<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>Trade-offs of recycling strategies under carbon tax and recycling target responsibility system: Trade-in vs. deposit-refund</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2743183</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Under the dual pressures of global climate change and sustainable resource management, carbon taxes and recycling target responsibility systems are synergistically fostering the green transformation of the manufacturing industry through integrated policy combinations. However, optimizing the selection of recycling strategies within reverse logistics under this complex regulatory framework remains a formidable managerial challenge. To explore the operational boundaries of two mainstream recycling strategies, namely Trade-in (TI) and Deposit-refund (DR), we develop a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model to compare their performance under dual environmental regulations. The findings reveal distinct cost thresholds for strategy selection. TI relies on an internal subsidy mechanism and is particularly effective for products with low production costs and rapid turnover. Its core advantage lies in leveraging discount incentives underpinned by high profit margins to significantly bolster demand for new products. Conversely, DR, which utilizes an external deposit mechanism, yields higher profits in high-cost industries. By externalizing incentive costs, DR maintains a more competitively priced system and effectively steers price-sensitive consumers toward remanufactured products. Interestingly, aligning policy design with the appropriate recycling strategy is key to achieving a triple-win outcome. When production costs are low and carbon taxes are high, TI more effectively balances economic growth, environmental protection, and social welfare. In contrast, DR emerges as the superior choice when production costs are high and carbon taxes are moderate. Our findings provide strategic guidance for firms to optimize recycling choices in reverse logistics and for regulators to orchestrate complementary environmental policies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 14:02:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2743183</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Designing a self-financing incentive program for zero-emission trucks in California: a market-based, feebate-inspired policy framework</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2705509</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Until the price gap between diesel and zero-emission trucks (ZETs) shrinks significantly, policy intervention is necessary to accelerate the transition to ZETs. California and others have imposed annual sales requirements on truck manufacturers, coupled with purchase incentives with limited state funding. To minimize the fiscal impact of government-funded incentives, we propose a self-financing rebate program for Class 4–8 trucks, using California as a case study. This is the first known study of truck feebates in the U.S. context, and likely globally. Under the scheme, diesel truck purchase or ownership would incur a fee, while ZET purchases would receive rebates. We consider various policy designs premised on revenue-neutrality (no cost to government) and minimizing cost burdens for transitioning fleets. Two design options are explored with multiple scenarios: a one-time upfront fee on diesel trucks at the point of sale or an Annual Fee on all operating diesel trucks, with the revenue used to finance rebates on ZET purchases. As an example, a One-time Fee of 7% of the new diesel truck purchase price (∼$5,100 to $20,400 per truck) or an Annual Fee of $290-$820 per diesel truck, depending on the class, could support rebates for 74,600 ZETs. Rebates decline from up to $277,000 in the first year to up to $40,000 in the last year as ZET sales spur. Any “excess” revenues could support ZET transition by funding charging infrastructure or incentivizing used ZETs. The Annual Fee approach provides the broadest funding base with modest fees.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:32:55 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2705509</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nonlinear Dynamics Analysis and Chaos Control of Price Game among Automobile Manufacturers</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2701797</link>
      <description><![CDATA[With the large-scale promotion of new energy vehicles, automobile manufacturers are continuously lowering prices to compete for market share. This disorderly “price war” has made pricing strategies in the automobile market increasingly complex and dynamic. Under a multi-product duopoly market structure and based on the Hotelling spatial competition model, this study develops a dynamic Bertrand pricing game model composed of two battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and one plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) under the carbon tax and dual credit policies. The dynamic characteristics of the three-dimensional discrete system are analyzed, including stability region, strange attractors and maximum Lyapunov exponent. The results show that: (1) Moderate price adjustments contribute more effectively to the long-term stability of the automobile market, and the stability region is the result of nonlinear coupling of the three. (2) Lower switching costs among automobile manufacturers can intensify market competition. (3) BEV manufacturers exhibit more stable pricing, indicating stronger market stability and guidance capability. Transforming manufacturers have steadier profits and stronger risk resistance, with PHEV pricing playing a key role in enhancing their competitiveness. (4) The dual credit policy regulates the market more effectively than the carbon tax policy. This study also identifies a “safe bottom line” of credit trading price for any level of carbon tax. (5) A composite control method of delayed feedback and state feedback is more effective for controlling the system.