<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD PIPELINE ACCIDENT REPORT: HIGHLY VOLATILE LIQUIDS RELEASE FROM UNDERGROUND STORAGE CAVERN AND EXPLOSION, MAPCO NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS, INC., BRENHAM, TEXAS, APRIL 7, 1992</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/406323</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The report explains how highly volatile liquid products escaped from an underground storage cavern and formed a vapor cloud that exploded, killing three people and damaging almost all buildings within 3 square miles of the storage facility.  From its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board identified safety issues in the following areas: safety control systems, cavern management procedures, employee and management performance, emergency preparedness, and Federal and State safety requirements and oversight for underground storage and related pipelines.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Oct 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/406323</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>COMPUTER MODELLING OF ELECTROSTATIC CONDITIONS AND HAZARDS IN TANK WASHING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/167190</link>
      <description><![CDATA[It is shown how a computer program for solving Poisson's equation in complex three-dimensional structures can be used for quantitative interpretation of electrostatic fieldmeter observations in practical situations.  Computations are presented relating to interpretation of electrostatic conditions during shipboard studies of tank washing operations in the cargo tanks of crude oil carriers.  The paper also discusses how the program was used to assess electrostatic ignition hazards by modelling possible discharge situations involving slugs of water and calculating the discharge energies which would be available as a function of geometric and electrostatic conditions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/167190</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ELECTROSTATIC CHARGES ON BOARD SHIPS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/165986</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The fundamental processes of electrostatic charge separation are discussed and the associated hazards of explosion, in particular when using grp material or other plastics (for fuel oil tanks and filling pipes) which cannot be grounded, are reviewed.  Tank washing is dealt with in some detail.  Order from NSFI as No. 21283.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/165986</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EXPLOSION AND FIRE ON BOARD THE SS CHEVRON HAWAII WITH DAMAGES TO BARGES AND TO THE DEER PARK SHEEL OIL COMPANY TERMINAL, HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL, SEPTEMBER 1, 1979. MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/157273</link>
      <description><![CDATA[At 1412 c.d.t., on September 1, 1979, while discharging cargo at the Deer Park Shell Oil Company terminal on the Houston ship channel, the American tankship SS CHEVRON HAWAII exploded, burned, and sank after it was struck by lightning.  A hull fragment from the exploding vessel penetrated a petroleum product tank at the terminal and caused the tank to explode and the contents to burn.  The vessel fire spread into a barge slip where four barges were discharging cargo; all four caught fire, three of which exploded and sank.  One crewmember and 2 radar repairmen aboard the vessel were killed, and 13 persons were injured.  Damage to the CHEVRON HAWAII was estimated at $50,000,000.  Damages to the terminal, barges, and other vessels, and accident-related claims exceeded $27,000,000. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the ignition by lightning of accumulated flammable cargo vapors on the deck of the CHEVRON HAWAII and the propagation of the resulting fire into a cargo tank through an open or improperly secured tank opening cover plate or ullage opening.  The explosion of the Shell Oil Company terminal petroleum tank on shore was caused by ignition of the contained ethyl alcohol when a heated projectile from the exploding vessel ruptured its roof and fell into the tank.  The barge fires and explosions were caused when the waterborne cargo fire from the vessel spread into the barge slip and ignited the barge cargoes. Contributing to the accident was the failure to remove the barges from the slip with available tugs or towboats, and the failure to properly maintain the barges' cargo tank closures.  Contributing to the loss of life was the lack of a safe gangway or brow between the vessel's crew accommodations and the cargo terminal or facility.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/157273</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LIBERIAN TANK VESSEL M/V SEATIGER EXPLOSION AND FIRE SUN OIL TERMINAL NEDERLAND, TEXAS, APRIL 19, 1979. MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/156834</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 2140 c.s.t., on April 19, 1979, the Liberian tankship M/V SEATIGER, which had suspended pumping seawater ballast into its cargo tanks because of electrical storms in the area, exploded, burned, and sank at a berth at the Sun Oil Terminal, at Nederland, Texas.  The SEATIGER was severely damaged in the area of its cargo tanks.  Two crewmembers were killed.  The total losses resulting from the explosion were estimated to be $35 million.  The terminal berth was out of service for 180 days.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the improper innstallation of the flame screen in the flame arrester aboard the SEATIGER which resulted in the propagation of fire through the cargo tank vent system after lightning ignited flammable gases at the top of the vent mast; and a partially open butterfly valve in the cargo tank vent pipe system which created a path for the flame to penetrate the cargo tanks.  The master's failure to require use of the available inert gas system to maintain a nonexplosive atmosphere in the cargo tanks contributed to the accident.