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    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
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    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
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      <title>The continued growth of online remarketing</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1700961</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 12:09:57 GMT</pubDate>
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      <title>An Ascending Auction for Freight Forwarder Collaboration in Capacity Sharing</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1640065</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In the highly competitive transportation market, small freight forwarders can form an alliance to secure capacity in advance and then share the capacity to fulfill their shipping requests during the freight season. Because not all the requests can be accepted, the rejected requests can be outsourced to the spot market typically at low profit margins. The forwarders are self-interested and have private information on the revenues and outsourcing profit margins of their requests. The centralized capacity-allocation problem is non-deterministic polynomial-time (NP)-hard, and its optimal solution may erode the profits of some forwarders. The authors propose an ascending auction mechanism to achieve truthful and approximately optimal capacity sharing. At each iteration of the auction, the set of bundles of capacity for each request is updated. The mechanism then determines a provisional capacity allocation and updates dual prices. Each request is allocated with a convex combination of bundles because a continuous capacity resource is considered. Strategy-proofness is ensured because all the winning bundles for an accepted request have the same payment, and the payment is ascending during the iterations. The mechanism iteratively expands the set of bundles and approximates the revenue loss to search optimal allocations, using the dual solution derived from minimizing primal-dual slackness. Social welfare is significantly improved compared with the no-collaboration case. The authors prove that the mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational, weakly budget balanced, and finitely convergent. Extensive computational experiments show that the mechanism has efficiency loss less than 3% and budget surplus less than 10% in most cases. To achieve high system efficiency and small budget surplus with a reasonable computational time, it is better to select an appropriately small bid increment, especially for large-scale problems.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Aug 2019 17:00:31 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1640065</guid>
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      <title>Disrupting the future of grocery retailing : the concept of an online grocery auction is simple but the implications to the retail industry are enormous</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1597137</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2019 09:56:44 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1597137</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Maximizing the auction experience</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1584778</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2019 12:08:18 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1584778</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Sold! : using the auction channel to find, dispose of trucks</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1584060</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2019 15:53:11 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1584060</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Synergy-based Bidding Method for Simultaneous Freight Transportation Auctions</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1549976</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The tremendous use of the Internet has led freight transportation procurement websites to become an effective marketplaces that bring together several carriers and shippers. These websites enable transportation of goods in a more cost effective and safer way. From the carriers’ point of view, this situation gives rise to the bid price determination problem in an auction based fast procurement process. Carriers place bids in multiple auctions simultaneously without knowing the lanes they win until the end of the auctions. This leads to uncertainty in the calculation of the lane bid price quotes at the beginning of the auctions. Kuyzu et al. (2015) proposed a stochastic bid price optimization model for addressing the uncertainty in simultaneous procurement auctions. However, their model is a non-concave maximization problem that requires historical data and solving an exponential number of NP-Hard optimization problems. In real-life situations, several auctions may need to be priced simultaneously. In this study, the authors propose a simpler approach so that the bid prices can be determined simultaneously with less computational effort. They develop an efficient synergy-based method to calculate a full truckload carrier’s bid prices so that the carrier can compete with other carriers and win the tendered lanes in a profitable way. The authors validate the effectiveness of the synergy-based method through computational experiments involving simulations of a virtual transportation procurement auction marketplace.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Nov 2018 10:24:09 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1549976</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System and its impact on motorcycles</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1538449</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System, implemented in 1990, uses uniform-price auctions to allocate Certificates of Entitlement (COE) or registration rights in five categories presently. Four of these are restricted to small and big cars, commercial vehicles and motorcycles. The fifth one is unrestricted as it allows successful bidders to register a vehicle in any restricted category of their choice. Owners are incentivised via another policy to deregister their vehicle by the tenth year expiry of the COE instead of revalidating it. Each deregistration results in a new COE. Currently, 10% of the COEs from each restricted category is channelled to the unrestricted category. However, hardly any of the expensive COEs in the unrestricted category has been used to register motorcycles. The sharp decline in the number of motorcycle COEs since 2014 has led to a surge in auction premiums at about twice the price of an entry-level motorcycle. The auction process before 2014 is shown to be exemplary with the COE premium driven by its inertia and a host of exogenous factors. After 2014 however, it appears to be unresponsive to the historically low quota levels. This undesirable auction trait needs to be remedied by a reformulation of the COE quota in order to help those most in need of a motorcycle to earn a living. Measures announced in the February 2017 Singapore Budget trudge in that direction.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Oct 2018 16:27:04 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1538449</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1530813</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper extends the theory of tradable bottleneck permits system to cases with multiple period markets and designs its implementation mechanism. The multiple period markets can achieve more efficient resource allocation than a single period market when users’ valuations of tradable permits change over time. To implement the multiple period trading markets, the authors propose an evolutionary mechanism that combines a dynamic auction with a capacity control rule that adjusts a number of permits issued for each market. Then, the authors prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i) the dynamic auction is strategy-proof within each period and guarantees that the market choice of each user is optimal under a perfect information assumption of users and (ii) the mechanism maximizes the social surplus in a finite number of iterations. Finally, the authors show that the proposed mechanism may work well even for an incomplete information case.