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:32:54 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2701797</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Policy pathways for low-carbon transport in Ireland: Carbon taxes and ICE bans</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2737145</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper develops I3E-Transport, a new Irish passenger transport model that integrates behavioural, technological, and macroeconomic drivers to assess the effectiveness of carbon taxation and internal combustion engine (ICE) phase-out policies on emissions from private cars and public transport. The model is soft linked to the Ireland Environment-Energy-Economy (I3E) CGE framework, allowing for a comprehensive evaluation of how these policy measures influence transport demand, vehicle stock composition, energy consumption and emissions within the passenger transport sector. Simulations for 2024–2050 indicate that, under a business-as-usual scenario, emissions rise by 2050 despite modest gains in energy efficiency and alternative vehicle uptake. A carbon tax yields only limited abatement, whereas a comprehensive ICE ban from 2035—banning hybrids—reduces CO₂ emissions by over five million tonnes relative to the baseline by 2050. However, the results show that the sector remains off track relative to implied carbon budget ceilings under a 2035 implementation, with only an earlier and comprehensive ban delivering substantial progress towards compliance, pointing to the need for timely and coordinated policy action to align Ireland’s transport sector with its long-term climate commitments.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 09:23:53 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2737145</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Carbon compensation for international scrap steel trade through maritime carbon pricing</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2720688</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The reuse of scrap steel is critical to decarbonizing the steel industry, with maritime logistics serving as the primary conduit for global scrap redistribution. The International Maritime Organization approved the Net Zero Framework (IMO-NZF) at MEPC 83 in April 2025, establishing a draft framework for emission reduction targets and carbon costs for global shipping. This study proposes a Substitutional Offset (SO) strategy aimed at easing the early compliance pressure of sustainable waste logistics, while maintaining climate policy constraints. Supported by Monte Carlo-based probabilistic carbon accounting, the results show that SO ratio adjustments are highly sensitive across 10 major international scrap shipping corridors. The study also offers a comparative analysis with the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), providing quantitative insights into potential alignment between the two carbon pricing regimes. Overall, this research contributes to reducing implementation barriers for global maritime carbon pricing and offers climate risk guidance for the increasingly constrained global scrap steel trade.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 09:46:42 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2720688</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Impact of personal vehicle emission tax policy and Pareto-improving strategies on travel and urban performance</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2693784</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Personal vehicle emission taxes (PVET) are attractive for reducing congestion and emissions, yet they often face political resistance because households perceive welfare losses—especially among long-distance suburban commuters. We develop an integrated welfare–transport–land-use equilibrium model for a core–suburb monocentric city with peak-hour highway bottleneck congestion and railway crowding, in which commuters jointly choose residence, mode, and departure time under PVET. The framework clarifies a structural coordination problem: PVET is effective in reducing highway traffic, emissions, and suburban land use, but it also lowers equilibrium utility by raising generalized commuting costs. We then compare three transport-based compensation instruments—highway capacity expansion, transit fare subsidies, and headway reductions—under a weak-versus-strong Pareto criterion. Transport-only compensation can restore (or even raise) welfare, but it tends to relax the city boundary, making welfare improvements and suburban expansion move together. Introducing a suburban land tax changes the frontier by acting directly on the land-use margin: when paired with PVET and a transport instrument, it opens a strong-Pareto corridor in which welfare is strictly higher and the suburban boundary is strictly smaller than in the baseline, with a subset delivering simultaneous welfare gains, spatial compaction, and emission reductions (“triple-win”). A case study of the Beijing–Langfang commuting corridor illustrates how these coordinated policy packages provide an illustrative basis for policy comparison and quantify the attainable improvements in welfare, urban sprawl, and emissions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:50:45 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2693784</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Optimal railway freight subsidy scheme for hinterland container transportation network considering carbon tax and shippers’ choice behavior</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2693778</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper focuses on the railway freight subsidy