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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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      <title>Navigation and Landing Transition Strategy</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1515287</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report defines the satellite navigation (Satnav) transition strategy that considers the vulnerability of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and describes proposed requirements for a backup navigation and landing capability for the National Airspace System (NAS). This report also provides the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA's) input to the Department of Transportation’s action plan to maintain the adequacy of backup systems for critical transportation applications in which GPS is being used. The FAA Satnav strategic transition ensures that adequate ground-based navigation aids (Navaids) are maintained and that the appropriate mix of systems is described that addresses GPS vulnerabilities. The transition time is through the full deployment of the next generation of GPS (GPS III), which brings improvements that address elements of the current vulnerabilities. The FAA will begin commissioning GPS augmentation systems and procedures starting in 2003 for NAS-wide operations from en route navigation through precision approach. The navigation strategy focuses on sustaining safety during GPS disruption for operations in instrument operations and recovery of aircraft operating within an interference area. Sufficient ground-based Navaids are to be retained to meet this NAS safety responsibility. Navigation equipment used by the Department of Defense is retained for homeland defense. Sufficient navigation infrastructure must also be retained for capacity and efficiency to continue commercial flight operations. Continuing operations by air transportation in the presence of interference is the best deterrent to the deliberate disruption of satellite navigation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2018 16:12:07 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1515287</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>New Brake By Wire Concept with Mechanical Backup</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1432630</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Brake-By-Wire (BBW) is a term used to describe next generation brake systems that rely on motor driven electro-mechanical calipers in place of conventional hydraulic components such as the booster, master cylinder, hydraulic unit, and parking brake. Instead the system configuration is simplified to a pedal simulator, electro-mechanical calipers that require no boosting, and electric control units. The active, highly-responsive, and independent control of the brake actuators at each wheel allows for great control flexibility and improved brake performance. It is also very well-suited for easy integration with cooperative regenerative braking and driver assistance functions.         Although such potential and innovations have driven the interest and research into BBW systems through the years, it has yet to be successfully introduced in series production mainly due to the underlying perception of the lack of reliability of electronic components and overall cost concerns.         In the current investigation, a new concept of BBW system is proposed as a step towards overcoming such hurdles. The proposed concept provides a mechanical backup function that does not deter the system from the original performance benefits of a BBW system. It is hoped that such an addition, which provides emergency braking capability with no electrical power, will give the BBW system the ultimate reliability that can help persuade its penetration into the brake market. This system also has the potential to reduce the overall cost of the system since reliance on complex system architectures, redundancies, and highly reliable electrical components can be reduced.         This study will investigate the feasibility and basic performance of the proposed BBW concept. First, prototype actuators for the proposed system were designed and manufactured. After checking the samples in bench tests, the actuators were built into a car to access the braking capability of the system.       ]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:09:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1432630</guid>
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      <title>Serial-To-Ethernet Devices an Inexpensive Upgrade</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1280927</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The communication section of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority's (MARTA’s) existing Synchronous Optical Networking (SONET) system was failing. The SONET system utilized a Plain Old Telephone Service (Modem/POTS/T1) to communicate Train Control, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) indications, and controls from the related field equipment to the Rail Service Control Center (RSCC). When the SONET failed RSCC would lose indications, and controls for large sections of the system, which caused large areas of the RSCC’s graphic display to “go dark”. MARTA Systems Engineering received two directives from Management to (1) stabilize the existing system and (2) provide a back-up system at a remote location. First, a theory was developed to tunnel serial protocols over Ethernet utilizing two Serial-to-Ethernet Ethernet devices (Terminal Server) that would replace existing communications (Modem/POTS/T1). Next, a Serial-to-Ethernet device had to be  selected, and tested. The device had to be reliable, economical, and easily configured. In conclusion, two different terminal servers were utilized; Train Control used a Lantronix UDS1100, and SCADA a Perle IOLAN DS1. Because the Train Control and SCADA communication is now on an Ethernet network, MARTA was able to build a Back-Up Control Center.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Dec 2013 13:09:36 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1280927</guid>
