<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=PHNlYXJjaD48cGFyYW1zPjxwYXJhbSBuYW1lPSJkYXRlaW4iIHZhbHVlPSJhbGwiIC8+PHBhcmFtIG5hbWU9InN1YmplY3Rsb2dpYyIgdmFsdWU9Im9yIiAvPjxwYXJhbSBuYW1lPSJ0ZXJtc2xvZ2ljIiB2YWx1ZT0ib3IiIC8+PHBhcmFtIG5hbWU9ImxvY2F0aW9uIiB2YWx1ZT0iMCIgLz48L3BhcmFtcz48ZmlsdGVycz48ZmlsdGVyIGZpZWxkPSJpbmRleHRlcm1zIiB2YWx1ZT0iJnF1b3Q7QWxhc2thIEdhcyBQaXBlbGluZSZxdW90OyIgb3JpZ2luYWxfdmFsdWU9IiZxdW90O0FsYXNrYSBHYXMgUGlwZWxpbmUmcXVvdDsiIC8+PC9maWx0ZXJzPjxyYW5nZXMgLz48c29ydHM+PHNvcnQgZmllbGQ9InB1Ymxpc2hlZCIgb3JkZXI9ImRlc2MiIC8+PC9zb3J0cz48cGVyc2lzdHM+PHBlcnNpc3QgbmFtZT0icmFuZ2V0eXBlIiB2YWx1ZT0icHVibGlzaGVkZGF0ZSIgLz48L3BlcnNpc3RzPjwvc2VhcmNoPg==" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>ALYESKA REMEDIES TAPS' PIPELINE VIBRATIONS AT THOMPSON PASS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/486867</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Pipeline vibrations during summer 1996 on the TransAlaska Pipeline System (TAPS) near Thompson Pass were determined by operator Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. to result from pressure pulses originating near a slackline portion of TAPS. The vibrations only occurred when the slackline-packline interface was positioned in a terraced portion of the pipeline topography downstream of the pass. This knowledge allowed Alyeska to control the pulsations by backpressuring the pipeline and moving the slackline-packline interface above the terrace.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 1998 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/486867</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ALYESKA PROGRAM ALLOWS PIG PERFORMANCE COMPARISON</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/481675</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The extensive database developed as part of Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's recent in-line inspections of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline has proven invaluable for evaluating the performance of in-line inspection surveys.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Mar 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/481675</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE: ACTIONS TO IMPROVE SAFETY ARE UNDER WAY</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/448166</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), operated by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, transports nearly 20% of the nation's domestically produced oil and has operated for nearly 20 years without a major oil spill.  However, throughout the pipeline's years of construction and operation, problems with the condition of the pipeline, the quality assurance program of its operator, and the effectiveness of the government's monitoring efforts have been reported.  More than 4,900 deficiencies in TAPS have been identified.  This report contains the General Accounting Office's response to a request to (1) assess Alyeska's progress in correcting TAPS deficiencies; (2) specifically, determine whether the corrective actions planned for three areas of deficiencies--electrical systems, quality, and preventive maintenance--will address the deficiencies; (3) determine whether regulators are taking action to improve regulatory oversight of the pipeline; and (4) identify the root causes of the deficiencies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 1995 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/448166</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>THE MARINE ALTERNATIVE TO ALYESKA</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/398744</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper examines the technical and economic implications of using icebreaking tankers to transport oil from Alaska's Prudhoe Bay to the U.S. West Coast in competition with the trans-Alaskan pipeline. Existing marine construction technology would permit the creation of a system of double-skinned, high-powered tankers that could safely navigate the Bering Strait.  Such a system might also provide a near-term solution to the Arctic oil logistics problems by circumventing the major environmental objections that have long plagued the proposed Alyeska pipeline route.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Jul 1994 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/398744</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TAPS REROUTE MEETS SCHEDULE, BEATS COST ESTIMATE</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/370652</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This article discusses the rerouting of 8.5 miles of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).  The project addressed extensive corrosion on a section of line through the Brooks Mountain Range.  The project was completed on schedule and under budget.  Discussed are the inspection program which identified the problem, the options that were available for correcting it, design challenges, the improved cathodic protection system on the new section, the use of river training structures, frozen soil excavation with explosives, and the construction scheduling and methods.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Sep 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/370652</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE: PROJECTIONS OF LONG-TERM VIABILITY ARE UNCERTAIN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/374256</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The Department of Energy (DOE) has stated that the Congress will have to authorize the leasing of the coastal plain of Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)--an area of high oil and gas potential--by 1997 to keep the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) operating ("Alaska Oil and Gas: Energy Wealth or Vanishing Opportunity?", Jan. 1991).  