optimization problem considering the impact of carbon tax in the port-hinterland transportation network with three modes and two ports. A bi-level model is developed to express the relationship between the government and shippers. At the upper level, the government formulate the optimal railway freight subsidy scheme serving multiple ports from a global optimization perspective, aiming to minimize total subsidy expenditure while achieving the railway volume target. In contrast, the lower-level model describes shippers’ choice behavior for ports and transportation paths by the capability-constrained nested Logit model, where the determining utility function is expressed as the opposite of generalized transportation costs consisting of freight fees, time, and carbon emissions costs. Given that the lower-level model shows convex optimization properties, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions is used to convert the bi-level model into an equivalent single-level model, solved by the active-set algorithm. Results indicate subsidies can boost railway volume, and the proposed optimal subsidy scheme is superior to individual port-centric subsidy schemes. Railway links can be classified into five categories based on subsidy amounts and utilization rates, and the fourth category with subsidy amount greater than 0 and 100 utilization rate is the main target link for the subsidy scheme, which serves port-proximate regions with strong freight demand. Moreover, subsidy-driven growth in railway volume primarily comes from demand nodes with railway stations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:50:45 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2693778</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The impact of carbon emissions on firm performance in the global transportation sector</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2684309</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This study examines the impact of carbon emissions on firm performance in the global transportation sector, utilizing data from 2002 to 2022. We explore both absolute carbon emissions and carbon emission intensity, considering firm performance from both market-based and accounting perspectives. The findings suggest that carbon emission intensity negatively influences long-term market valuation (Tobin's Q), while both carbon emissions and intensity positively affect return on assets and stock returns. This implies that managers tend to prioritize short-term profitability over long-term sustainability, which supports the managerial myopia hypothesis. We also investigate the moderating effects of carbon taxes and product market competition on the relationship between carbon emissions and firm performance. The results suggest that these mechanisms are insufficient to incentivize substantial reductions in carbon emissions. Furthermore, we find that carbon emission intensity can prompt managers to implement related policies, but these efforts have not yet translated into measurable impacts on firm performance. The findings imply that stronger regulatory frameworks and stakeholder pressures are required to align the transportation sector with global net-zero targets.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 17:02:35 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2684309</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Combined China-Europe Railway Express and maritime transport with subsidy and emission tax considerations</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2605021</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper investigates the effects of the combined China-Europe Railway Express (CERE) and maritime transport on the China-Europe cargo transport market with subsidy and emission tax considerations. The interrelationships among shippers, railway carrier, domestic liner carrier, foreign liner carrier and the social planner are described by a vertical structure model. Four types of carrier operating regimes, namely full competition, full cooperation, and the cooperation between railway carrier and domestic or foreign liner carrier, are explored and compared. The aim of the social planner is to achieve the welfare maximization of the system by optimizing the subsidies for the railway carrier and the emission taxes on the domestic and foreign liner carriers for creating a mankind community from a perspective of the shared future. The emission amounts before and after implementing the policies of the subsidies and the emission taxes are compared. The results show that: (i) the cooperation of the railway carrier and the domestic (or foreign) liner carrier reduces (or raises) the emission tax on the domestic (or foreign) liner carrier, but raises (or reduces) the subsidy for the railway carrier; (ii) the social planner tends to impose the emission tax on the domestic liner carrier for a low congestion level at the transfer port and a high substitution degree between combined CERE-maritime transport and direct waterway transport; the planner is inclined to subsidize the foreign liner carrier and the railway carrier for a low congestion level and a low substitution degree to encourage more shippers to use the low-carbon mode of the combined CERE-maritime transport; and (iii) the subsidy and emission tax policies are beneficial to emission reduction for a low congestion level and a high substitution degree. These findings provide a guidance for the Chinese and European governments to promote the development of the combined CERE-maritime transport mode and to control the carbon emissions of the China-Europe cargo transport market through adjusting the subsidy and emission tax policies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:14:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2605021</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Shore power adoption strategies of