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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EARTHQUAKE OBSERVATION NETWORK SYSTEM FOR ROAD ADMINISTRATION PURPOSES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/463028</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Actions of the Kanto Regional Construction Bureau in response to earthquakes are based on the announcements of seismic intensity by the Meteorological Agency.  The announcements are made within minutes of seismic activity and provide a basis on which to assess the general scale of the earthquake and to prepare for action.  The sites of concern, however, are sometimes far from the sections of roads administered by the Bureau, making the announcements inadequate for the purpose of fine-tuned road management.  The most important considerations in road administration subsequent to an earthquake are preventing secondary disasters, avoiding disorder in transportation networks, securing emergency transportation routes, and the rapid restoration of road sections damaged by the earthquake. Achieving these ends calls for the construction of a system capable of instantaneously collecting seismic data at various sites and combining these with information on topographical and geological conditions, seismic resistance of the road structures, and road management systems.  The Kanto Regional Construction Bureau plans to install seismographs throughout the region it administers to rapidly establish--in the event of an earthquake--an appropriate course of preliminary action, efficiently manage checks on facilities, and provide road users with information.  The seismographs installed will be used to form a network, the Earthquake Observation Network System, with the objective of administering roads based on the seismic data detected instantaneously subsequent to an earthquake.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jul 1996 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/463028</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>MARITIME TERRORISM-AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/167184</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Systems analysis in maritime security is management's weapon against terrorism and produce diversion.  A detailed study of vulnerability, criticality and threat is necessary to formulate a risk profile for each offshore vessel and facility.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/167184</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>OIL SPIL COUNTERMEASURES IN OFFSHORE PRODUCTION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/165411</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The importance of serious oil spill contingency planning cannot be overemphasized.  It is not enough to have consultants punch out thick "contingency planning" documents which end up sitting in cabinets.  One must have a core of experts in government and industry, trained in the latest technologies, armed with the best equipment and materials and prepared to respond on a 24-hour basis to major spills wherever they may happen in Canada.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/165411</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>ARCTIC MARINE EMERGENCY PLAN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/165461</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Arctic Marine Emegency Plan aims to: 1. set out the mechanism under which the Canadian Coast Guard responds to a marine emergency in the Central and Eastern Arctic, either as the lead or the resource agency; 2. establish the procedures to rapidly activate a command structure and to marshal and deploy the appropriate resources to any marine incident, other than SAR, where the Coast Guard has the lead role; 3. establish the points in the Canadian Coast Guard structure where: a) the decision as to the nature of the response required for a particular emergency is made; b) command of that response is exercised; d) other lead agencies and industry may seek Coast Guard assistance.  4. establish procedures by which the Canadian Coast Guard and Transport Canada can be alerted to an emergency and informed of operational progress.  Although oil and other noxious material spills, or imminent threats of spills, constitute the major portion of the marine emergencies with which Transport Canada's Canadian Coast Guard is assigned to deal, this plan establishes the policy for responding to all peacetime marine emergencies where the Coast Guard either is assigned as, or supports, the agency leading the response.  The saving of life is the paramount consideration; therefore, this plan is subordinate to the requirements of the federal marine search and rescue structure.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/165461</guid>
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      <title>OIL SPILL IN STOCKHOLM ARCHIPELAGO 1979. COMBAT AND CLEANUP</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/166548</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of the report is to identify what went wrong and what worked satisfactorily during oil spill removal in 1979. The following problem sectors are evaluated: planning emergency service, command and cooperation, role of the county administration, communications, flow of reports and information, inventory of damage, combat conditions and methods, boundary between combatting oil and cleanup, cleanup organisation and methods, the mass media, and and resources.  Order from NSFI as No. 22260.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/166548</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>FIRE ONBOARD THE ITALIAN PASSENGER SHIP ANGELINA LAURO CHARLOTTE AMALIE HARBOR ST. THOMAS, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS MARCH 30, 1979. MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/157673</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On the afternoon of March 30, 1979, a fire erupted in the crew galley onboard the Italian passenger ship ANGELINA LAURO while it was berthed starboard side to the West India Company dock, Charlotte Amalie Harbor, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands.  The fire quickly spread from the crew galley to a dining room.  The fire was fought onboard by the ship's crew and shoreside firefighters.  Heavy smoke impeded firefighting efforts aboard the ship and eventually forced the crew to leave the ship.  Firefighting efforts continued to be directed against the exterior of the vessel, but the fire raged out of control throughout the interior spaces until the fire burned itself out 4 days later.  