<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>Causes and Mitigation of Radio Frequency (RF) Blackout during Reentry of Reusable Launch Vehicles</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1469523</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Aerospace Corporation was tasked to assess radio frequency (RF) blackout phenomena caused by plasma generation around vehicles during reentry and presently known methodologies for mitigation of this condition inhibiting communications. The purpose was to understand these phenomena and mitigation approaches applicable to reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) used for commercial space. The viability and limitations of selecting frequency bands amenable to continuous communication in presence of plasma sheaths were assessed and mitigation recommendations provided. The ability to predict the ionized flow field for classes of vehicles most likely to emerge as hypersonic space transportation systems, with sufficient accuracy to identify the altitudes of blackout onset and recovery within reasonable bounds, has been demonstrated for altitudes greater than approximately 100 kft. This high-altitude regime is the most likely for future space transportation due to low g forces and low heat loads. For the lower, suborbital altitudes, many commercial RLVs will not be subjected to RF blackout because their relatively low velocities will not create conditions that generate plasma. Determination of the interaction of RF with a known ionized layer, including reflection, attenuation, refraction, high-power breakdown limits, and also effects of the plasma on the antenna characteristics, have been demonstrated successfully. Analytic codes are available to evaluate these phenomena. Approaches for mitigating the interruption of communications due to interactions of plasma electrons with RF signals are reviewed. The most promising are: aerodynamic shaping, injection of quenchants, use of magnetic windows, and use of high frequencies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2017 12:22:16 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1469523</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS: AUGUST 2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT - GREAT LAKES REGION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/755057</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the August 14, 2003 blackout that affected the Northeastern United States.  It is part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on transportation system facilities and services and the role of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) in emergencies.  It also highlights the importance of good communications between transportation agency staff and the public safety officials who are the first responders during catastrophic events.  The findings documented in this report are a result of the creation of a detailed chronology of events in the Great Lakes Region (principally Detroit and Cleveland metropolitan areas), a literature search, and interviews of key personnel involved in transportation operations decision-making during the blackout.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Apr 2005 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/755057</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE AUGUST 2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT, GREAT LAKES AND NEW YORK CITY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/740350</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On Thursday, August 14, 2003, a series of seemingly small events, happening in concert, produced the largest blackout in American history.  Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on August 14, a brush fire caused a transmission line south of Columbus, Ohio, to go out of service.  At 3:05 p.m. and at 3:32 p.m., two separate transmission lines in Northern Ohio failed.  Over the next 30 minutes, five additional transmission lines in Ohio and Michigan failed.  At 4:10 p.m., the electrical system connecting the region south of the Great Lakes, including the cities of Cleveland, Ohio, and Detroit, Michigan, to New York and New Jersey experienced a profound failure due, in large part, to the sudden vulnerability of the transmission system.  A cascading effect occurred, in which lines sequentially overloaded and then failed, leaving a swath of 3,700 miles--including portions of Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and the Maritime provinces--in the dark.  This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to this catastrophic event.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Sep 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/740350</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS: AUGUST 2003 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT, NEW YORK CITY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/740351</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the August 14, 2003, blackout throughout the Northeast.  It is part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on transportation system facilities and services and the role of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) in emergencies.  It also highlights the importance of good communications between transportation agency staff and the public safety officials who are the first responders during catastrophic events.  The findings documented in this report are a result of the creation of a detailed chronology of events in the New York City metropolitan region, a literature search, and interviews of key personnel involved in transportation operations decision-making during the blackout.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Sep 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/740351</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/740352</link>
      <description><![CDATA[To assist state and local transportation staffs in preparing for and responding to major incidents, the Federal Highway Administration Office of Transportation Operations and the U.S. Department of Transportation Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office have commissioned a series of reviews to investigate the effects of catastrophic events on roadway and transit systems.  This report compares the findings of six previously conducted case studies:  Blackout, New York City Metropolitan Area - August 14, 2003; Blackout, Great Lakes Region - August 14, 2003; Terrorist attack, New York City - September 11, 2001; Terrorist attack, Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area - September 11, 2001; Rail Tunnel Fire, Baltimore, Maryland - July 18, 2001; and Earthquake, Northridge, California - January 17, 1994.  This comparative analysis includes an assessment of how the conditions and locales at the case study sites governed appropriate responses and what lessons those factors hold for future preparedness at locations across the country.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Sep 2004 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/740352</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>DRIVING BEHAVIOR AND BLACKOUT IN THE TUNNEL</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/108987</link>
