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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <item>
      <title>A Marriage of Two Communities: Pairing capabilities to improve maritime security</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1735485</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The purpose of this article is to highlight the synergy and opportunity that successfully pairing the capabilities of the afloat and deployable specialized forces (DSF) communities provides to the Coast Guard's daily operations and national security objectives. In particular, combining the National Security Cutter (NSC) and the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT) into a complementary and scalable force package has enabled the Coast Guard to meet the demands of the rapidly changing global security environment, such as countering drug trafficking and weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, extending the reach of the Coast Guard’s short-notice maritime response capability by using the NSC as a staging platform for MSRT boarding operations achieves the objective envisioned in the operational requirements for the NSC and MSRT assets, as well as the overarching strategic objective in Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century by providing national decision makers with time and decision space to deal with these types of threats. As the Coast Guard strives to be relevant and responsive to the needs of the nation, two of the current commandant’s guiding principles, it must continue to seek and maximize opportunities to pair the specialized capabilities of the DSF and other communities with those of the afloat community, because they can actually go together like peas and carrots.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2020 17:54:48 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1735485</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Container Shipping and Security Issues: the Carriers' Responsibility in the Fight Against Terrorism</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1413148</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Today, the container shipping industry faces a threat from terrorism that could not be envisaged before 9/11. While the public sector has already initiated a variety of aggressive programs to tackle such threats, the private industry also needs to prove its ability to share the burden. An imminent challenge is to deter and prevent the use of ocean containers as weapons of mass destruction. This paper specifically focuses on an effective use of information technology to assist the fight against terrorism. It proposes a new idea to the container shipping industry, namely that the container shipping industry must approach security issues through the use of interconnected standardised databases within a common information system. The industry was born in the late 1960s, when technology was not readily available to accommodate an information system at this level. The dramatic progress of information technology, however, permits the industry today to embrace new business solutions in order to strengthen security. Many years ago, this was just a concept and a theory, but today it can be put into actual practice. These solutions would ensure the authorities' fast and timely response against terrorism. Immediate action by the industry is now necessary to prevent any ocean container from being used as a weapon of mass destruction.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jul 2016 10:03:07 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1413148</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Preparing airports for weapons of mass effect</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1358324</link>
      <description><![CDATA[With terrorist threats in the news, now is the time for airports to review airport emergency/ airport security preparedness plans (AEPs/ASPs) in the event of an attack that may include weapons of mass effect (WME). These weapons include chemical, biological, cyber, radiation, nuclear blast and explosives that are likely threats to the airport in today’s uncertain world. This examination was intended to be primarily a descriptive and non-experimental analysis that measures the perceived preparedness of US airports and employee preparedness training in the event of an actual attack. The findings of this examination suggest that a gap exists in airport emergency and airport security preparedness at those US airports responding to the survey, and recommends that airport management at these airports adopt a security management system (SeMS) approach to AEP/ASP planning. It also suggests that an employee training checklist be incorporated into these plans to train airport employees on how to protect themselves in the event of an actual attack.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 09:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1358324</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1263823</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are critical to the U.S. economy, but can be exploited by terrorists. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard are responsible for maritime security. Through its Container Security Initiative (CSI) program, CBP identifies and examines U.S.-bound cargo that may conceal weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and through Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), CBP partners with international trade community members to secure the flow of U.S.-bound goods. Under the International Port Security (IPS) program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to assess compliance with security standards. GAO was asked to review DHS's maritime security programs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the foreign ports that pose the greatest risk to the global supply chain and focused its maritime container security programs to address those risks, and (2) actions DHS has taken to help ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs. DHS components have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports and cargo, but not all components have applied risk management principles to assess whether maritime security programs cover the riskiest ports. The U.S. Coast Guard uses its risk model to inform operational decisions for its IPS program and annually updates its assessment. In contrast, CBP has not regularly assessed ports for risks to cargo under its CSI program. CBP’s selection of the initial 23 CSI ports was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat information when it expanded the number of CSI ports. CBP has not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States for its CSI program since 2005. In 2009, CBP developed a model that ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis of risk, but it was never implemented because of budget cuts. By applying CBP’s risk model to fiscal year 2012 cargo shipment data, GAO found that CSI did not have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered high risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower risk locations. Since the CSI program depends on cooperation from sovereign host countries, there are challenges to implementing CSI in new foreign locations, and CBP’s negotiations with other countries have not always succeeded. For example, CBP officials said it is difficult to close CSI ports and open new ports because removing CSI from a country might negatively affect U.S. relations with the host government. However, periodically assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the results to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations, as well as determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports, would help ensure that CBP is allocating its resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to best mitigate the risk of importing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other terrorist contraband into the United States through the maritime supply chain. DHS has taken steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs, but faces host country political and legal constraints. The Coast Guard has implemented a risk-informed model that prioritizes the countries to visit and assist. Also, the Coast Guard and CBP have made arrangements with foreign government entities to mutually recognize inspections of each other’s ports and maritime supply chains through the IPS and C-TPAT programs. CBP has also utilized technological improvements to target some U.S.