The ANGELINA LAURO was almost destroyed.  Two persons received minor injuries.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the initial fire aboard the ANGELINA LAURO was overheated oil in an unattended skillet in the crew galley.  This initial fire propagated and spread throughout the ship and resulted in the ship's destruction because of: (1) the failure of responsible vessel personnel to promptly establish effective control and coordination of the shipboard firefighting effort; (2) failure of the ship's fire detection and sprinkler system to provide early warning of and to extinguish the fire in a concealed overhead space; and (3) the extensive use of combustible materials in the ship's internal construction, which provided fuel for the fire and aided the generation and spread of smoke which hampered firefighting efforts. Contributing to the spread of the fire were: (1) an accumulation of combustible residues on the interior surfaces of the hood and duct; (2) the routing of the galley's grease vapor exhaust duct through a fire division bulkhead and the failure of the exhaust duct fire dampers and insulation to isolate the fire; and (3) the failure of those crewmembers who first observed smoke to promptly notify the bridge and sound the fire alarm.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/157673</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>MANAGEMENT OF EMERGENCIES IN THE NORTH SEA</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/160949</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The safety aspects related to oil activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf are of great concern to the companies involved, the authorities and the public.  This concern relates to personnel safety, protection of the environment and the safety of the installations.  The overall safety work is all-embracing in the sense that it must be integrated with the design, the construction and the operation.  Basically, safety is achieved by measures to prevent accidents from occurring and by emergency measures to reduce the consequences if accidents do occur. A wide range of R&D projects, of which many have been initiated or sponsored by the government, are concerned with improving safety.  The emergency preparedness aspects have been in focus for several of these, and the intention of this paper is to give a survey of current thinking on an overall emergency preparedness system and how it should be built up, maintained and further developed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 1981 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/160949</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>U.S. COAST GUARD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL DISCHARGE RESPONSE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/161671</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Research and Development is presently conducting a program to develop equipment and methods for responding to discharges of hazardous chemicals into the waters of the United States.  The program to ameliorate hazardous chemical discharges has been divided into six project areas as follows: (1) Prevention and Reduction; (2) Personnel Protection; (3) Detection, Identification and Quantification; (4) Hazard Assement Modeling; (5) Containment, Treatment, and Recovery; (6) Disposal.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/161671</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CHRIS UTILIZATION SURVEY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/149744</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of this project was to conduct a one-year review of the usefulness, adequacy, and responsiveness of the Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS) based upon actual field experiences of Coast Guard users for whom the system has been developed.  In addition to identifying specific opportunities for system improvement and evolution, a second important purpose was to facilitate the initial "fine tuning" of the system following its initial deployment.  Although the study focused on emergency spill response use of CHRIS, nonemergency uses, such as contingency planning, were also examined.  The review covered the following CHRIS components and adjuncts: A Condensed Guide to Chemical Hazards, CG-446-1; Hazardous Chemical Data, CG-446-2; Hazards Assessment Handbook, CG-446-3; Response Methods Handbook, CG-446-4; Hazard Assessment Computer System, (HACS); Regional Contingency Plan Data Base (part of the Regional Contingency Plan).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/149744</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ONSCENE COORDINATION AMONG AGENCIES AT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/150160</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Observations of emergency response activities following a March 31, 1977, railroad accident near Rockingham, North Carolina, prompted the National Transportation Safety Board to initiate this special investigation of emergency response plans for handling railroad accidents in which hazardous materials, including those classified as radioactive, are involved.  While the movement of hazardous materials through normal transportation channels is of concern to Federal, State, and local Government agencies and to the public, the transportation of radioactive materials is of special concern.  For this reason, special plans designed to cope with emergencies involving radioactive materials have been developed at various levels of Government and by Private industry.  These plans are the most comprehensive yet formulated for handling hazardous materials emergencies, and they have served as models for many nonradiological contingency plans.  With the probable increase in the transportation of radioactive and other hazardous materials by rail, the Safety Board believes that all existing emergency response plans need to be critically reviewed to determine their adequacy.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/150160</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OIL POLLUTON RESPONSE PLANNING GUIDE FOR EXTREME WEATHER</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/152196</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This Guide is intended to provide the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) with information and guidance useful in developing action plans and contingency plans for conducting oil pollution response operations in open water.  