      <description><![CDATA[THE EFFECT OF EMERGENCY BLACKOUT IN A TUNNEL BEFORE AN EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY WAS PROVIDED IS INVESTIGATED. THE EFFECTS OF SEVERAL DIFFERENT DURATIONS OF THE BLACKOUT WERE TESTED SUCH AS 210 MS., 240 MS. AND 420 MS. NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ON DRIVING BEHAVIOR WERE FOUND FOR 5 SUBJECTS WHO DROVE THROUGH THE TUNNEL UNDER THESE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS. ONLY THE RESULTS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE INDICATED CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE BLACKOUT BUT NO POSITIVE EFFECT ON DRIVING. FROM THE RESULTS OBTAINED, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE BLACKOUT WITH THE DURATION OF LESS THAN 400MS. DID NOT DISTURB DRIVING BEHAVIOR.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/108987</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICE FOR MARKING REMOVAL</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/365802</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article discusses successful methods for the removal of paint stripes and other markings from asphalt pavement. Includes the following methods: blackout paint, scarifying, pressure washing, and heat scraping.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 1992 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/365802</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>REVOLUTIONARY BUSES IN EUROPE OFFER ANSWER TO ENERGY CRISIS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/132975</link>
      <description><![CDATA[FRANCE'S TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH GROUP IDENTIFIES AND REVIEWS 51 PROJECTS DEALING WITH INNOVATIVE BUSES CAPABLE OF MORE EFFICIENT FUEL UTILIZATION.  SOLUTIONS TO THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT PROBLEM EUROPE FACES IN ITS CONGESTED CITIES INCLUDE ELECTRIC-BATTERY CITY BUSES, TROLLEYBUSES, MECHANICAL ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS BASED ON HIGH-SPEED FLY- WHEELS THAT FEED ELECTRIC MOTORS.  ALSO REVIEWED ARE FOUR STEAM BUS PROJECTS NOW IN OPERATION, REPORTS ON DIAL-A-BUS SYSTEMS, GAS BUS SYSTEMS, AND AUTOMATIC VEHICLE MONITORING. EACH PROJECT IS IDENTIFIED BY THE PROGRAM NAME, SPONSOR, COUNTRY, BACKGROUND MATERIAL, AND CONTRACT DATA.  TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF EACH VEHICLE AND COST DATA ARE GIVEN.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jul 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/132975</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RELIABILITY ASPECTS OF ROAD TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNALS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/59002</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Australian standard 1057 is quoted to define reliability as the probability of performing a required function under prescribed conditions for a stated period of time.  The author discusses this definition, presenting as an example, those factors influencing the reliability of a traffic signal system.  Most of these factors are shown to have an economic basis, with a direct bearing on level of service to the public with maximum safety and minimum delay.  Safety is discussed with reference to the boundary that exists between "acceptable" and "unacceptable", and hazard ratings and maximum acceptable probability of occurrence of seven traffic signal display faults determined from a public opinion survey in Sydney are tabulated.  Sydney's traffic signal system (August 1976) comprises some 1150 sets of signals, including 215 of the mid-block type for the sole protection of pedestrians. The operation of the complex and comprehensive maintenance system is described, and the composition of the main traffic signal fault categories presented and discussed. The establishment of reliability objectives is considered to be of importance, especially in view of the increasing sophistication of traffic control techniques.  The ultimate benefit of the more sophisticated system is questioned if it cannot be maintained AS Effectively as a less flexible system with higher reliability.  Research into performance requirements is quoted which enables the economic consequences of signal failure to be assessed. Data are quoted to show, as an example, that a reduction in the number of hours of black-out of a signal installation from 40 to 20 per annum would justify additional expenditure in the order of A$1000 per site (on the basis of a 20-year project period).  It is suggested that reliability is the responsibility of the purchaser rather than the equipment manufacturer. /TRRL/]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 May 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/59002</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES FOR BLACKOUT DRIVING</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/116856</link>
      <description><![CDATA[ONLY VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH BLACKOUT LIGHTS ARE PERMITTED TO OPERATE DURING BLACKOUTS. DURING THESE PERIODS, SPECIAL DEVICES ARE NEEDED TO REGULATE, WARN, AND GUIDE DRIVERS OF THESE VEHICLES. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS TRAFFIC SIGNS AND MARKINGS WAS TESTED DURING ACTUAL BLACKOUT CONDITIONS. CONCLUSIONS INDICATE THAT TRAFFIC SIGN DESIGN AND INSTALLATION SHOULD MEET THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS: (1) THEY SHOULD BE REFLECTORIZED WITH EITHER REFLECTIVE MATERIAL OR REFLECTIVE BUTTONS; (2) THEY SHOULD BE MOUNTED LOW; (3) THEY SHOULD BE AS CLOSE TO THE PAVEMENT AS POSSIBLE; (4) WHEN THE SIGN CANNOT BE MOUNTED LOW ENOUGH TO FALL WITHIN THE BLACKOUT BEAM, IT MAY BE EITHER EXTERNALLY OR INTERNALLY ILLUMINATED; (5) SIGNS SHOULD BE ERECTED AS NEARLY PERPENDICULAR WITH THE LINE OF SIGHT OF THE OBSERVER AS POSSIBLE; (6) COLORS OF BLACK SIGNS ARE NOT SO IMPORTANT AS CONTRAST, AND A BLACK AND WHITE COMBINATION IS SUFFICIENT FOR ALL SIGNS. CONCLUSIONS ON PAVEMENT MARKINGS INCLUDE: (1) VISIBLE CENTERLINES ARE ESSENTIAL; (2) REFLECTORIZED WHITE CENTERLINES ARE VERY EFFECTIVE; (3) DASHED LINES ARE NOT SO EFFECTIVE AS CONTININOUS LINES, AND YELLOW NOT SO EFFECTIVE AS WHITE, ALTHOUGH ALL ARE ADEQUATE; (4) EDGE LINES ARE HELPFUL, BUT UNNECESSARY; (5) CURBS AND OBJECTS WITHIN THE DIRECT LINE OF TRAFFIC MUST BE MARKED.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 1971 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/116856</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>