-bound cargo shipments remotely from the United States to reduce CSI staff in foreign countries. However, CBP faces political and legal constraints in host countries. For example, according to CBP and government officials in one country, a national law precludes the transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government Customs officials. As a result, CSI officials must be present at each CSI port in that country to view the scanned images. Further, in some ports, CBP has made efforts to expand the scope of its CSI targeting to include contraband other than WMD, but that is subject to approval by the host governments. GAO recommends that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2013 10:32:27 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1263823</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nonproliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1213772</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The global use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has increased significantly over time, raising concerns about their proliferation. MTCR and Wassenaar are the multilateral regimes that address UAV proliferation. MTCR seeks to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction delivery systems, while Wassenaar seeks to limit the spread of certain conventional weapons and sensitive technologies with both civilian and military uses. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in February 2012. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to address (1) global trends in the use of UAV technology, (2) U.S. national security considerations concerning UAV proliferation, (3) multilateral and bilateral tools to control UAV proliferation, and (4) coordination of U.S. efforts to limit the spread of UAV technology. Since 2005, the number of countries that acquired a UAV system nearly doubled from about 40 to more than 75. In addition, countries of proliferation concern developed and fielded increasingly more sophisticated systems. Recent trends in new UAV capabilities, including armed and miniature UAVs, increased the number of military applications for this technology. A number of new civilian and commercial applications, such as law enforcement and environmental monitoring, are available for UAVs, but these applications are limited by regulatory restrictions on civilian airspace. The United States likely faces increasing risks as countries of concern and terrorist organizations seek to acquire UAV technology. Foreign countries’ and terrorists’ acquisition of UAVs could provide them with increased abilities to gather intelligence on and conduct attacks against U.S. interests. For instance, some foreign countries likely have already used UAVs to gather information on U.S. military activities overseas. Alternatively, the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests by providing allies with key capabilities and by helping retain a strong industrial base for UAV production. For instance, the United Kingdom and Italy have used UAVs purchased from the United States to collect data on Taliban activity in Afghanistan. The United States has engaged in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address UAV proliferation concerns. The United States principally engaged the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to address multilateral UAV proliferation concerns. Since 2005, the United States proposed certain significant changes to address how MTCR controls UAVs, but members could not reach a consensus for these changes. Also, while the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) controls the export of some key dual-use UAV components, it does not control other dual-use technologies that are commonly used in UAVs. The Department of State (State) has also used diplomatic cables to address the proliferation of UAV-related technologies bilaterally. State provided to GAO about 70 cables that it sent from January 2005 to September 2011 addressing UAV-related concerns to about 20 governments and the MTCR. Over 75 percent of these cables focused on efforts by a small number of countries of concern to obtain UAV technology. U.S. agencies coordinate in several ways to control the spread of UAV technology, but could improve their UAV-related information sharing. For instance, an interagency group reviews many license applications to export UAV technology. However, there is not a formal mechanism to ensure that licensing agencies have relevant and timely intelligence information when making licensing decisions. Also, State’s licensing database cannot provide aggregate data on military UAV exports State has authorized, which may impair the U.S. government’s ability to oversee the release of sensitive UAV technology. The Department of Defense (DOD) and State each conduct end-use monitoring of some UAV exports, but differences in the agencies’ programs may result in similar types of items being subject to different levels of oversight. GAO recommends that State improve its export licensing database to better identify authorized UAV exports, that relevant agencies improve mechanisms for sharing information relevant to the export licensing process, and that State and DOD harmonize their UAV end-use monitoring approaches.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 19 Sep 2012 13:28:36 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1213772</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Overview of Transportation in Kabul City, Afghanistan</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1092013</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Afghanistan and its capital, Kabul, are often in the news as they recover from the years of war with the help of the international community and in particular the United States. Much of the transportation infrastructure has either been damaged or has deteriorated due to lack of regular maintenance over the last three decades. This article presents an overview of the current state of transportation in Kabul and highlights the opportunities for improving the transportation situation through practical research. Specifically, this article discusses the layout and demographics of Kabul, the system of roads, the traffic composition and demand, the public transportation system, the freight and air transportation systems, the traffic regulations, highway safety, transportation security and vehicle emissions. By outlining the current state of affairs, the potential areas of research and improvement are identified. Two important areas of research include systematic planning to rectify the haphazard development that occurred in recent years and creative traffic control strategies to improve highway efficiency and safety. Out of the past destruction of transportation infrastructure arises a Phoenix-like opportunity to re-birth a brand new transportation system for Kabul.