The Guide considers two general categories of response operations at sea: 1. Prevention of (further) spillage from tanker and other vessel casualties.  2. Oil Spill mitigation and cleanup.  The following types of information are presented in the guide: 1. Outlines for Action Plans.  2. Planning guidance.  3. Requirements for initial casualty assessment. 4. Roles of ship's Master, Salvor, other key personnel. 5. Description of response system and equipment options. 6. Data needs for use in selecting appropriate response approach.  7. Selection criteria for deciding between alternative response approaches.  8. Checklists for various types of the response operations.  9. Sources for additional information.  Background is provided on state-of-the-art (SOA) techniques and systems that can be employed in pollution response situations.  This document also provides a decision-making guide in certain cases for selecting the preferred approach in view of the sea state, casualty parameters, and other environmental conditions.  The examples given and the criteria stated may be combinations of parameters that may be encountered in actual operations. Therefore, the action of the OSC must be based on the actual conditions that exist, or that are expected to exist within the time frame of the response operation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 1980 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/152196</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RESPONDING TO CASUALTIES OF SHIPS BEARING HAZARDOUS CARGOES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/142216</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The objective of this study is to assess national capability to respond to marine casualties involving vessels carrying hazardous cargoes.  Response to an incident consists of minimizing the consequences of the incident, including any accidental cargo release; maintaining local public safety; controlling and cleaning up pollution; and salving the stricken vessel and its cargo.  In February 1978, the National Research Council's Marine Board established a Panel on Response to Casualties Involving Ship Born Hazardous Cargoes to undertake the assessment.  This report presents the results of that assessment.  The panel employed a case study methodology in the conduct of the study.  This consisted of developing scenarios describing hypothetical but plausible marine casualties and then conducting game simulations in which those who would actually respond to the incidents simulated their actions in a seminar, or game, mode.  The panel then based its assessment of response capabilities on information developed in the course of the case studies and its collective experience in casualty response.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Nov 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/142216</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>STANDARDIZED MAPS FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENTS--SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/88190</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Problems reported by emergency response personnel in developing pre-emergency plans and making tactical decisions during hazardous materials transportation emergencies prompted the Safety Board to conduct this special investigation.  The investigation disclosed a need to improve methods for predicting the expected behavior of hazardous materials in emergencies, for both preplanning and tactical uses.  Existing information sources were found to be inadequate for these purposes.  A method to improve the recording of hazardous materials behavior in accident investigations that will improve preplanning and tactical decisionmaking for hazardous materials emergencies was identified and has been adopted as a tentative accident reporting standard by the Safety Board for accidents involving hazardous materials.  Immediate and potential uses for the standardized hazardous materials behavior maps are identified and implementation problems are discussed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Aug 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/88190</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET--AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM TO MEET DEFENSE EMERGENCY AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/83805</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with Commercial airplanes to augment military airlift during peacetime and wartime.  This is a review of the Military Airlift Command's (MAC) regulations, procedures, and contracts governing this program.  The program concepts and their testing and evaluation are discussed with the MAC and 15 air carriers in the long-range international CRAF.  A DOD exercise that simulated an airlift emergency is reviewed.  The status and types of modifications to be performed on the CRAF program are considered.  MAC's and air carriers' views on the adequacy or compatibility with wide-body aircraft needs of military ground-support equipment and airfields are presented, as well as Air Force test loadings of wide and narrow-body aircraft.  An inventory was obtained of North Atlantic Treaty Organization members' Civil Aircraft, and the NATO initiatives in establishing a program similar to the United States CRAF program with the MAC is discussed.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 Jun 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/83805</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AN ANALYSIS OF CONUS INLAND WATERWAYS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/82102</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This study is an analysis of historic peacetime and planned contingency movement of DOD cargo on the US inland waterways.  Inland waterways, for the purpose of this study, are defined as including navigable rivers and canals possessing water depth of 9 feet and intrabay and intraocean waters capable of supporting DOD cargo movement.  A resume of public terminals possessing desired characteristics is included.  While a lack of both peacetime and planned contingency use precludes the designation of specific routes and/or public terminals as critical, certain routes, due to the frequency and/or economy of use, are designated as important to the national defense.  However, in every instance, alternative delivery mean (rail or highway) are available.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 1979 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/82102</guid>
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