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Nov 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/156834</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION STUDY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/160449</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The study was divided into five phases: Phase I included an analytical evaluation of the possible magnitude and damage potential of a spill of LNG; Phase II consisted of shock tube tests and tests in thin film hemispheres to evaluate potential transition from deflagration to detonation in unconfined clouds of flammable gases; Phase III included a series of spills of LNG onto water to determine pool size, flame height, flame radiation, vapor dispersion, and flame speed through a vapor cloud; Phase IV consisted of a series of spills of LPG and gasoline onto water to provide direct comparison of the hazard potential of LNG, LPG, and gasoline; Phase V consisted of additional thin film hemisphere tests to determine whether a detonation initiated by a high explosive charge or a detonation exiting a tube could be sustained within an unconfined vapor cloud. Preliminary analysis of the data indicate that (1) transition from deflagration to detonation in unconfined vapor clouds does not appear to occur; (2) flame heights observed during LNG pool fires are taller than predicted; (3) LNG pool fires do not spread over the entire pool surface; (4) LNG is extremely difficult to detonate; (5) due to high flame speeds, fires on LPG pools tend to cover the entire pool surface; and (6) the emissive power of the flame in both LNG vapor and pool fires is higher than expected.  The results of this study will be used in updating the spill models contained within the USCG Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS) and the Population Vulnerability Model (PVM).  This study was partially funded by the Energy Research and Development Administration, The American Gas Association, The Office of Pipeline Safety Operations, and the U.S. Department of Energy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Nov 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/160449</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UNCONFINED VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS. A PRESTUDY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/158405</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The current knowledge on unconfined vapor cloud explosions is reviewed in the light of the hazard such an explosion represents especially to offshore installations and with the purpose of identifying the need for future research.  The damage potential of an unconfined vapor cloud is determined by the rate of energy release during the explosion, or the flame speed.  Unless strong acceleration mechanisms are present, the maximum pressure will be of the order of magnitude of 0.1 bar or less.  Factors that accelerate the flame increase the damage potential of the cloud. Quantitatively, little is known about such mechanisms, and more research is needed on flame accelerations.  On offshore platforms vapor cloud explosions may be strongly coupled to confined vented explosions.  Research is needed on situations where a confined explosion propagate to an external vapor cloud and ignites this strongly.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/158405</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DETONATION-FLAME ARRESTOR DEVICES FOR GASOLINE CARGO VAPOR RECOVERY SYSTEM</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/155942</link>
      <description><![CDATA[An experimental program was carried out to (1) develop empirical data on the deflagration-to-detonation run-up distance for flowing mixtures of gasoline and air in 15.2-cm- (6.0-in.-) diameter piping simulating a vapor recovery system, and (2) evaluate the quenching capability of eight selected flame control devices subjected to repeated stable detonations.  The deflagration-to-detonation run-up distance was found to be 11.2 m (36.7 ft), or a length-to-diameter ratio of 74.  The relative roughness of the run-up length of piping was 0.010 to 0.015.  The stable detonation downstream of the transition point had a velocity of 1800 m/s (5906 ft/s) with a stable peak pressure of 1900 kN/sq m (275 psia).  There appeared to be no discernable correlation between the initial flow velocity used in testing and the resulting run-up distance.  Detonations were obtained only at equivalence ratios greater than 0.8; however, there was no correlation between equivalence ratio and run-up distance for equivalence ratios ranging from 0.9 to 1.4.  The successful detonation-flame arresters were: (1) spiral-wound, crimped aluminum ribbon, (2) foamed nickel-chrome metal, (3) vertically packed bed of aluminum Ballast rings, and (4) water-trap or hydraulic back-pressure valve.  Installation configurations for two of the more applicable arresters, the spiral-wound, crimped stainless-steel ribbon and the vertically packed bed of aluminum Ballast rings, were further optimized by a series of parametric tests.  The final configuration of these tow arresters were demonstrated with repeated detonation tests at conditions that simulated vapor recovery system operation.  On these tests, the combustible mixture of gasoline and air continued to flow through the piping for periods up to 120 seconds after the initial detonation had been arrested.  There was no indication of continuous burning or reignition occuring on either side of the test arresters.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/155942</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ELECTROSTATIC CHARGE GENERATION CAUSED BY TANK CLEANING MACHINE AND DANGER OF EXPLOSION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/79567</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A discharge from an unearthed object to earth is suspected as a possible source of an incentive spark in tank.  Example of possible unearthed conductor is a slug of water produced by the washing process.  Tests of the possibility of creating water slugs show that the very high capacity fixed washing machine is able to produce dangerous water slugs, on the other hand, with the portable type of washing machine no such water slugs can be detected.  Order from NSFI as No. 15011.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Oct 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/79567</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EXPLOSION AND FIRE ON BOARD THE UNMANNED TANK BARGE OCEAN 80 AT CARTERET, NEW JERSEY ON 25 OCTOBER 1972 WITHOUT LOSS OF LIFE. MARINE CASUALTY REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/24220</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On October 25, 1972, the tank barge OCEAN 80 was loading gasoline and fuel oil at the General American Transportation Corporation Terminal, Arthur Kill, Carteret, New Jersey. About 0600, a fire and several explosions occurred on the barge. Before the resultant fires were extinguished, the barge was destroyed and the terminal and nearby facilities were damaged substantially. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the casualty was the ignition, by an unidentified source, of gasoline which spilled from overflowing cargo tanks on the OCEAN 80. A major contributing factor was the failure of the barge tankerman and the terminal dockman to adhere to prescribed cargo transfer procedures. The National Transportation Safety Board's recommendations listed in this report are addressed to the U.S. Coast Guard.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Jul 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/24220</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TANK BARGE B-924 FIRE AND EXPLOSION WITH LOSS OF LIFE, GREENVILLE, MISSISSIPPI, NOVEMBER 13, 1975. MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/68765</link>