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      <title>GPS Disruptions: Efforts to Assess Risks to Critical Infrastructure and Coordinate Agency Actions Should Be Enhanced</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1267756</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Global Positioning System (GPS) provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide and is used extensively in many of the nation’s 16 critical infrastructure sectors, such as communications and transportation. GPS is also a key component in many of the modern conveniences that people rely on or interact with daily. However, sectors’ increasing dependency on GPS leaves them potentially vulnerable to disruptions. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review the effects of GPS disruptions on the nation’s critical infrastructure. GAO examined (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks and potential effects of GPS disruptions on critical infrastructure, (2) the extent to which the Department of Transportation (DOT), and DHS have developed backup strategies to mitigate GPS disruptions, and (3) what strategies, if any, selected critical infrastructure sectors employ to mitigate GPS disruptions and any remaining challenges. To assess the risks and potential effects from disruptions in GPS) on critical infrastructure, DHS published the GPS National Risk Estimate (NRE) in 2012. In doing so, DHS conducted a scenario-based risk assessment for four critical infrastructure sectors using subject matter experts from inside and outside of government. Risk assessments involve complex analysis, and conducting a risk assessment across multiple sectors with many unknowns and little data is challenging. DHS’s risk management guidance can be used to help address such challenges. However, GAO found the NRE lacks key characteristics of risk assessments outlined in DHS’s risk management guidance and, as a result, is incomplete and has limited usefulness to inform mitigation planning, priorities, and resource allocation. A plan to collect and assess additional data and subsequent efforts to ensure that the risk assessment is consistent with DHS guidance would contribute to more effective GPS risk management. A 2004 presidential directive requires the DOT, in coordination with DHS, to develop backup capabilities to mitigate GPS disruptions, and the agencies have initiated a variety of efforts that contribute to fulfilling the directive. For example, DOT is researching GPS alternatives for aviation, and DHS began efforts on GPS interference detection and mitigation and is researching possibilities for a nationwide backup to GPS timing, which is used widely in critical infrastructure. However, due to resource constraints and other reasons, the agencies have made limited progress in meeting the directive, and many tasks remain incomplete, including identifying GPS backup requirements and determining suitability of backup capabilities. Furthermore, the agencies’ efforts have been hampered by a lack of effective collaboration. In particular, DOT and DHS have not clearly defined their respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities or what outcomes would satisfy the presidential directive. Without clearly defining both roles and desired outcomes, DOT and DHS cannot ensure that they will satisfy mutual responsibilities. Implementing key elements of effective collaboration would allow the agencies to address many uncertainties regarding fulfillment of their presidential policy directive. Selected critical infrastructure sectors employ various strategies to mitigate GPS disruptions. For example, some sectors can rely on timing capabilities from other sources of precise time in the event of GPS signal loss. However, both the NRE and stakeholders GAO interviewed raised concerns about the sufficiency of the sectors’ mitigation strategies. Federal risk management guidance requires DHS to work with federal agencies and critical infrastructure sector partners to measure the nation’s ability to reduce risks to critical infrastructure by using a process that includes metrics. GAO found that DHS has not measured the effectiveness of sector mitigation efforts to GPS disruptions and that, as a result, DHS cannot ensure that the sectors could sustain essential operations during GPS disruptions. The lack of agreed-upon metrics to measure the effectiveness of sector mitigation efforts hinders DHS’s ability to objectively assess improvements, track progress, establish accountability, provide feedback mechanisms, or inform decision makers about the appropriateness of the mitigation activities. DHS should ensure that its GPS risk assessment approach is consistent with DHS guidance; develop a plan to measure the effectiveness of mitigation efforts; and DOT and DHS should improve collaboration.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2013 09:16:14 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1267756</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Rear Collision Avoidance Using Only Small Baseline Wide Angle Stereo Camera</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1215962</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A large number of new vehicles are being equipped with parking and backing-up assistant systems. Those systems support the driver to better “see” obstacles relying to the driver to react on time to avoid collisions but none of them can detect generic obstacles to control the vehicle and prevent collisions. The authors present a vision “only” safety system. The authors have chosen a wide-angle stereovision-based sensor combined with computer vision intelligence to detect all obstacles above 10cm up to 6m behind the vehicle. Additionally to detecting all obstacles, the system also recognizes pedestrians, which is needed to enhance collision avoidance intelligence. The authors aim at detecting pedestrians and cars, but also curbs, stopping blocks and small rocks which are ignored by most of other systems. In order to fulfill automotive design requirements, and make it easy to install, the authors have developed a 140deg monitoring system (120deg effective stereo) using only a 5cm baseline on a single board stereo camera. From a theoretical point of view, the authors explain how to determine minimal baseline and image resolution. The authors confirm the theory by a series of experiments. The authors present the system ability to detect (h>10cm) obstacles in urban situations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Oct 2012 09:14:40 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1215962</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Development and Testing of a Post-work Checking Support System</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1138023</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In light of the collision between a train and the bucket of a backhoe that occurred on the Keihin Tohoku line. East Japan Railway Company (JR East) has set down strict rules for checking the worksite after work. However, the checking method of just visual checking by personnel, such as work managers, still relies solely on human attention. And even after setting down rules, operation disruptions due to tools left at the work site reoccurred. As a result, the authors decided to develop a backup system for physical aspects limited to larger tools that can greatly affect train operation if left. A system using multipurpose technology for frontline worksites to prevent leaving larger tools on the track was developed. Development was conducted based on the current working situation and checking after work. The prototype, a radio frequency identification (RFID) system, was then examined in actual work. With a goal of developing a mass-production model for future introduction, this article will report on field tests conducted on this system.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 15:05:40 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1138023</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Improvement of Transportation Reliability by Mutual Backup System for Controllers</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1103861</link>