DOE concluded that because of the projected rate of decline in oil production from Alaska's North Slope, TAPS will likely be forced to shut down by the year 2009.  The 1997 leasing date was based on DOE's conclusion that it would take about 10 to 12 years after congressional authorization to develop new oil fields in ANWR.  The possible shutdown of TAPS could be a consideration in reaching a policy decision on whether to open ANWR's coastal plain to oil and gas development or whether to designate the coastal plain as wilderness, thereby precluding any future development.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to assess the accuracy of and the support for DOE's conclusions.  GAO evaluated the reasonableness of (1) the minimum operating level that DOE assumed for TAPS, (2) the model and the key economic, geologic, engineering, and cost assumptions that DOE used to estimate oil production at the North Slope, and (3) DOE's conclusion that it will take 10 to 12 years to develop new oil fields in ANWR. Briefly, GAO found the following:  DOE's conclusion that TAPS will shut down between 2006 and 2011, with 2009 as the "most likely" year, implies a level of precision that does not exist. No one knows the future oil production from the North Slope or the exact operating level at which TAPS will be forced to shut down.  Neither DOE's assumption regarding TAPS' minimum operating level nor DOE's economic model and the model's underlying assumptions fully considered the uncertainties present in projecting future oil production and its relationship to TAPS.  The major owners of TAPS are part of large, vertically integrated oil companies.  Therefore, many factors must be considered when deciding whether or not to shut down TAPS.  For example, the companies may be willing to incur the expensive changes required to continue operating TAPS at reduced levels if warranted by the overall profitability of the companies' Alaska operations.  Finally, GAO agrees with DOE's conclusion that developing new oil fields in ANWR after a lease sale would take 10 to 12 years.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 04 Jun 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/374256</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TAPS'S LEAK DETECTION SEEKS GREATER PRECISION</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/372479</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Since start-up of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), operator Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has developed, maintained, and up-graded a highly sophisticated leak-detection system.  The pipeline's length and unique physical and operational characteristics make leak detection a technological challenge for the designer.  This article describes TAPS and how leaks are detected.  There are five different methods to detect leaks along the pipeline:  visual surveillance; flow deviation; pressure deviation; flow difference deviation; and computer analysis of volume balances.  Further details are provided in this article.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 1993 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/372479</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE: REGULATORS HAVE NOT ENSURED THAT GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS ARE BEING MET</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/357049</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study to determine whether regulatory oversight of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) has been adequate to ensure (1) operational safety, (2) oil spill response capabilities, and (3) ability to protect the environment.  In brief, GAO found the following:  While Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has the basic responsibility for complying with various regulatory requirements, government regulators are also responsible for ensuring that Alyeska's actions result in the pipeline being operated safely and in an environmentally sound manner.  However, the five principal federal and state regulatory agencies have not had the systematic, disciplined, and coordinated approach needed to regulate TAPS.  Instead, these agencies relied on Alyeska to police itself.  For example, the regulators did not systematically or independently assess Alyeska's corrosion prevention and detection or leak detection systems, nor did they require that Alyeska demonstrate that it can respond adequately to a large-scale oil spill.  It was not until after the Exxon Valdez incident and the discovery of corrosion that the regulators began to reevaluate their roles and focus on issues such as whether Alyeska's operating and maintenance procedures meet the pipeline's special engineering design and operating requirements, or whether Alyeska can adequately and promptly respond to a large-scale oil spill. In January 1990, the regulators established a joint office to provide for more effective TAPS oversight.  GAO believes that central leadership and a secured funding source may help ensure that this office provides adequate oversight.