<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>Striving for a net-Zero emission future: Impact of feed-in tariffs on BOT highway investment and subsidy decisions</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2630926</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Integrating green electricity generated by renewable energy sources (RES) to power highways is a crucial strategy for developing low-carbon transportation. Previous research on highway investment and pricing decisions under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes has seldom considered the impact of integrating clean energy, let alone the impact of the associated incentive tools. This study develops a stylized model to analyze private sector investment decisions in RES-integrated highway projects, alongside public sector subsidy design under RES incentive policies (feed-in tariffs, FIT). We derive the optimal highway and RES capacities as well toll charges, finding that the FIT rate initially increases both highway and RES capacity but eventually impedes highway investment, leading to higher tolls. We further demonstrate that both the RES cost subsidy and the volume-based subsidy can effectively substitute for the FIT, with equilibrium subsidy levels endogenously offsetting its impact on investment when the FIT rate is low. Conversely, under high FIT rates, a larger volume-based subsidy is required to offset the profit gap between toll revenues and green electricity sales, whereas the RES cost subsidy becomes ineffective. This study provides valuable insights for policymakers and for both the public and private sectors involved in sustainable highway projects under BOT schemes.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 16:58:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2630926</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Fixing the time trap: fair PPP concession renegotiation via asset valuation and traffic regression</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2643212</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Infrastructure development is paramount for economic growth and improved quality of life. However, constrained government budgets often impede the ability to meet escalating infrastructure demands solely through public funding. To overcome these fiscal limitations, public‐private partnership (PPP) arrangements have been widely adopted globally as an alternative financing model. While numerous PPP projects have yielded positive outcomes, persistent challenges remain—particularly in the long-term management of concession agreements over extended project lifespans. A pervasive issue is the frequent renegotiation of PPP contracts, often resulting in imbalances in safeguarding the interests of private investors, public authorities, and taxpayers. A critical limitation of current practice is the absence of a clear, objective methodology for determining concession periods during such renegotiations. This study addresses this gap by introducing a novel model for recalibrating concession durations, leveraging residual asset valuation and traffic volume forecasting via regression analysis as key determinants. By quantifying residual infrastructure asset value and forecasting traffic patterns, the proposed model establishes a more transparent and equitable foundation for concession period renegotiations. This approach is expected to mitigate conflicts, strengthen stakeholder trust, and ensure a more balanced distribution of benefits throughout the PPP project lifecycle.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 15:50:27 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2643212</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Assessment of Key Risks Affecting Investment Capital Performance in Vietnam’s BOT-Tolled Highway Projects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2593960</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Highway transportation projects rely heavily on state funding, posing challenges for infrastructure development. Many countries, especially developing ones, have introduced policies to attract private investment through partnerships to mitigate these issues. However, concerns remain regarding their effectiveness. This study examines how critical risks cause increases in initial investment of Build-Operate-Transfer tolled highway projects in Vietnam. Twenty-five risk factors were identified through a literature review and expert opinion. Data was collected via a five-point scale questionnaire and analyzed using Cronbach’s alpha, t-tests, factor analysis, and fuzzy synthetic evaluation (FSE). Results highlighted that payment procedure, state policy, and legal issues significantly impact the project’s investment capital performance. Seven principal components were extracted from the original factors, explaining 57.3% of the total variance. The FSE model rated the risk impact at 3.6 out of 5, counting for 72%. These findings provide valuable insights for enhancing the overall investment performance of BOT-tolled highway projects.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2025 09:25:22 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2593960</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Contract design for BOT roads in the presence of autonomous vehicles</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2572433</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines contract design for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects in the presence of autonomous vehicles (AVs). The authors incorporate the impact of AVs on expanding road capacity through their platooning effect, whereby AVs travel in coordinated fleets with reduced headways. The authors derive the first-best BOT contracts under two distinct traffic management policies: the integrated policy, in which AVs and human-driven vehicles (HVs) share lanes, and the designated-lane policy, in which AVs and HVs use separate lanes. The authors also characterize the firm’s optimal BOT contracts under each policy. The authors' results show that under the integrated policy, AVs may be charged a negative toll when their market share is sufficiently small and headways involving AVs are sufficiently reduced, while HVs are consistently charged a positive toll under both policies. The authors further demonstrate that first-best BOT contracts can be implemented under both policies with the support of government subsidies. In comparing the two policies under BOT contract, the authors find that the integrated policy outperforms the designated-lane policy in terms of firm profit and social welfare when the AV market share is either very low or very high. Finally, the authors show how lane capacity allocation under the designated-lane policy affects the policy preferences of both the government and the firm.