      <description><![CDATA[About 1245 on November 13, 1975, the tank barge B-924 caught fire in one of its cargo tanks and exploded while being repaired at the Brent Towing Company's repair facility in Greenville, Mississippi.  The explosion blew the bow rake away from the vessel with such force that large sections of debris were deposited up to 500 yards away, and internal bulkheads, shell plating, and strength members in promixity were severely distorted.  A secondary fire engulfed the forward portion of the B-924.  The fire, fueled by cargo residues in the B-924, required over 1 1/2 hours of intensive firefighting to extinguish.  The fire and explosion killed four persons and injured two others.  The adjacent barge B-428 was damaged slightly.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this casualty was the failure of a National Fire Protection Association certified marine chemist to insure that the tank barge B-924 was safe for electric arc welding repairs.  Contributing to the accident were the inadequate method currently used for certifying and regulating marine chemists and the absence of adequate mandatory standards or regulations to insure a safe working environment in vessels being repaired.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Apr 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/68765</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SS V. A. FOGG; SINKING IN THE GULF OF MEXICO ON 1 FEBRUARY 1972 WITH LOSS OF LIFE. MARINE CASUALTY REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/21331</link>
      <description><![CDATA[At 1240 on February 1, 1972, the tankship V.A. FOGG departed Freeport, Texas, en route to the Gulf of Mexico to clean cargo tanks that carried benzene residue. The vessel was due to arrive in Galveston, Texas, at 0200 on February 2. At approximately 1545, February 1, the V.A. FOGG suffered multiple explosions and sank. All 39 persons aboard died as a result of this casualty. This report contains the action taken by the National Transportation Safety Board in determining the probable cause of the casualty and in making recommendations to prevent its recurrence. The report also contains the Marine Board of Investigation report and the action taken by the Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the initial and subsequent explosions was the ignition of benzene vapors which were present both within the open cargo tanks and on the main deck of the tankship. The investigative record in this case does not contain sufficient information to determine the ignition source of the initial explosion. The probable source of ignition of the subsequent explosions was the heat produced from the preceding explosions. (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Feb 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/21331</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BULK CARRIER OPERATIONS SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROJECT. PHASE I</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/62378</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Appropriate scale modeling methods for studying liquid petroleum cargo shiptank electrostatics, washing and atmosphere control phenomena are established and evaluated. A review of currently available full and model scale study data and implications of this data in view of the developed modeling criteria are presented. Recommended laboratory studies in the areas of atmosphere control, tank washing and electrostatics are discussed with emphasis on the utilization of additional laboratory data supplementing current knowledge to develop definitive design and operation guidelines.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Nov 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/62378</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYROTECHNIC SIMULATION OF THE PRESSURES DUE TO WAVE ACTION--APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEM OF SLOSHING IN (LNG) TANKERS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/53774</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The risk of accidents occurring on sea routes increases with the growth of LNG tonnage carried.  The nature of the gases carried deserved particular attention.  Should a methane carrier of 200,0900 m capacity accidentally discharge its load, a release of energy equivalent to a Type A nuclear charge would result.  Reference is made to an incident that occurred in the LNG carrier Arctic Tokyo which was due to a small escape of gas across the membrane of the insulation bulkhead of a cargo tank.  This membrane had been distorted by the sloshing effect of the methane in the tank during rough weather. Tests carried out by Technigaz and Bureau Veritas to evaluate the critical pressure wave are mentioned.  The pyrotechnic research and study group of D.C.A.N., Toulon, have developed a pyrotechnic device to generate an impulse comparable to a nuclear shock wave.  The tests, which were carried out on 1/10th scale to reduce the risks involved, are briefly described.  These tests provided a realistic simulation of the sudden stresses due to sloshing in the tank and wave effect on the hull.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Aug 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/53774</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EXPERIMENTS ON A MODEL OF AN ESCAPE OF HEAVY GAS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/53781</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A description is given of model experiments on a release of heavy explosive gas, propane or butane, into the atmosphere at ground level.  Both long and short term releases were considered and the validity of the model is discussed.  A method of extrapolating the experimental results to full scale is provided.  The experiments were carried out at the request of the UKAEA to investigate the spread of a plume of a heavier-than-air inflammable gas with a view to determining the area over which an explosive mixture might exist.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Aug 1977 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/53781</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>