      <description><![CDATA[With a focus on creating a 21st century suburban commuter train, JR East has had the advanced commuter (AC) train under development. A prototype car, which was manufactured during the last fiscal year using various constituent technologies to create a comprehensive product, is now having running tests performed on it. JR East is paying attention to how, in th event of a breakdown, AC train impacts on transportation can be minimized, in order to achieve one of the AC train's development concepts, the goal of transportation reliability improvement. JR East has also used an unprecedented concept as the basis of mutual backup system development efforts. JR East has finished AC train prototype production that uses the ATS-P device mutual backup system as an automatic train protection device and door-operating control unit backup system. A field test has been performed for verification of satisfactory basic function. The authors examine these issues.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2011 12:00:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1103861</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Guidelines for Traffic Signal Energy Back‐up Systems</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/900968</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Power outages affect traffic signalized intersections, leading to potentially serious problems. Current practices of responding to power failures are very basic, ranging from ‘do nothing’ to installing portable generators. The purpose of this research project was to provide the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) with a better understanding of the practices of other agencies in dealing with dark traffic signals and to develop guidelines for instrumenting uninterrupted backup power at intersections across the state. The main goals of the project are to: (1) recommend cost effective methods for alternative power at traffic signals in NYS; (2) identify the pros and cons of each of the alternative power sources; and (3) develop a methodology for identifying those NYS traffic signals for installation of alternative energy power sources. The research activities consisted of the following eight tasks:  Task 1: Kickoff meeting; Task 2: Conduct Assessment of Alternative Energy Solutions; Task 3: Identify and Evaluate Possible Technologies; Task 4: Develop Prioritization Guidelines; Task 5: Perform a Historical Power Outage Analysis for NYS; Task 6: Develop a Specification for the Alternative Energy Sources; Task 7: Plan to Integrate the Selected Alternatives with the Existing Signal Structure; and Task 8: Deployment Plan.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2009 16:16:23 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/900968</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Satellite Navigation Backup Study</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/898362</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) manages a unique public/private partnership in developing a sweeping vision that will guide the evolution of the National Air Space (NAS) to meet the needs of the 21st century. This initiative, called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), will bring transformation to the U.S. air transportation system by 2025. A key capability for transforming the NAS is satellite-based navigation (SatNav). Modernization plans and augmentation strategies for the Global Positioning System (GPS) will make it a more valuable asset to aviation. The addition of Galileo and possibly GLONASS and COMPASS will further enhance the performance capabilities of satellite based navigation systems. The vulnerabilities of GPS as a navigation signal are well known and the threat of disruption to this service is a concern. These vulnerabilities, defined in technical reports such as the 2001 Volpe GPS Vulnerability Assessment report; US policies to support critical transportation applications in the event of a GPS disruption; and the importance of SatNav in the JPDO vision are the motivations for this study to identify and assess backup satellite navigation solutions. Specifically, the objective of the SatNav Backup Study is to identify an appropriate set of 'area navigation' satellite backup solutions for operation in the NextGen in 2015, 2020, and 2025. The study includes a requirements analysis for a backup system, development of evaluation criteria, and a comparative cost assessment for each proposed backup solution, supporting the overall evaluation of candidate solutions. A secondary focus of the study was consideration of possible candidates for SatNav backup to support the precision approach and surface navigation phases of flight operations. This aspect of the study is presented in the appendices.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2009 12:46:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/898362</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Wireless Passenger Communication System</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/887785</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Equipping passenger trains with a back-up public address (PA) communication system for use by the train crew to communicate with passengers is feasible. In the event of an emergency (collision, derailment, etc.) in which the communication trainline circuit is broken, passenger rail vehicles equipped with PA/intercom systems lose the capability for communications throughout the entire train. The crew must be able to communicate to passengers to reduce confusion, curtail panic, and prevent circumstances which could result in injuries or further danger to passenger and crew. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) funded a Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) project that investigated the feasibility of developing and equipping passenger rail cars with a back-up communication system that is effective in the event of a break or interruption in the communication trainline. This back-up communication system would be powered independently of the car battery system and would allow for 1 hr of talk time from the initial break in the trainline circuit. The system would be accessible via a handset so that crew, as well as emergency responders, would be able to communicate instructions to the passengers from inside and outside of the train, within a given range.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2009 16:11:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/887785</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RATIONALE FOR IMPROVING THE PROTECTION AGAINST MIDAIR COLLISIONS. VOLUME I. SUMMARY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/41433</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The existing surveillance-based air traffic control system has been effective in preventing midair collisions, especially those involving air carrier aircraft. Improvements in this effectiveness can be achieved, in the short-term, thorugh mandatory carriage of altitude-encoding beacon (ATCRBS) transponders. To achieve the desired major improvements in collision prevention for public air transportation requires the addition of an independent backup capability to the primary ground-based system and a new capability beyond the limits of its surveillance coverage. These can be best achieved in the mid-term by an airborne BCAS system based on the mandatory carriage of altitude-encoding transponders. The BCAS design should permit a longerterm upgrading to the compatible DABS transponder and implementation of IPC in at least the dense traffic areas.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 23 Jun 2002 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/41433</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM: STATUS OF WIDE AREA AUGMENTATION SYSTEM PROJECT</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/496520</link>
