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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOOR CONTROL SYSTEMS IN METROPOLITAN RAILWAYS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/275983</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Safety of passengers has received increasing attention in recent years, particularly with respect to technical features of rapid transit trains with which riders come into direct contact.  Special attention has been paid to the situation when passengers are entering or leaving trains and to the functioning and controls of doors.  These problems have intensified as completely automated services have been introduced where there are no staff on trains or at stations.  The safety philosophies in this field have repercussions not only on the operation of conventional systems but also on the attitude of government and responsible authorities towards safety.  This report summarizes existing views and experience concerning the control and monitoring of doors on conventional rapid transit cars from the operational standpoint.  It can serve as a guide in designing similar systems for more completely automated modes.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 28 Aug 2004 04:44:14 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>SECURITY AND PROBABILITY IN RAILWAY SIGNALLING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/202536</link>
      <description><![CDATA[To ensure that a system is safe in spite of the failure of components, it is built on the fail-safe principle. Probability calculations do not allow this principle to be abondoned for they can only deal sufficiently accurately with part aspects.  Probability can also easily lead to over-dimensioning and hence to un-economical solutions.  It also puts high demands on manufacture and maintenance; probability calculations are applicable in cases where random and independent events coincide.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 1984 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>SAFETY METHODOLOGY IN RAIL RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/10568</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The report records the results of a study by the National Transportation Safety Board of the October 2, 1972, accidental derailment of a BART train and of the significant management and institutional approaches used to achieve safety as they influenced this system. The purpose of focusing attention on the cause and effect impact of this subject matter on the safety of the BART hardware system is to make this experience available to other municipalities who are implementing or are contemplating the development of a new rail rapid transit system. The report recommends abandonment of the fail-safe concept, and an organized disciplined approach to accomplishing rapid transit system safety, through the application of current safety management and engineering concepts.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jan 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>MULTI-LOAD-PATH STRUCTURES FOR HIGHWAY BRIDGES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/146520</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The failure of a component or connection that had been considered vital to the structural integrity of a bridge does not always result in the collapse of the bridge as a whole.  When a bridge survives such a failure, it has been possible to reconstruct the bridge safely and to reopen it to use after a short time.  This survival of the structure when total collapse would be expected is believed to be due to the ability of most structures to redistribute loads after the failure of a component or connection. Multi-load-path structures have this ability, but single-load-path structures do not.  Although this ability to redistribute loads is the result of an unintentional backup system, no present bridge design criteria require consideration of such an ability.  The objectives of this paper are to establish, by providing proper definitions, a framework of reference for further discussion, to explore the merits of excluding single-load-path structures from future designs, and to describe the extra design work required if such considerations become criteria for design. /Author/]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jan 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>EVOLVING A RATIONAL TRANSIT SAFETY PROGRAM</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/67170</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The system safety principles and procedures developed by the U.S. Department of Defense are discussed with regard to their applicability to transit.  Possible difficulties include the cost of implementing large-scale system analysis techniques, such as fault-free analysis, and the difficulty of obtaining reliable probability data for the various failure modes when completely new and unproven designs are considered.  Notwithstanding these difficulties, there does not seem to be any inherent conflict between Department of Defense procedures and traditional railroad practices.  In fact, the former specifically recommend that historical safety data from similar applications be integrated into the safety plan and that fail-safe design procedures be used to control high-risk situations.  Two examples of how military risk management techniques can be combined with traditional rail practices are provided.  The first is a preliminary hazard analysis, and the second shows how fault-tree techniques can be used to investigate whether a brick-wall stopping criterion is really necessary. /Author/]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Mar 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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