<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Union Pacific Railroad Conductor Injury, Lexington, Nebraska, June 25, 2025</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2728170</link>
      <description><![CDATA[​​On June 25, 2025, about 12:33 p.m. local time, a Union Pacific Railroad conductor was seriously injured while riding the lead tank car during a shoving movement on the industry lead track at the Chief Ethanol Fuels fac​ility in Lexington, Nebraska. The Union Pacific Railroad switching crew was in the process of shoving 25 empty rail cars into the facility when the accident occurred. The conductor was struck when the lead tank car sideswiped a stationary trackmobile fouling the industry lead track. Emergency medical responders airlifted the conductor to a hospital in Kearney, Nebraska.​​​​ ​The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the June 25, 2025, accident was the Union Pacific Railroad conductor’s failure to control the shoving movement in accordance with the General Code of Operating Rules by stopping short of an obstruction that was fouling the industry lead track and not identifying the potential hazard created by riding the lead tank car on the side passing in close proximity to equipment on an adjacent track. Contributing to the accident was the improper placement of the trackmobile by Chief Ethanol Fuels personnel beyond the clearance point, creating a close clearance hazard on the industry lead track, and the lack of standardized railroad operating rules training for those personnel.​]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 16:13:03 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2728170</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: American Auto Works Conductor Fatality, Richmond, California, April 4, 2025</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2721754</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On April 4, 2025, about 9:17 a.m. local time, a conductor was fatally injured during switching operations at the BNSF Railway Automotive Distribution Facility, located on the BNSF Stockton Subdivision in Richmond, California. The switching crew was performing a shoving movement with two locomotives and five railcars on yard track 405 when the conductor became pinned between two railcars that the switching crew was attempting to couple together. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of April 4, 2025, conductor fatality in Richmond, California, was the conductor going in between the railcars without the crew establishing proper protection. Contributing to the accident was the ineffective communication between the engineer and the conductor while performing switching operations.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 08:51:48 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2721754</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Norfolk Southern Railway Conductor Injury, Muscle Shoals, Alabama, April 9, 2025</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2704037</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On April 9, 2025, about 1:15 p.m. local time, a Norfolk Southern Railway conductor on yard job AH-01 was seriously injured while performing switching operations at Norfolk Southern Railway’s Sheffield Yard in Muscle Shoals, Alabama. The conductor was found on the ground near the north rail of track 5 in the receiving yard with severe injuries to his lower legs and feet. The Sheffield Yard supervisor called 911; emergency medical services arrived on the scene and airlifted the conductor to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Medical Center. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the April 9, 2025, Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) accident was the conductor’s noncompliance with NS’s operating rules. Contributing to the accident was NS’s inadequate oversight to validate that employees were routinely following operating rules established to promote safety while performing switching operations.​]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 09:36:41 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2704037</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: R.J. Corman Railway Group Conductor Injury, Guthrie, Kentucky, June 26, 2025</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2694404</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On June 26, 2025, about 5:00 p.m. local time, an R.J. Corman Railway Group conductor was seriously injured during a railcar switching operation at Guthrie Yard in Guthrie, Kentucky. The conductor was working with an engineer to separate a damaged railcar from a block of 13 railcars and move it onto a siding track east of the main track. During the switching operation, the conductor suffered a serious injury to his foot when he placed it between equipment to push the knuckle of a coupler into alignment. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the June 26, 2025, R.J. Corman employee injury at Guthrie Yard was the conductor circumventing established safety rules during coupling operations, resulting in the employee’s foot being crushed between two railcars. Contributing to the incident was the extreme heat, which influenced the conductor’s decision to expedite the work.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 09:06:48 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2694404</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Carolina Coastal Railway Employee Injury, Rocky Mount, North Carolina, November 19, 2024</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2636164</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On November 19, 2024, at 2:55 p.m. local time, a Carolina Coastal Railway conductor sustained serious injuries after being struck by a railcar during a switching operation on the Nash County Subdivision Main Track near Rocky Mount, North Carolina. The injured conductor was working to reposition two coupled railcars that had been gravity-dropped onto the track when the trailing railcar struck him, resulting in the amputation of his leg below the knee.​​​ The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the Rocky Mount, North Carolina, Carolina Coastal Railway conductor accident was the conductor losing his grip while attempting to apply the hand brake from an unsafe position on the railcar. Contributing to the accident were inadequate training methods that likely led the conductor to perform an unsafe gravity-drop move.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 09:44:50 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2636164</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Norfolk Southern Railway Conductor Injury, Norfolk, Virginia, July 19, 2024</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2617190</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On July 19, 2024, about 12:35 p.m. local time, a Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) conductor suffered serious injuries during a gravity-fed switching operation at Lambert’s Point Yard in Norfolk, Virginia. The accident occurred when the accident conductor—part of a crew tasked with releasing coal cars, one at a time, down a descending grade at the gravity-fed switching facility in the Barney Yard section of Lambert’s Point Yard—was struck by a coal car that had unexpectedly rolled in his direction. The coal car ran over his lower-right leg and lower-right arm, amputating both extremities.