shipping companies and pricing decisions of the port under subsidies and carbon taxes: A game theoretical analysis</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2614759</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Shore power technology offers significant potential to reduce shipping emissions, particularly at berth, yet its widespread adoption faces complex economic and strategic challenges. This study develops a game-theoretical framework to investigate how the strategic interactions among shipping companies and the port under the four channel structures, i.e., Single-Leader Multi-Follower-Competitive (SLMF-Com), Single-Leader Multi-Follower-Cooperative (SLMF-Coo), Cooperative Multi-Leader Single-Follower (Coo-MLSF), and Cooperative-Competitive (Co-opetition), affect the decisions on shore power adoption and pricing under the governmental carbon tax and subsidy policies. Theoretical results reveal that the joint implementation of carbon taxes and per-unit subsidies substantially broadens the equilibrium conditions for shore power adoption, proving more effective than either policy separately. Changes in bargaining power structures, such as port dominance or stronger shipping alliances, play a significant role in shaping adoption incentives and distributing revenue and profits. While port-led scenarios maximize port revenue, shipping company alliances can secure higher profits. The game-theoretical analysis also identifies a pervasive “prisoner’s dilemma” where excessive competition, even with low retrofit costs, can suppress overall adoption rates, highlighting the need for coordinated policies. Furthermore, adopting shore power consistently increases cargo volumes, indicating its potential as a market-expanding strategy. The numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses, conducted based on the real-world data from the Shanghai Port, empirically validate these theoretical findings. The numerical results demonstrate that higher carbon taxes and targeted subsidies effectively improve shipping companies’ willingness to adopt shore power and improve green performance for ports, confirm that per-unit subsidies are more effective than one-off capital subsidies for sustained adoption, and highlight how practical barriers, such as connection delays and infrastructure heterogeneity, impede uptake. Theoretical and numerical results demonstrate that stakeholder collaboration and the joint tax-subsidy instrument are crucial for boosting policy efficacy and accelerating maritime decarbonization, with actionable implications for green port development and the low-carbon transformation of the shipping industry.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:14:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2614759</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Towards Green Ferry Corridors in the Adriatic Sea – Integrating Monte Carlo Simulations into Life Cycle Costing Scheme for Methanol</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2655563</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The maritime transport sector is essential to global trade, handling a large share of international trade volume, but its reliance on fossil fuels raises significant environmental and economic concerns. The transition to greener options is slow, with 98.8% of the fleet still using fossil fuel, while the research into economic performance of this transition often overlooks fuel price volatility, a critical factor influenced by global events which have caused significant fuel price fluctuations. This paper introduces a model which incorporates fuel price volatility into lifecycle cost assessments (LCCA) on an example of a ferry connecting the Croatian and Italian shores of the Adriatic Sea. A comparison of diesel- and methanol-powered systems is provided, using Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate economic sustainability under volatile fuel prices. Diesel prices showed a consistently symmetrical and normal distribution across all simulations, indicating a stable price range, while methanol prices demonstrated more volatility. The LCCA results, which included the simulated fuel prices, showed that methanol-powered systems despite greater price volatility, show lower overall costs through different carbon taxation scenarios.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 16:16:24 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2655563</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Shipping, carbon pricing, and inflation pass-through: The Silent Absorber hypothesis</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2665705</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This study explores whether the recent introduction of CO₂ emission pricing in maritime transport has affected freight rates and inflation in the euro area. Focusing on the regulatory shift implemented in 2023, we examine whether the additional costs for shipowners have been passed on to shippers and consumers. Using a Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) model, we analyze the dynamic interactions between CO₂ allowance prices, freight rates, oil prices, inflation, and macro-financial variables from January 2023 to August 2024. The BVAR framework, suitable for small-sample analysis, allows us to trace impulse responses and uncover potential pass-through effects. Our findings challenge the common assumption that environmental taxation leads to inflationary pressures. Specifically, we find no significant increase in freight rates or inflation following a rise in CO₂ prices. Instead, the data indicate a slight drop in oil prices and a modest gain in shipowners’ revenues, suggesting that much of the regulatory cost has been absorbed within the sector. This implies that the short-term (1–2 years) inflationary impact of maritime decarbonization was limited. As the first empirical analysis of its kind using real-time data and a macro-shipping lens, this study provides timely insights for policymakers assessing the economic neutrality of green regulation in maritime transport.