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2025 17:15:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2572433</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Build-Transfer-Operate with risk sharing approach for railway public-private-partnership project in Korea</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2548296</link>
      <description><![CDATA[To attract the private sector to railway public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the public sector is required to share risks resulted from a failure in demand forecasting. The Korean government introduced BTO-risk sharing (BTO-rs) as a new PPP arrangement to promote investments in railway projects. BTO-rs is to share operating costs and revenues by both the public and private sectors. This study explains the methodology of BTO-rs. Based on BTO-rs, this study conducted the sensitivity analysis for the real railway project. The result of the sensitivity analysis suggests that sharing ratio of the excess operating profit and loss of the government and demand are the most influential factors affecting the concessionaire’s rate of return.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 10:10:54 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2548296</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BOT contract of high-speed rail project design considering uncertain economic spillover</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2471086</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The rapid development of high-speed rail (HSR) has had a significant impact on economic development, but it requires substantial investment and places a burden on public funds. The COVID-19 pandemic has further strained government budgets, making alternative funding models attractive. The build-operate-transfer (BOT) model, commonly used in highway projects, involves private companies building and operating infrastructure in exchange for toll revenues. This study explores the use of flexible and fixed BOT contracts for HSR projects and analyzes their impact on private sector investment share and social welfare in HSR projects. The authors' analytical and numerical simulation findings suggest that under the flexible BOT contract, the private sector investment share increases with the expectation and uncertainty of the economic spillover effect. It decreases with a short HSR infrastructure lifecycle but remains unaffected by a sufficiently long lifecycle. In contrast, a fixed BOT contract raises private sector investment share regardless of the uncertainty of economic spillover. A longer HSR lifecycle amplifies the effect of economic spillover under both types of contracts. Expected social welfare rises with the HSR infrastructure's lifecycle under the fixed BOT contract, but for the flexible BOT contract, it initially increases and then exhibits a jump-down discontinuity at the threshold lifecycle of the HSR infrastructure. The flexible BOT contract outperforms the fixed BOT contract with a shorter lifecycle or higher spillover uncertainty, while the fixed BOT contract yields more welfare improvements for a longer lifecycle.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Dec 2024 10:35:43 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2471086</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Investment Decisions In The BOT Transport Infrastructure Applying Fuzzy Real Option</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2281965</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the transport infrastructure, the investments are very large projects with long life cycles, which make them both risk investments and decision problems built on imprecise and uncertain assumptions. Usually, the transport infrastructure investments are divided into two or more steps to invest. Therefore, the question that a management group must answer for a deferrable investment opportunity is: if the project can be postponed up to T time periods, what is the project valuation? In this paper the authors will adopt a fuzzy real option model to solve the problem.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2024 16:18:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2281965</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Period-dependent pricing methods of multi-type vehicles for BOT highway projects with pavement rehabilitation effects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2351112</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the planning stage of a BOT highway project, the future traffic demand plays a pivotal role on designing contract factors. Considering that the traffic demand generally has variations with time, the constant tolls during the concession period obviously is not a good choice. And the different toll charges classified by vehicles types definitely affect the traffic composition and maintenance cost. To address this practical issue, this study proposes the mixed integer nonlinear programming models to select the period-dependent toll charges for multi-type vehicles and highway capacity, by considering both the objectives of the government and private firms. Then two solution algorithms are provided to solve the authors' proposed models. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to assess the applicability and efficiency of their models and algorithms.