A GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MERGING-GIVEWAY INTERACTION: A JOINT ESTIMATION MODEL

This study's focus is on the equilibrium selection in case there exists multiple equilibria. Proposed is a method to estimate the probabilities of equilibrium selection as well as payoff functions of the players. The paper presents a case study that used a set of observation data about merging-giveaway behavior at on-ramp merging sections through which the proposed model could properly estimate the probability of equilibrium selection.

Language

  • English

Media Info

  • Features: Figures; References; Tables;
  • Pagination: p. 503-518

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 00929750
  • Record Type: Publication
  • ISBN: 0080439268
  • Files: TRIS
  • Created Date: Aug 5 2002 12:00AM