<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="https://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Transport Research International Documentation (TRID)</title>
    <link>https://trid.trb.org/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://trid.trb.org/Record/RSS?s=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" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description></description>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <copyright>Copyright © 2026. National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.</copyright>
    <docs>http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss</docs>
    <managingEditor>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</managingEditor>
    <webMaster>tris-trb@nas.edu (Bill McLeod)</webMaster>
    
    <item>
      <title>Fixing the time trap: fair PPP concession renegotiation via asset valuation and traffic regression</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2643212</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Infrastructure development is paramount for economic growth and improved quality of life. However, constrained government budgets often impede the ability to meet escalating infrastructure demands solely through public funding. To overcome these fiscal limitations, public‐private partnership (PPP) arrangements have been widely adopted globally as an alternative financing model. While numerous PPP projects have yielded positive outcomes, persistent challenges remain—particularly in the long-term management of concession agreements over extended project lifespans. A pervasive issue is the frequent renegotiation of PPP contracts, often resulting in imbalances in safeguarding the interests of private investors, public authorities, and taxpayers. A critical limitation of current practice is the absence of a clear, objective methodology for determining concession periods during such renegotiations. This study addresses this gap by introducing a novel model for recalibrating concession durations, leveraging residual asset valuation and traffic volume forecasting via regression analysis as key determinants. By quantifying residual infrastructure asset value and forecasting traffic patterns, the proposed model establishes a more transparent and equitable foundation for concession period renegotiations. This approach is expected to mitigate conflicts, strengthen stakeholder trust, and ensure a more balanced distribution of benefits throughout the PPP project lifecycle.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 15:50:27 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2643212</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cooperative Strategy for Airline Code-Share Agreements – a Comparative Analysis</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2400098</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Members of marketing airline alliances cooperatively book seats from the operating airline and compete with each other in the market. This paper models and discusses two types of bargaining pricing processes: representative-based and agent-based cooperative bargaining. It also considers the internal negotiation mechanism within the marketing airline alliance for representative-based bargaining. Using a cooperative bargaining approach, the effects of marketing airline mergers in code-share agreements with the operating airline are analysed. The performance of two sub-strategies under representative-based bargaining is compared with the non-cooperative case. The study concludes that representative-based bargaining without internal negotiation intensifies competition, while representative-based bargaining with internal negotiation has the opposite effect. Cooperative bargaining with internal negotiation benefits both the marketing airlines and the operating airline, whereas representative-based bargaining without internal negotiation may result in a total profit loss. The choice of which bargaining strategy to adopt depends on the bargaining power and the substitutability of different market airline brands. This research provides the basis and support for the formulation of pricing strategies in airline alliances' code-sharing.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 11:36:10 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2400098</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The electric vehicle as organisational alibi: the cases of Stellantis Vigo, VW Navarra and SEAT Martorell</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/2377980</link>
      <description><![CDATA[All around the world, the automotive industry is undergoing profound transformations that are affecting the living and labour conditions of thousands of workers throughout the sector. One hegemonic rationale offered to explain (and thereby justify) these changes is the sector's ongoing process of decarbonisation - its attempt at addressing both climate change and the depletion of oil reserves - and the central element in that process has been the transition to electric vehicles. This article presents the hypothesis that the possible paths to decarbonisation are not one but many, as indicated by the different profitability strategies currently being pursued in the manufacture of electric vehicles. Nevertheless, the goal of decarbonisation has sometimes served as an ideological alibi for the imposition of certain systems of organisation of production over others, especially at plants in semi-peripheral European regions (such as Spain). The success of such technological determinism will ultimately depend on the local culture of collective bargaining and the capacity of workers to resist unsatisfactory conditions.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2024 17:43:30 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/2377980</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Good Staff Scheduling and Rostering Practices in Transport: Final Report</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1891340</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The objective of this study is to identify good staff scheduling and rostering practices in the transport sector and make practical recommendations on how rostering systems can be improved. This study was carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic. While it acknowledges the overall impact of this, it does not specifically focus on how this affected rosters and staff scheduling. The methodology for the study includes literature review, stakeholder interviews and surveys of social partners, companies and workers. The study developed a typology of different sources of staff scheduling and rostering practice consisting of four types: based on social dialogue, collective agreements and co-determination; driven by collective agreements at a range of levels; state-centred with influence of collective agreements; and with little influence of collective bargaining but some company-level worker representation and participation. Within this framework, the study collected 41 current practices and clustered them according to specific type of practice. Following the critical appraisal of these practices, eight systems were selected as good practices, based on their sustainability, scalability and transferability. On the basis of the lessons learnt from these practices, the study then makes a number of practical recommendations to the European Commission, the EU-level social partners, national governments, national social partners, employers and employers’ organisations and workers and workers’ representatives on how to improve current arrangements in order to benefit companies and improve the work-life balance of workers.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Nov 2021 15:19:28 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1891340</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agreement Between the National Air Traffic Controllers Association AFL/CIO and the Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1853562</link>
      <description><![CDATA[The parties agree that air traffic controllers serve in a unique, complex and safety critical occupation. This collective bargaining agreement is designed to improve working conditions for air traffic controllers, facilitate the amicable resolution of disputes between the Parties and contribute to the growth, efficiency and prosperity of the safest and most effective air traffic control system in the world.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Nov 2021 11:46:56 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1853562</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Teamsters promote tentative UPS deal; some members raise doubts on details</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1586522</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2019 16:20:19 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1586522</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ryanair in balancing act of labor piece vs. costs : more strikes could disrupt peak-season operations; business model also hinges on high degree of flexibility, which labor rejects</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1585794</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2019 15:17:21 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1585794</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>YRC, Holland, New Penn open contract talks with Teamsters</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1584306</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2019 15:58:39 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1584306</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UPS, Teamsters bargain amid threat of strike</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1522279</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Jul 2018 12:20:54 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1522279</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UPS, flight workers' union at odds over labor deal</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1510867</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2018 16:44:54 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1510867</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>War and (labor) peace : how the Ninth Circuit changed the rules of engagement for service providers and organized labor</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1510772</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2018 16:42:17 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1510772</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1508542</link>
      <description><![CDATA[This paper studies the behavior of the national air traffic control (ATC) centers in the EU as it relates to bargaining between a union and government. The authors analyze wage formation, the reactions of ATC's to a price-cap, the slow adoption of new technologies, the reluctance to vertically disintegrate, the slow standardization, and the failures of mergers of neighboring ATC's. The theory is illustrated by using estimated union preference parameters and bargaining power parameters for the government. The authors find that bargaining power and union preferences vary greatly by country.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2018 17:20:46 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1508542</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unions tell Ryanair to start negotiating : joint letter sets out demands for uniform pilot pay rises and urges carrier to make "credible" steps towards recognition</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1507159</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 02 Apr 2018 11:28:34 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1507159</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UPS seeks 'flexibility' in new contract as labor talks begin with Teamsters</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1504427</link>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Mar 2018 09:40:40 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1504427</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Disruption gives way to dialogue</title>
      <link>https://trid.trb.org/View/1501285</link>
      <description><![CDATA[Spain's docker dispute has had a broader impact on European ports as one industry body encouraged wider strikes and stepped back from social dialogue. But talks look set to resume, reports Andrew Spurrier.]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 05 Feb 2018 15:51:26 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://trid.trb.org/View/1501285</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>