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2024 16:52:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2351112</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Signaling contracts design for Build–Operate–Transfer roads under asymmetric traffic demand information</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2347667</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In a build-operate-transfer (BOT) road project, the government offers a concession contract to a private investor based on traffic demand information. When the government is privately informed about the demand information—namely, the potential traffic demand (PTD)—it might be challenging for the private investor to quantify the project’s prospects, which could diminish its enthusiasm for involvement. In that case, the government has incentive to design a concession contract that acts as a signal of facility demand to the private investor. This study uses a signaling model to develop an incentive-compatible BOT contract when the government possesses an informational advantage concerning PTD. The authors find that the optimal contract for the government under the high-PTD condition is distorted relative to a symmetric-information contract. However, this distortion comes at the cost of social welfare loss, which can be viewed as signaling cost, and it is affected by PTD variation and the marginal social cost of public funds. In a separating equilibrium, optimal contracts lie in one of four regions whose bounds are determined by PTD variation. They further extend the research by considering the private investor’s risk-averse attitude. They find that the existence of an optimal signaling mechanism is influenced by the extent of risk aversion (ERA). Interestingly, however, a risk-averse attitude does not magnify the distortion of an asymmetric-information contract, and the signaling cost decreases with ERA. The ranges of separating equilibrium outcomes are also influenced by ERA. Based on their findings, they derive some policy insights regarding BOT contracts design.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2024 16:12:13 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2347667</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Decision Framework for Efficient Risk Mitigation in BOT Highway Infrastructure Service Projects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2204560</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Revenue risk is the most critical factor that hampers the long-term viability of highway infrastructure service projects. This paper develops an integrated multi-method decision framework to evaluate and compare multiple revenue risk mitigation strategies for build-operate-transfer (BOT) highway infrastructure concessions. Using the project data of a real highway BOT case project in India, this paper models and evaluates various risk mitigation strategies on different performance metrics using Monte Carlo simulation analysis. The technical efficiencies of the risk mitigation strategies are estimated using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and efficient strategies are identified. The findings suggest that strategies comprising appropriate combinations of minimum revenue guarantee, excess revenue share, and revenue shortfall loan mitigate the revenue risk most efficiently. The decision framework and the findings facilitate efficient public infrastructure contract design by policymakers and set multiple research directions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2023 16:26:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2204560</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Effects of asymmetric investment cost information on revenue-compensated build-operate-transfer highway contracts</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2151919</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the planning stage of build-operate-transfer (BOT) highway projects, private firms usually possess more information about the investment cost than governments. This study considers the problem of how to design project contracts and regulate private firms whose investment costs are unobservable to governments. A principal-agent model is proposed to investigate this type of BOT contracts, in which governments aim to maximize social welfare, while the firms are guaranteed a reserved level of profit and have no incentive to misreport their costs. Besides, the extent to which the information asymmetries influence these contracts is examined through an analysis of the effects of the distribution of marginal cost parameters and the shadow cost of public funds. Furthermore, properties of these contracts are discussed and compared with the revenue-compensated BOT contracts under symmetric cost information.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 26 Jun 2023 18:12:14 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2151919</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Incentive contracts with demand guarantee in BOT toll road projects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2135608</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Demand uncertainty is a significant issue faced by both the government and private firms in build-operate-transfer (BOT) toll road projects. To encourage private firms' participation, the government usually provides them with demand guarantee. This paper investigates and compares the optimal BOT contracts with the minimum demand guarantee (MDG) and the flexible demand guarantee (FDG), respectively, in environments of symmetric and asymmetric information. It is determined that under the MDG with asymmetric information, the private firm's optimal effort decreases with respect to the guarantee level, which indicates that the MDG provides the private firm with a disincentive to exert effort to increase traffic demand. Under the FDG with asymmetric information, the private firm's optimal effort decreases with respect to the guarantee level and threshold coefficient. Through a comparison of the environment with asymmetric information, the optimal toll price, optimal guarantee level and resulting social welfare are higher under the FDG for a small threshold coefficient. Therefore, it is concluded that the government may choose the FDG instead of the MDG for a small threshold coefficient, which means that the FDG is suitable for toll roads with relatively low demand. Conversely, the government prefers to choose the MDG instead of the FDG when the threshold coefficient is large enough, which means that the MDG is suitable for toll roads with relatively high demand. The authors further demonstrate that their model results still qualitatively hold when traffic congestion is considered.