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Apr 2011 14:44:03 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1092013</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Web-Based Weapons of Mass Destruction Training for Transit Police</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/987173</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In response to increased terrorist attacks on mass transit systems worldwide, emergency planning and security efforts have intensified. One of the most important planning elements is the provision of training for first-response personnel. Yet few terrorism-related training programs specific to the mass transit sector are available. To address this unmet need, a web-based weapons of mass destruction (WMD) simulation training program, specifically designed for transit police, was recently developed, implemented, and evaluated. Results indicate that this program was effective in improving transit police officers’ ability to recognize and respond to WMD simulations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Nov 2010 07:39:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/987173</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Detection, Recovery, and Destruction Systems for Sea-Disposed Chemical Munitions: Port Kanda, Japan</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/915030</link>
      <description><![CDATA[There is an ongoing systematic project for sea-disposed chemical munitions detection, recovery, and destruction at Port Kanda, Japan. This project is an excellent case study, since it is unique in its size, scope, and complexity of operations. Systems used include a DAVINCH® float detonation system, a double-walled container for chemical munitions recovery and transport, chemical agent resistant diving gear, and a high efficiency magnetometer system for detection and identification of chemical munitions. Over 2,700 chemical munitions have been recovered from the surveyed and cleaned-up area and destroyed. To gain the public's acceptance and assure them that no contamination remains, the pre- and post-recovery sampling and analysis results are disclosed to the public. There is a brief discussion of the potential impacts to seafood from arsenic-bearing compounds, which were a concern. There is proposal of a deep sea operation system involving the DAVINCH® floating detonation system on the recovery site and a remote recovery sealing up container. The concept of "Critical Depth" is introduced by the authors for the munitions clean up. "Critical Depth" is the reasonable depth  to which recovery of a potential contamination source should be considered and beyond which it should not.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 07:14:45 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/915030</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Overview of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Chemical Weapons Disposal Oversight Program</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/915035</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Destruction of outdated chemical weapons was mandated by the U.S. Congress in the early 1970s. Law requires the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to review plans for chemical warfare material transportation and disposal to ensure adequate public health and safety protection. Methods and facilities must be described in plans, as well as destruction schedules and facility management. Protection of "public health and safety by reviewing, advising, and making recommendations on the safe disposal and transportation of stockpile and non-stockpile chemical warfare agents" is the mission of CDC's Chemical Weapons Elimination program. The program partnered with agencies such as state health departments, local medical facilities, and state environmental departments as part of its oversight role. Guidance and expertise are provided by CDC to address issues and concerns of officials and the public. CDC also addresses issues for workers and local areas through its work with local citizens' advisory committees and federal agencies. Several methods are used to destroy chemical warfare agents in the United States stockpile, including incineration and chemical processing with caustic products. Transportable treatment systems are among technologies used to destroy recovered chemical warfare material. In chemical weapons elimination, the United States Army is a world leader. More than a decade of experience demonstrates that safe destruction of these weapons can take place without harming destruction-facility employees, the community, or the environment. The author focuses on the history and challenges of systems that safely destroy chemical weapons and how they must be considered in plans for recovery and destruction of underwater chemical munitions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 07:14:44 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/915035</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/886557</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Protecting the critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. Attacks on CI/KR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CI/KR as weapons of mass destruction could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences. The overarching goal of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is to: Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation’s CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CI/KR protection efforts into a single national program to achieve this goal. Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CI/KR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their inter-connecting links resulting from exposure, injury, destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into initial facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, leveraging “self-healing” technologies, promoting workforce surety programs, and implementing cyber security measures, training and exercises, business continuity planning, and restoration and recovery actions, among various others. Achieving the NIPP goal requires actions to address a series of objectives that include: (1) Understanding and sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards; (2) Building security partnerships to share information and implement CI/KR protection programs; (3) Implementing a long-term risk management program; and (4) Maximizing efficient use of resources for CI/KR protection, restoration, and recovery. These objectives require a collaborative partnership between and among a diverse set of security partners, including the Federal Government; State, Territorial, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; international entities; and nongovernmental organizations. The NIPP provides the framework that defines the processes and mechanisms that these security partners will use to develop and implement the national program to protect CI/KR across all sectors over the long term.