      <description><![CDATA[As a key element of its overall program for modernizing the National Airspace System, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is planning a transition from ground- to satellite-based navigation by using satellite signals generated by the Department of Defense's (DOD) Global Positioning System (GPS). However, GPS by itself does not satisfy all civil air navigation requirements, such as the one requiring that aircraft operators be provided timely warnings of system malfunctions and another requiring that the system be available virtually all of the time.  FAA is developing a network of ground stations and geostationary communications satellites to enhance GPS so that satellite-based navigation can meet those requirements.  This network is known as the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). The system is expected to improve the safety of flight operations, allow fuel-efficient routing of aircraft, and enable FAA to eventually phase out its network of ground-based navigation aids.  The Secretary of Transportation was directed to report on the status and management of the project, including an identification of baseline performance, cost, and schedule goals and to provide a risk assessment.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review the status of the WAAS project. They also examined whether the Secretary's report provides a complete assessment of FAA's risks in developing the WAAS project.  In addition, they examined how alternative assumptions would affect WAAS' benefit-cost analysis of January 1998.  Briefly, in terms of system performance, the Secretary's report recognized that WAAS' vulnerability to intentional or unintentional interference from electronic equipment was addressed.  This vulnerability may lead FAA to retain an independent backup system and to revise its transition plan that calls for phasing out all of the agency's ground-based systems by 2010.  By identifying a range of cost estimates and associated probabilities, the Secretary's report addressed GAO's past concern that FAA's firm, discrete-point cost estimates implied a level of precision that could not be supported, particularly early in the project's development.  The Secretary's report fell short of providing a complete assessment of the uncertainties FAA faces in achieving WAAS' schedule goals.  When FAA recalculated its benefit-cost ratio, at the request of GAO, to determine the potential impact of three alternative assumptions the net present value of the project's net benefits were found to be twice as great as the costs.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 1999 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/496520</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>LORAN OR DECCA NAVIGATOR IN THE 1990S?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/396483</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A special radio-navigation conference convened in early 1987 by the International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) is reviewed.  The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the future of Loran and the Decca Navigator chains once the worldwide Global Positioning System (GPS) becomes operational. Recommendations were needed because after 1992, Coast Guard will no longer retain responsibility for Loran-C transmitters and, simultaneously, several Decca Navigator chains will require refurbishment. Attendees at the conference favored Loran-C as the system to be continued as backup to GPS.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/396483</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ARTS IIA DESIGN ANALYSIS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/177623</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report documents the analysis performed by the COMSIS Corporation and SRI International of the proposed design for the ARTS IIA air traffic system for terminal areas with low to medium traffic density. ARTS II will be upgraded to ARTS IIA with the replacement of the LSI-2/20 minicomputer by the LSI-2/40, which is faster and has more memory capacity, and the addition of minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW), conflict alert (CA), a tracker to support these, and a training target generator (TTG). The study addressed the use of semiconductor memory in an air traffic system and the requirement for a battery backup power supply. The algorithms for the enhancements were studied to determine whether the LSI-2/40 has sufficient speed to perform them under traffic and display loads expected in 1990. It is concluded that the replacement computer has the capacity to perform the enhancement functions under maximum target and display load for the expected air traffic environment. (Author)]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Dec 1982 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/177623</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>HELICOPTER, VTOL SHORTCOMINGS AIRED</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/73738</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Cockpit information display system deficiences are the weak points of helicopter and VTOL designs and may be the underlying cause of a significant percentage of operational accidents.  There is an insufficient level of attention paid to the air data information presented to the crew and the level of human engineering that has been applied to the design of helicopters.  Pilots still do not have cockpit instrument displays of basic information to enable them to have a manual backup.  Existing cockpit displays in some aircraft are well behind the state-of-the-art from a human engineering standpoint.  It is noted that current technology could develop a helicopter cockpit that would permit safe, single-pilot flight on instruments throughout the aircraft's flight evelope with the same confidence and precision that could be executed on a clear, calm day.  Density altitude, flight path and speed through the air mass, continuous dynamic presentations of power and control margins available from instant to instant are additional parameters that should be readily available for the pilot's use.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jun 1978 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/73738</guid>
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