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:04:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2135608</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Using Bargaining Model with Loss Aversion and a Risk of Breakdown to Determine Compensation for Buyback of Early Terminating BOT Highway Projects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2132152</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Build-operate-transfer (BOT) tends to be used in the construction industries for massive transportation infrastructure projects, one of which is highway projects. The compensation for the early termination of BOT highway projects has become the most striking and concerning issue for the enterprise and the government. Although the works of the compensation for early terminating BOT projects are rich in the construction industry, there is an absence of a thorough investigation of bargaining game-theoretic applications in the construction engineering and management (CEM). To develop a reasonable and fair decision mechanism for the compensation for early terminating BOT highway projects in CEM, a valid approach to evaluating compensation is proposed using a bargaining game. An alternating-offer bargaining game model is constructed to analyze the bargaining process, where loss aversion of the enterprise and the government as well as risk of breakdown is considered in the bargaining process. The compensation amount is derived by solving the constructed bargaining game model. It is shown that the compensation amount for the enterprise is related positively to loss aversion of the government and negatively to its own loss aversion. It is shown that the enterprise can obtain more compensation from the risk of breakdown. Finally, the results of the developed bargaining game model are verified by applying them to the Wutong Mountain Tunnel BOT highway project in Shenzhen, China. The constructed bargaining model enables the enterprise and the government to forecast the agreement on compensation amount in CEM. This paper offers an approach to compensation for early terminating BOT highway projects in CEM.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 07 Apr 2023 13:34:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2132152</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Management of Foreign Exchange Risk for Build–Own–Operate–Transfer Hydropower Projects in Nepal: A Good-for-All Approach</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2118480</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Financing demands for the increasing number of large-scale build–own–operate–transfer (BOOT) hydropower projects in Nepal have necessitated greater mobilization of foreign investment. International investors and lenders perceive significant foreign exchange (FoREX) risk when investing in such projects. In Nepal and various developing countries, FoREX risk-allocation mechanisms offered by the public sector allocate significant FoREX risks to project sponsors and have failed to attract substantial foreign investment. The industry is thus in need of alternative FoREX risk-allocation mechanisms that ensure reasonable returns to project sponsors, minimize downside risk to the public sector, and maintain reasonable electricity tariffs for consumers. To address this need, this study proposes a feasible good-for-all risk-allocation mechanism and presents a financial analysis of the proposed mechanism via a case study of an ongoing Nepalese BOOT hydropower project. The comparative merits of the proposed risk-allocation mechanism over the existing mechanism are illustrated via a case study of an ongoing BOOT hydropower project in Nepal. The case study is also extended to represent different hydropower projects using various cost and revenue scenarios. The results of extended analysis showed that the proposed risk-allocation mechanism should be more effective for economic projects, and that implementation is feasible based on the current institutional arrangements observed in Nepal.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2023 13:33:44 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2118480</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>VfM-at-Risk Analysis Model for Build–Operate–Transfer Infrastructure Projects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2018868</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Existing models have failed to capture the stochastic nature of input variables for the value-for-money (VfM) analysis in build–operate–transfer (BOT) infrastructure projects. The present study aims to address this knowledge gap by offering a VfM-at-risk analysis model and developing a stochastic-based model that takes account of the risk allocation scheme and cost efficiency in the valuation. The proposed model can deal with the net-cost and net-revenue projects. This study introduces weighted risk reduction factors to accommodate the interaction between public and private agencies in sharing risk outcomes and a metric to measure the optimality of a risk allocation scheme. A case study based on Indonesia’s BOT water supply project was used to demonstrate the model application. It is shown that cost efficiency and an optimal risk allocation scheme enhance VfM. Moreover, the wisdom of using the BOT option can be challenged when the public agency is at least as good as the private agency unless other reasons exist, and allocating project risk to an agency that cannot best deal with it can reduce VfM. This study concludes with model limitations and directions for future research.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 13 Oct 2022 09:25:03 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2018868</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>