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Apr 2009 14:59:30 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/886557</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The ACCA Fire / Rescue Department</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/879106</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article highlights the operations of Pennsylvania's Allegheny County Airport Authority (ACCA) Fire / Rescue Department. Responsible for all aircraft fire emergencies, including structural fires occurring on airport property, the department has 50 employees and operates 19 pieces of equipment. One of the department's main responsibilities is protecting the 100,000 acres that comprise Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT). Besides fire protection, the department maintains an Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and responds to incidents involving Hazardous Materials / Weapons of Mass Destruction (HazMat / WMD). ACCA also operates the Federal Aviation Administration's Regional Aircraft Rescue Firefighting (ARFF) Training Facility based at PIT. The training facility offers new and innovative firefighting techniques and is operated by ACCA personnel, who serve as instructors in addition to their regular duties. Recently, the training facility has begun to regularly host the Basic and Advanced ARFF schools, whose courses are presented by the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2009 12:30:54 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/879106</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PDR Guide to Terrorism Response</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/865246</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This is the first step-by-step guide for terrorism response. This book authoritatively covers all forms of terrorist attack for all types of personnel. In addition to in-depth information on biological and chemical agents, it also provides basic response data on incendiary, explosive and nuclear attacks. Produced with leading terrorism experts, it offers three levels of information lets user choose the amount of detail needed: (1) general preparedness - for hazard assessment & emergency actions; (2) signs and symptoms - for fast identification of the agent used; and (3) biological and chemical agents - at a glance and in-depth. Experts from Johns Hopkins faculty and other leading academic centers collaborated on this guide to make it one of the most valuable tools you can have when faced with a terrorism crisis – from attack to recovery. This guide is ideal for everyone from first responders to medical personnel, and, possibly a book that you want to purchase and have available now, should ever need it.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2008 09:07:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/865246</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. Testimony</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/860748</link>
      <description><![CDATA[U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012. To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports. This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. This testimony is based on U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)  products issued from July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement: (1) Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze data for participating seaports. (2) Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP lacks information on host nation equipment and practices. (3) Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased security. (4) Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of implementing 100 percent scanning. (5) Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time and may be difficult to access. (6) Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program. (7) Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require international agreements for transfer to CBP officials. (8) Consistency with risk management: International partners state that 100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management principles and diverts resources away from other security threats. (9) Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to trade. GAO recommended in prior reports that DHS develop human capital plans, enhance performance measures, and gather information on the efficacy of host government systems. DHS is taking steps to address the recommendations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2008 07:48:14 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/860748</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Protecting Our Marine Environment: Destruction of the F/V Challenger</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/860164</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Destruction of the F/V Challenger, a former marine shrimping vessel in southern Florida, is examined. Involvement of Coast Guard Sector St. Petersburg for potentially adverse Caloosahatchee River water, environmental, and ecological impact minimization resulted after a report of pollution from the vessel. The case fell under federal control after the registered owner would not assume responsibility for the cleanup. The removal and destruction process; vessel state and litigation protection value; planning for and actual removal and destruction; cost summary and lessons learned for the final project; and environmental benefits are described. Inserts describe the execution stage project network and responsible party contact attempts.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2008 07:27:25 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/860164</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/849676</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify and examine high-risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2003 and 2005 that CSI helped to enhance homeland security, and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations. By collaborating on the development of the Department of Homeland Security’s Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and by revising the CSI strategic plan as GAO recommended, CBP has contributed to the overall U.S. strategic planning efforts related to enhancing the security for the overseas supply chain. Also, CBP reached its targets of operating CSI in 58 foreign seaports, and thereby having 86 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers pass through CSI seaports in fiscal year 2007—representing a steady increase in these measures of CSI performance. To strengthen CSI operations, CBP has sought to address human capital challenges and previous GAO recommendations by increasing CSI staffing levels closer to those called for in its staffing model and revising its human capital plan. However, challenges remain because CBP continues to rely, in part, on a temporary workforce; has not determined how to optimize its staffing resources; and reports difficulties in identifying sufficient numbers of qualified staff. In addition, CBP has enhanced relationships with host governments participating in CSI. However, hurdles to cooperation remain at some seaports, such as restrictions on CSI teams witnessing examinations. CBP improved its evaluation of CSI team performance at seaports, but limitations remain in the evaluation process that affect the accuracy and completeness of data collected. CBP has not set minimum technical criteria for equipment or systematically collected information on the equipment, people, and processes involved in CSI host government examinations of high-risk, U.S-bound container cargo. Also, CBP has not developed general guidelines to use in assessing the reliability of these examinations. Thus, CBP potentially lacks information to ensure that host government examinations can detect and identify weapons of mass destruction, which is important because containers are typically not reexamined in the United States if already examined at a CSI seaport. CBP refined overall CSI performance measures, but has not fully developed performance measures and annual targets for core CSI functions, such as the examination of high-risk containers before they are placed on vessels bound for the United States. These weaknesses in CBP’s data collection and performance measures potentially limit the information available on overall CSI effectiveness. GAO recommends that CBP enhance data collected on CSI team performance, host government examinations, and related performance measures.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 14:36:23 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/849676</guid>
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