​ The National Transportation Safety Board found that the​​​ probable cause of the July 19, 2024, Norfolk Southern employee injury at the Lambert’s Point Yard was the accident conductor attempting to apply the hand brake within the track gauge while using a retracted brake stick for unknown reasons. Contributing to the accident was the accident conductor’s inadequate application of hand brakes, and failure to comply with established company rules governing track and equipment fouling.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 09:29:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2617190</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Union Pacific Railroad Conductor Struck and Killed by METRA Train, Kenosha, Wisconsin, September 4, 2024</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2617187</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On September 4, 2024, about 12:11 p.m. local time, the conductor of northbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP) train MCHAL-04 was struck and killed by southbound METRA commuter train M338 at milepost (MP) 50.57 of the UP Kenosha Subdivision near Kenosha, Wisconsin. There were no other fatalities or injuries. ​​The probable cause of the accident was the conductor of Union Pacific Railroad train MCHAL-04 being struck by METRA train M338 when fouling the adjacent track for unknown reasons. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the crew of train MCHAL-04 to conduct a comprehensive job briefing that would have alerted the conductor to the risks he was facing while in the foul of the track waiting to conduct the wheel inspection. Also contributing was the failure of the engineer and student engineer of train MCHAL-04 to maintain situational awareness of the conditions outside of the locomotive, which would have enabled them to provide warning to the conductor, via the radio, of the approaching METRA train.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 14 Nov 2025 08:43:56 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2617187</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Keeping her in her Place: Women loco-pilots negotiating masculine spatialities in Indian Railways</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2599170</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Indian Railways are known to be one of the world’s largest railway networks (Kerr 2011). Train drivers, or loco-pilots, are among the most significant workers who keep this network running. In the Indian Railways, women started entering the loco-piloting profession in the 1980 s. As many women continued to join over the decades, one of the biggest challenges they faced was adapting to infrastructures that were originally designed for male workers. Even now, be it the control room, the engine cab, or even the resting rooms and toilets, hardly any spaces crucial to the loco-pilot’s work envision women as the primary users. As a result, women’s experiences of these masculine spaces involve constant negotiation with authorities, as well as social biases, to be able to drive trains and move ahead. This gets further complicated with the extremely mobile nature of the job, wherein women are constantly expected to move through different areas, thus bringing into question how the spatiality of mobility influences and gets influenced by gender. Using data gathered through non-participant observation, in-depth interviews, and secondary literature, this paper seeks to document and present women loco-pilots’ experiences of their work spaces, in order to throw light on the gendered relationship between spatiality and mobility in the context of transport workers’ lives.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2025 16:39:15 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2599170</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: CSX Transportation Conductor Trainee Fatality, Baltimore, Maryland, June 26, 2023</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2582144</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This report discusses the June 26, 2023, fatality of a conductor trainee who was killed when he fell from an intermodal railcar during a shoving movement and was struck by the train at Seagirt Marine Terminal in Baltimore, Maryland. The safety issues identified in this report include: (1) deficient CSX Transportation operating rules for riding equipment, which did not provide adequate protection against the risk of slipping; (2) deficient CSX Transportation training on how to ride intermodal railcars; and (3) the lack of research-based federal standards for the safe use of railcar safety appliances when riding equipment. As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issues new safety recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration, CSX Transportation, and all Class I railroads.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2025 15:00:21 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2582144</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Norfolk Southern Railway Conductor Injury, August 27, 2024</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2576954</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On August 27, 2024, about 10:10 p.m. local time, a Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) conductor was seriously injured while coupling railcars at the Lambert’s Point Yard in Norfolk, Virginia. The conductor was part of a crew using locomotives to move railcars that had been gravity fed (rolled down-grade without a locomotive) into a yard track. The conductor made several attempts to couple a railcar to his train by directing the engineer in the lead locomotive to reverse short distances to bump the couplers together. During the last of these attempts, contact between the couplers caused the free-rolling railcar to travel up-grade. The conductor asked the engineer to stop the train and secure it against movement, a step normally taken before working between rail equipment. Shortly afterward, after the train itself had been secured and was not in motion, the railcar rolled back down-grade and struck the conductor. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the NS conductor being struck and injured by a railcar was his working in the path of free-rolling stock without first confirming that it was stationary or securing it against movement; NS operating rules did not explicitly instruct employees to ensure that separation was maintained on downhill grades by securing railcars against movement, and the rules' incomplete coverage of switching operations on a downhill grade reduced the conductor's ability to perform his duties safely.​​]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2025 08:53:17 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2576954</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Railroad Investigation Report: Union Pacific Railroad Train Collision and Conductor Fatality, Melrose Park, Illinois, July 6, 2024</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2571872</link>