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2018 09:43:49 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1530813</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The use of auctions for allocating airport access rights</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1524100</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper considers the challenge of managing congestion at an airport by restricting the total number of flight operations at that airport. It reviews historical evidence, economic theory and data analysis related to the challenge of airport congestion management. It argues that this evidence presents a strong case for the use of a market mechanism to control access and more specifically for the use of periodic auctions to allocate limited term slot leases. It then shows that the existing body of knowledge and practical experience with the use of combinatorial auctions lead naturally to highly viable auction designs for the airport slot context. It further provides analysis of a variety of specific issues related to the use of auctions in the context of airport slots.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 26 Jul 2018 14:36:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1524100</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Auction bidders vie for deals at massive equipment sale</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1504313</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Mar 2018 09:36:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1504313</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>Combinatorial Auction-Based Pricing for Multi-Tenant Autonomous Vehicle Public Transportation System</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1491983</link>
      <description><![CDATA[A smart city provides its people with high standard of living through advanced technologies, and transport is one of the major foci. With the advent of autonomous vehicles (AVs), an AV-based public transportation system has been proposed recently, which is capable of providing new forms of transportation services with high efficiency, high flexibility, and low cost. For the benefit of passengers, multi-tenancy can increase market competition leading to lower service charge and higher quality of service. In this paper, the author studies the pricing issue of the multi-tenant AV public transportation system and three types of services are defined. The pricing process for each service type is modeled as a combinatorial auction, in which the service providers, as bidders, compete for offering transportation services. The winners of the auction are determined through an integer linear program. To prevent the bidders from raising their bids for higher returns, the author proposes a strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-based charging mechanism, which can maximize the social welfare, to settle the final charges for the customers. The author performs extensive simulations to verify the analytical results and evaluate the performance of the charging mechanism.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2018 17:04:54 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1491983</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Wyoming road sign auction yields $33,000</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1490501</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2017 10:27:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1490501</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Truthful, Budget-Balanced Bundle Double Auctions for Carrier Collaboration</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1489020</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper aims to propose effective auction mechanisms for the carrier collaboration problem with bilateral exchange, which is generally the problem of how to realize the potential of carrier collaboration over a bilateral exchange transportation network (e.g., a business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce logistics environment). Carriers offer the lanes with the highest marginal costs for subcontracting, while they are allowed to bid on bundles of the lanes. The authors construct a bundle double auction (BDA) for the one-unit demand case in which the lane offered by each buyer (transportation service purchaser) is only required to be covered with one truckload once. The BDA mechanism realizes incentive compatibility, individual rationality, budget balance, and asymptotical efficiency. The authors then propose two mechanisms, called BDA-1 and BDA-2, for the multiunit demand case in which each buyer asks for one or multiple truckloads of transportation service. Both mechanisms are effective but differ in incentive compatibility and realized social welfare. The computational study shows that all proposed mechanisms are practically implementable and lead to considerable cost savings for the carrier collaboration network, and most of the benefits generated via collaboration are assigned among carriers. The authors also numerically analyze the impacts of three operational factors: network structure, the degree of self-served lanes, and the number of lanes in the network.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2017 09:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1489020</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The distributional effects of lotteries and auctions—License plate regulations in Guangzhou</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1488912</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Lotteries and auctions are common ways of allocating public resources, but they have rarely been used simultaneously in urban transportation policies. This paper presents a unique policy experiment in Guangzhou, China, where lotteries and auctions are used in conjunction to allocate vehicle licenses. Guangzhou introduced vehicle license regulations to control the monthly quota of local automobile growth in 2012. To obtain a license, residents are required to choose between the lottery and auction method. Since the introduction of the regulations, there has been heated debates on the distributional effects of lotteries and auctions; however, the debates have not been grounded in empirical studies. The authors analyze the distributional effects of such mixed mode of resource allocation in a positive manner based on individual behavioral choices. The authors conducted a survey in January 2016 (n?=?1000 people?*?12 months), and used mixed logit models to analyze how socio-economic status, including income and household automobile ownership, determined people’s choices among lottery, auction, and non-participation alternatives. The authors find that income increased participation, but did not influence non-car owners’ choices between lotteries and auctions, which contrasts with the common notion that lotteries benefit the poor. Additionally, the positive impact of car ownership on participation indicates a car-dependent trajectory for automobile growth. The significant socio-economic differentiators between lotteries and auctions were age, gender, and education. Proxies of mobility needs were insignificant overall. The program attributes had a much larger impact than all other variables—people were more likely to choose lotteries with higher winning rates and more participants and more likely to choose auctions with higher prices and more participants. The authors concluded that for those who participated, the choice between lotteries and auctions did not depend on their income or mobility needs but, rather, the probability of winning plates and the opportunity for speculation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Nov 2017 16:35:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1488912</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Actions move variety of truck types; more buying activity shifting online</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1469301</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Sidebar: Auctioneers offer value-added services, including more information found online.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jun 2017 10:29:59 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1469301</guid>
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