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 1992 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/357049</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ALBERTA EXPANSION--CONCLUSION: TRANSIENT SIMULATIONS HELP DECIDE EXPANSION DESIGN</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/358709</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Foothills Pipe Lines Limited, Calgary, evaluated two approaches to solving pipeline-capacity delivery problems of the future Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System (Angts) around the Empress, Alberta extraction plants. Extensive engineering analysis, including off-line pipeline transient simulations to evaluate potential operational problems, indicated that the best approach for Foothills' system expansion entailed raising the operating pressure in the Foothills pipeline at Empress to nominal 1,000 psig and constructing decompression-recompression facilities to maintain gas-stripping capabilities.  Construction was completed and the facilities placed into service in November 1990.  This concluding article (Part 1, O&GJ, Vol. 89, No. 25, June 24, 1991, TRIS 610157) compares transient analyses of both the low-pressure, integrated configuration and the chosen high-pressure, segregated configuration.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 1992 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/358709</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ALBERTA EXPANSION--1: ANGTS PREBUILD EXPANSION SOLVES PRESSURE CONSTRAINTS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/358301</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Foothills Pipe Lines Limited, Calgary, has employed an unusual decompression/recompression design to address pressure constraints in expanding a section of the Eastern Leg prebuild section of the future Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System (Angts).  This first of two articles presents the engineering, economic, and operations justifications for the selected hydraulic design.  The operational superiority of the high-pressure alternative under transient conditions will be discussed in the conclusion to this series.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 1992 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/358301</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ADEQUACY OF THE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE AND TERMINAL. STATEMENT OF JAMES DUFFUS, III, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER, POWER AND OFFSHORE ENERGY RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/344068</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This is the testimony of James Duffus, III, Director, Natural Resources Management Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, General Accounting Office, on the adequacy of regulatory oversight efforts intended to ensure the safe operation and maintenance of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).  It is reported that while several federal and state agencies have the authority to regulate TAPS, the pipeline has not received the systematic, commprehensive oversight needed to ensure compliance with operational safety, emergency response, and environmental requirements.  This is of particular concern because of recent disclosures by the pipeline operator that TAPS is experiencing significant corrosion problems.  Also, the Exxon Valdez accident and subsequent concern about oil spill preparedness have increased the frequency of federal and state oversight of TAPS.  In addition, efforts are underway to improve agency coordination and cooperation. These efforts show promise if organized and staffed appropriately.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 1991 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/344068</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE SYSTEM REFORM ACT OF 1989. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION, COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, SEPTEMBER 26, 1989</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/304025</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This is a hearing on H.R. 3277, a bill to improve federal laws relating to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, and for other purposes.  It contains the text of H.R. 3277, testimony, prepared statements, and additional material submitted for the record.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 1991 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/304025</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PRUDENT INVESTMENT IN LARGE COMPLEX PROJECTS : THE CASE OF THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE SYSTEM</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/322629</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 1990 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/322629</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CHECKING ON ALYESKA'S ANIMALS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/228682</link>
      <description><![CDATA[SUBTITLE: A COMPREHENSIVE AND SCIENTIFIC SURVEY ALONG THE RIGHT-OF-WAY OF THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE FINDS WILDLIFE UNDISTURBED AND THEIR NUMBERS UNDIMINISHED]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 1986 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/228682</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TRANS-ALASKA OIL PIPELINE OPERATIONS : MORE FEDERAL MONITORING NEEDED : REPORT TO THE CONGRESS</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/219988</link>
      <description><![CDATA[No abstract provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 1985 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/219988</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>