      <description><![CDATA[On July 6, 2024, about 1:36 a.m. local time, a Union Pacific Railroad (UP) conductor was killed in a raking collision while protecting a shoving movement at UP’s Proviso Yard in Melrose Park, Illinois. At the time of the accident, eastbound train MPRNL-06 was traveling along the South Melrose Track out of Proviso Yard 4. At the same time, train MCBCH-05 was shoving west on the City Lead Track, which merges with South Melrose Track. The conductor of train MCBCH-05 was positioned on the leading end of a tank car when it struck the right side of train MPRNL-06.​ The National Transportation Safety Board  (NTSB) ​​determined that the probable cause of the Union Pacific Railroad train collision was the conductor, who Union Pacific Railroad sent into the field without performance-based verification that he could safely navigate the territory, not alerting the engineer to stop the train before reaching the designated stopping point. Contributing to the accident was Union Pacific Railroad’s failure to provide the required and requested assistance to the inexperienced conductor who was not familiar with the territory. Further contributing to the accident was the striking train crew proceeding with riding the shoving movement after being informed by the yard controller that no additional support would be provided.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2025 08:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2571872</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Weekly crew scheduling for freight rail engineers: A network approach</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2531098</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Freight rail engineers and conductors have long faced unpredictable and inflexible work schedules, leading to on-the-job fatigue, compromised safety, and poor work-life balance. This paper aims to construct robust weekly schedules for these crew members to alleviate the pressures associated with irregular and unpredictable work hours. The scheduling problem is formulated as a multi-commodity network flow problem on a directed time-space graph. Both two-city and three-city districts are addressed. To account for the variability in travel times, a set of scenarios is defined in which demand is increased by up to 20% to build slack into the schedules. The results are validated using Monte Carlo simulation where 100 random weekly instances are generated for each city pair and key performance metrics assessed. Major findings show that (i) optimal weekly schedules can be constructed in minutes for engineers in crew districts with two cities, and in several hours for engineers in crew districts with three cities, (ii) different percentages of demand increase significantly affect the degree of robustness, and (iii) forming crew districts with three cities rather than two gives better results in terms of required number of engineers and trip coverage rates.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 2025 16:16:12 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2531098</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Safety and Reliability Evaluation of Vision for Train Drivers</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2263975</link>
      <description><![CDATA[In this research, 358 subjects were selected to study the correlation between the dynamic vision and the safety of train drivers. The result shows that the dynamic vision is significantly different, while the static one is similar. Being an essential index to train driver, the safe limit value of dynamic vision should be no less than 0.5. Furthermore, the evaluation and measurement on vision is put forward in the paper. Additionally, another emphasis is how to determine the detection method and the evaluation system of the dynamic visual ability, when it corresponds to railway transportation safety management regulation.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jan 2025 10:14:10 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2263975</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The use of human senses by train drivers to detect abnormalities</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2314848</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Driverless and unattended train operation is a foreseeable future. While many functions of the driver can be automatized and replaced but detecting abnormalities is more difficult to automate. This study investigates how train drivers detect abnormalities. The objective is to prepare the way for unattended train operation also for remote areas. Using disruption descriptions, written by train dispatchers, we have identified which senses are used by the train drivers and in which situations. Four of the human senses are used by train drivers to detect abnormalities: the visual, the auditory, the somatosensory, and the olfactory systems. The most used sense by the train drivers to detect abnormalities is the visual system. Before introducing driverless and unattended train operation, alternative tools for detecting abnormalities should be included based on the human senses.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2024 15:18:33 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2314848</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Issues with Voluntary Reporting by Train Drivers and Their Impact on the Railway</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2287591</link>
      <description><![CDATA[For organisations to take preventive measures and eliminate potential accidents, the information gained through voluntary reporting is essential. Employees do not, however, report voluntarily for a number of reasons. In this study, we examine why train drivers, who are vital to maintaining rail safety, fail to report hazardous occurrences, leading to employee silence. The measurement tool, which has already been developed specifically for aviation employees, has been applied to 346 train drivers working on Turkish Railways. The scale used for research purposes has proven to be valid and reliable for organisations involved in railways. As a result, it was determined that the drivers did not participate in voluntary reporting due to relational and prosocial, disengaged, quiescence and acquiescence and fear and defensive factors. The highest score for the reasons for non-reporting was observed in the dimension of quiescence and acquiescence. The results of the correlation analysis between dimensions, which are assumed to be the reasons for non-reporting, point to strong positive relationships between each dimension.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2024 16:14:05 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2287591</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>