Private Road Competition and Equilibrium with Traffic Equilibrium Constraints

Toll road competition is among the most important issues under a build-operate-transfer scheme, which is being encountered nowadays in many cities. When there are 2 or more competing firms and each operates a competitive toll road, their profits are interrelated due to the competitors' choices and demand inter-dependence in the network. In this paper the authors develop game-theoretic approaches to the study of the road network, on which multiple toll roads are operated by competitive private firms. The strategic interactions and market equilibria among the private firms are analyzed both in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. The toll road competition problems in general traffic equilibrium networks are formulated as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints or bi-level variational inequalities. Heuristic solution methods are proposed and their convergences are demonstrated with simple network examples. It is shown that private pricing and competition can be both profitable and welfare-improving.

  • Availability:
  • Authors:
    • Yang, Hai
    • Xiao, Feng
    • Huang, Haijun
  • Publication Date: 2009

Language

  • English

Media Info

Subject/Index Terms

Filing Info

  • Accession Number: 01117632
  • Record Type: Publication
  • Files: TRIS, ATRI
  • Created Date: Dec 30 2008 12:32PM