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 17:04:32 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2665705</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Differentiated carbon pricing mechanism for crude oil shipping: balancing efficiency and equity</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2697514</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Accelerating maritime decarbonization requires Market-Based Measures (MBMs) to bridge the fossil-green cost gap. Prevailing uniform carbon pricing, however, creates an efficiency-equity dilemma: it offers aggregate cost-effectiveness yet disproportionately burdens developing economies. To enable differentiated treatment within a globally uniform framework, we propose the Port Carbon Intensity Index (PCII) mechanism. Utilizing ports as the nexus of global trade, the PCII links route-specific emissions to economic value-added. Using an integrated optimization framework parameterized by global Automatic Identification System (AIS) data from 2020 for crude oil tankers, we quantify trade-offs between uniform pricing and the PCII. Results show that the PCII mechanism robustly promotes regional equity by shifting compliance costs toward developed regions. Furthermore, the comparative cost-effectiveness of the two mechanisms is highly sensitive to ballast voyage allocation methodologies, and technological cost reductions alone cannot resolve long-term distributional imbalances. These findings provide important insights for designing equitable and effective maritime decarbonization policies.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 09:26:41 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2697514</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Do fringe benefit cars make the car fleet greener?</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2657065</link>
      <description><![CDATA[It has proven difficult to reduce carbon emissions from the transport sector; in fact, emissions from this sector are still increasing worldwide. Reducing emissions by reducing road transport is challenging; therefore, a transition to a vehicle fleet with low or zero emissions seems essential. Many new cars in OECD countries are sold to firms as fringe benefit cars (sometimes called company cars in the literature). The generous taxation of such cars has been shown to have negative welfare effects because it increases the consumption of cars. However, it is sometimes justified since it speeds up the transition of the car fleet to lower-emission vehicles. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how fringe benefit cars impact carbon emissions, fuel type, weight, size, engine power, and market value of new cars. We apply micro register data including all adult Swedes and their cars, spanning the years 1999 to 2020. By using a matching model that combines Exact matching and Mahalanobis distance matching, the fuel consumption of the fringe benefit car is compared to the hypothetical new private car that the employee receiving the fringe benefit would have otherwise purchased. We find that new fringe benefit cars tend to be larger, heavier, and more powerful than the hypothetical new private cars that fringe benefit car recipients would have otherwise purchased, However, we also find that new fringe benefit cars sold in 2019–2020 consumed 1.2 L less fuel per 100 km compared to hypothetical new private cars, a decrease of 20 percent. The lower fuel consumption of the fringe benefit cars in these years results from a higher share of electric vehicles among them. We also find that the likelihood of the fringe benefit car being an alternative-fuelled vehicle is 6 percentage points higher than if it was bought as a private car.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 09:10:06 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2657065</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reliability Assessment for Multistate Semiconductor Global Logistics Networks with Freight Charges and Carbon Taxes Considerations</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2633765</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The semiconductor industry is highly globalized and technologically intensive, making supply chain operations critically important for global economic development and industrial stability. Semiconductor enterprises rely heavily on global logistics networks (GLNs) to ensure efficient delivery across international boundaries. Within a semiconductor GLN, the carrier capacity is often affected by bookings from other customers or operational disruptions, resulting in multiple states. Accordingly, the network can be modeled as a multistate semiconductor GLN (MSGLN). This study assesses the logistics reliability of an MSGLN under a transportation cost constraint, in which the transportation cost comprises both freight charges and carbon taxes. An algorithm based on minimal paths is developed to evaluate its reliability. The applicability of the proposed method is demonstrated through a case study that explored the impact of varying carbon tax rates, demands, budget levels, and booking lead times on logistics reliability. The proposed reliability metric offers quantitative decision support to semiconductor enterprises in supply chain risk assessment, transportation budgeting, market prioritization, and the evaluation of order-fulfillment capability, while also aligning with the climate action objectives of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 13 (SDG 13).]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 11:24:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2633765</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>