state credit is pledged to the venture.  The tanker terminal will be 26 miles offshore Freeport, in the Gulf of Mexico, with onshore facilities near Jones Creek in Brazoria County.  Estimated cost of the offshore terminal and its support facilities ashore is estimated to be $800 million.  These facilities are presently scheduled to begin operations in 1983.  The report gives a brief review of the benefits, financing, offshore and onshore facilities and an environmental analysis. Drawings and diagrams of the mooring system, pumping platform and terminal are included.  A terminal throughput of 2 million barrels/day is anticipated.  The port capacity is 2.5 million barrels/day.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jun 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/84939</guid>
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